Jihad and the State in Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan

Aisha Younus, School of Politics and International Relations, College of Arts and Social Sciences, The Australian National University

Abstract
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan have become an epicenter of jihadi militant activity (holy war). The dominant perspective states that the Pakistani state is responsible for creating jihadis in FATA. This perspective, as the only explanation, will be challenged. While addressing one major question, namely, what has been the role of the state of Pakistan in creating jihadi militants in FATA, it will be argued that the inhabitants of FATA, Pakhtun tribesmen, have a strong jihadi tradition, well entrenched in their history and culture. This study will be structured as a historical analysis aimed at understanding Pakhtun culture to explain their jihadi militant outlook.

Introduction
In this paper, I aim at enlarging our understanding of the ongoing militant upsurge in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA] of Pakistan in the post-9/11 period. After the American-led ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan, most of Taliban and trans-national jihadis (from Al-Qaeda and Central Asia) took refuge, across Durand Line, in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Later, by re-organizing and re-structuring themselves, these militants initiated their struggle against the presence of foreign troops, comprised of the United States and its Western allies, in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas became a hub of militant activity in a war on terror; FATA was soon regarded as the most dangerous place in the world. Since the U.S. and Pakistan were allies in the war on terror in Afghanistan, Pakistan was pressured to take military action against militants who were using FATA as a sanctuary in launching operations against international forces in Afghanistan. The FATA tribesmen, due to religious and ethnic associations, not only supported Taliban, but, by forming Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan [TTP], a Pakistani Taliban movement, initiated a militant struggle against the Pakistani state. Therefore, in this paper, I will be addressing the following major questions: why has there been an upsurge of militancy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan in the post-9/11 period? What is the relevance of the tribal jihadi tradition in understanding their ongoing militant posture?

After joining the international coalition against terrorism, Pakistan became a direct player as well as a victim in the war on terrorism. The decision makers in Islamabad, though accepting most of the U.S. demands, had a tacit understanding that they would stay neutral in the war on terror; they would neither participate in military operations nor provide their land for any such activity. Evidently, Taliban’s...
support in tribal areas was exceptionally high due to close ethnic and religious associations between Pakhtuns across the Durand Line. A tribal lashkar of ten thousand Pakhtuns, under the leadership of Sufi Muhammad, the founder of Tehrik-i-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), movement for the enforcement of Islamic law, was mobilized to conduct jihad against the U.S. led international forces in Afghanistan in 2001. As a result, “thousands of Pakistani tribesmen were killed or captured.” The rest of them returned home wounded, but resolved to revenge (badal) those lost. After the fall of Taliban, “between eight thousand and twelve thousand Taliban, or 20 percent of their total force, had been killed with twice that number wounded and seven thousand taken prisoner. Those remaining fled to their home villages or Pakistan.” Moreover, “between six hundred and eight hundred Arabs were escorted out of Tora Bora...Bin Laden and a few body guards escaped on horseback into Parachinar,” the Kurram Agency in Pakistan. Consequently, the scope of war on terror was extended and the Pakistan army launched military operations in search of foreign militants in FATA. Due to these operations, Islamabad had to bear severe human and financial loss. According to a report, Pakistan lost a total of 49,000 lives since the September 11, 2001 event in the U.S. Since 2007, 15,681 armed personnel, 5,152 civilians (in terrorist attacks and bomb blasts), and more than 200 members of tribal peace committees, or lashkars, including volunteers and chieftains, were killed. Moreover, by extending aggressive propaganda against the West and the U.S., militants were trained, in training camps based in Tribal Areas, to conduct terrorist attacks all over the world. The ongoing militancy in FATA therefore became a threat to Pakistan as well as to global peace and security. This situation requires a profound study of the nature of ongoing militancy in Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

Literature Review and Main Argument

In the existing literature, a number of explanations exist on the subject.

Explanation One

Many studies have regarded the Pakistani state’s negligence in uplifting socio-economic conditions as a primary factor of militancy in FATA. It has been argued that the poor, uneducated Pakhtun society of FATA, “with few other employment prospects,” became a primary recruit for Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Poverty has contributed towards the creation of an “enabling environment” that

...demolishing bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network. For Reference see Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (Free Press, 2006), 204-05.

5 The TNSM was emerged as an indigenous movement for the implementation of sharia in Malakand District of the Khyber Pakhtukha Province of Pakistan during 1980s.


7 Ibid., 96.

8 Ibid., 98-99.

9 Mudassir Raja, "Pakistani Victims: War on Terror Toll Put at 49,000," The Express Tribune March 27, 2013.

10 Ibid.


encouraged militancy. This proposition has significance in explaining militant attitudes in an underdeveloped and uneducated tribal society. Nevertheless, it does not explain how militancy has been restricted to Pakhtuns with minimal or no impact on other non-Pakhtun tribes inhabited in the same border area. Moreover, the existence of various Pakhtun tribal lashkars, volunteer tribal forces formed to fight against militants, suggest that that all Pakhtun tribes are not militants. This observation regarding poverty, as a pre-requisite of militancy, is therefore questionable; an investigation of other factors is required in order to account for the militant upsurge in FATA.

**Explanation Two**

This perspective on the subject suggests that the Pakistani state contributed towards militarization of FATA in three phases. During the first phase, Islamabad trained and equipped many tribal lashkars, the volunteer fighters, to fight against the Indian troops inside Kashmir during 1947-48. This explanation, however does not acknowledge that the tribal jihadi movement during the first India-Pakistan war (1947-48) was a volunteer Pakhtun tribal uprising, induced by their associations with Islam and Kashmiri Muslims, across Durand Line.

During the second phase, Islamabad supported Afghan mujahideen against the Afghan President Daud’s alleged support of the secessionist forces of Pakhtunistan during the early 1970s. For this purpose, Islamabad trained “around 5,000 Afghan Islamists opposed to the Daud’s regime” during 1973 and 1977. Moreover, they were provided “basic infantry weapons…[and] some specialized training in how to conduct guerilla warfare under an SSG team [from the Pakistan army].” These studies do not take into account the indigenous factors, socio-cultural and political, that contributed towards the emergence of the Afghan resistance movement during 1963-73. Moreover, Islamabad completely abandoned supporting Afghan mujahedeen after concluding an agreement of non-interference with the Afghan President Daud in 1976.

In the third phase, the Pakistani state, with extensive financial, diplomatic and logistical support from the United States and Saudi Arabia, created a trans-national jihadi force to expel the Soviet troops from Afghanistan during 1979-1988. For this purpose, 3,500 transnational jihadists from all over the world, including Osama bin Laden and his mentor Abdullah Azzam, came to Peshwar, the city of Khyber

---

15 Shinwari, "Understanding Fata: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion and Society in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas ", 41.
18 Pakhtunistan is based on an idea of the independent state for Pakhtuns across Durand Line.
19 Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2005), 80.
20 "Babar the Great": An Extensive Interview with One of Pakistan’s Real Warriors, Maj Gen (Retd) Naseerullah Khan Babar, 2001.
Pakhtunkha, to support the Afghan mujahideen.\(^{23}\) Also a number of madaris, religious schools, were established to create a “belt of religiously motivated students who could assist Afghan mujahideen to evict the Soviets from Afghanistan.”\(^{24}\) The construction of jihadi madaris and congregation of global jihadis eventually led towards the radicalization of tribal areas.\(^{25}\) After the Soviet withdrawal, these madaris were re-oriented towards Kashmir jihad and for the support of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Consequently, a majority of the Taliban Ministers not only graduated from madaris on the Pakistani side of the border, but madrasa students also became the primary supporters of Taliban.\(^{26}\) Islamabad’s relentless support to Taliban thus exposed tribal areas to an excessive Taliban’s influence.\(^{27}\) Inspired by the success of Taliban’s Islam in Afghanistan, tribesmen also demanded the implementation of sharia and initiated proto-Taliban type activities in the Pakhtun belt in 1999.\(^{28}\) This thesis has a strong explanatory value and is regarded as the dominant perspective on the subject. It suggests that the militant upsurge in FATA is a consequence of Islamabad’s policies, induced by national, regional and global compulsions. The relevance of non-state jihadi militants as a factor in Pakistan’s security policy has been acknowledged by a number of studies on the subject.\(^{29}\) However, during the Afghan Jihad (1979-1988), the Pakistani state was fighting a global war against communism with an alleged support from the International community. Also, the role of Islamabad, and international jihadis as “soldiers of God” was eulogized globally.\(^{30}\) With reference to madrasa based radicalization in FATA, studies suggest that “contrary to popular belief, madaris are not categorically tied to militancy.”\(^{31}\) “Only suicide bombers are the main recruits from madaris, since they tend to be impoverished, extremely young (15 years of age and sometimes younger), impressionable, poorly trained, and with little or no education.”\(^{32}\) In fact, “the militant recruitment to the Jihadi organizations comes from religious gatherings in and outside the mosque [forty four percent], social network of family and friends [forty two percent], and madrasa and schools [twenty six].”\(^{33}\) Even if, one agrees to the substantive role of Islamabad in radicalization of FATA, this observation does not explain why the state itself became a victim/target of militancy in the post-9/11 period.

The basic purpose of this paper is not to disqualify all of the above explanations. Instead, the idea is to highlight the fact that existing explanations only describe part of the reality about the ongoing


\(^{24}\) Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror, 114.


\(^{29}\) Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror. Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Carnegie Endowment, 2010).

\(^{30}\) Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror, 114.


\(^{33}\) Ibid., 59.
militancy in FATA. The situation in FATA is complex and requires a holistic understanding of the situation. Therefore, in this paper I will argue that in conjunction with all of the above explanations, one has to take into account the Pakhtun tradition of jihad to understand the ongoing tribal upsurge in FATA. This approach will help in understanding Pakhtun jihadi posture within its socio-cultural and religious context. Therefore, a historical analysis of the Pakhtun jihadi tradition from the British-India period till today will be the main objective of this paper.

For this study, data has been collected through interviews; personal communications with scholars, academicians, officials from the Pakistan army, and the former state officials. Along with archival research, material is gathered from books and journals [international and national], reports from various national and international think tanks; national newspapers (the News, Dawn, Daily Times), and official reports and analyses from the Federal and the Provincial Governments of Pakistan. I have divided this study into two sections. In the first section, I will explain the Pakhtun area, its people, culture and their associations with Islam and jihad. In section two, I will be discussing the tribal jihadi tradition in order to evaluate its relevance for the ongoing militancy in FATA.

I- FATA: Area and its People

FATA is comprised of an area of 27,500 square Kilometers that forms a 1,200 kilometer wedge between southern Afghanistan and settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, previously known as the North Western Frontier Province. On three sides, FATA is bordered by settled districts of Pakistan, while the Durand Line, on the western side, forms the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It consists of seven political agencies and six smaller zones, known as ‘frontier regions’ that separate tribal agencies from the rest of the country. The seven agencies of FATA: Bajur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North and South Waziristan are home to Tarkalani, Mohamand, Afridi, Orakzai, Turi, Uthmanzai Wazir—Mahsud and Ahmedzai Wazir tribes respectively. Towards the east, six continuous zones or ‘Frontier Regions’ to FATA [FR Peshawar, FR Kohat, FR Tank, FR Bannu, FR Lakki, and FR Dera Ismail Khan] fall under the Jurisdiction of the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. According to the 1998 national census, Tribal Areas are home to almost 3.2 million Pakhtuns along with some 1.5 million refugees from Afghanistan. Also, with distinct languages and dozens of sub-dialects, non-Pakhtun tribes of Baluchis, Ketrans, Nuristan, Brahui, Munjis, Chitralis, Shinas, Gujaris, Hazaras, Kowars, Savis, Tajiks, Hindkosh, Dameli, Kalamis, Urmurs, Wahkis, the Gawar-Batis, Badesh, Khirgiz, and Burushos dwell in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. Overall, the Pakhtun’s habitat of about 15-25 million is divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Durand and administrative lines therefore not only violate ethnic considerations but also create an artificial and fixed tribal limit in contradiction to tribal “migratory and nomadic practices”—living on one side for few months before moving to the other for the

35 Nawaz, “Fata— a Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” 2.
36 Ibid., 1.
38 For the purpose of this study, a Pakhtun is defined as the one who can trace his lineage through the father’s line to one of the Pakhtun tribes, and in turn to the apical ancestors irrespective of speaking Pakhtu or living in Pakhtun areas. For reference see Akbar S. Ahmed, "Pakhtun Economy and Society: Traditional Structure and Economic Development in a Tribal Society," (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 84.
rest of the year. Nevertheless, Pakhtuns, by sharing a common language, history and culture, not only associate with each other, but create a very strong bondage across the Durand Line.

Understanding Pakhtun’s Muslimness

The overarching principles of Pakhtunwali and Islam, though they are apparently different, sync well in Pakhtun society. The Pakhtuns, who are known as warlike and rapacious, are socially bound to follow the Pakhtun code of honour: Pakhtunwali. The three principles: melmastia, badal, and nanwatee, form integral features of Pakhtun society. The first trait, melmastia or hospitality, denotes that if someone seeks protection, a Pathan is bound to provide it, even if he is an enemy. Another principle is Badal or revenge. The tradition of revenge is not directed merely against the individual, but against the whole clan, leading towards “blood-feuds” that may end up in elimination of whole families or small tribes. The third facet is Nanwatee or surrender, ‘going in’ or a ‘giving in’ to an enemy. This custom carries with it “a connotation of great shame for the one who undertakes it and no obligation to accept it on the part of the one to whom it is offered.” Based on these cultural institutions, Pakhtunwali is the ordering principle in an otherwise anarchic Pakhtun society. Along with Pakhtunwali, the “Pakhtun social world, its mores, and norms, the symbols of its society, are embodied in and often identical to those of the wider world of Islam.” A Pakhtun is thus positioned as Muslim and Pakhtun in society since his birth and no one can deny him these rights. Islam therefore holds a substantial role and position in Pakhtun society.

The Pakhtuns have primordial associations with religion and generally follow the Sunni interpretation of Islam. There are two defining principles of Pakhtun’s Islam. The first, primordial one, demands a firm faith in the oneness of God and the Prophethood of Prophet Muhammad. The Pakhtun “accepts religion without doubts or questions… feels close affinity to God that needs no translation and interpretation….. obedience and submission; total loyalty of his will to the infinite power of the Almighty, that is all that is required of him and that is what he gives willingly.” Similarly, the Prophet is crucial to the discussion of tribal Islam as Pakhtuns regarded him as “a kind of tribal chief par excellence.” Moreover, the claims of the conversion of tribal ancestors towards Islam by the Prophet himself assign them a higher social status. Despite this, “Islam is alive in tribal society not through the memory of teachings of great scholars or saints or their shrines but is part of everyday tribal lore and common descent memory.” Also, it “did not comport with formal orthodox Islam, which is based on holy text and relies on learned scholars with a capacity for research and debate to interpret its fine points.” Deviances from Islam, taking of interest for loans or not allowing women their right, are

39 Cuthbert Collin Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908, with a Survey of Policy since 1849 (Curzon Press, 1975), 57.
42 James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland (Hague: Mount and Co., 1963), 64.
43 Ibid., 66.
45 Ibid., 313.
46 Ibid., 313.
accepted honestly and justified as “Pakhto riwaj (custom) as if by such an explanation the guilt would be extenuated or even exculpated.” Nevertheless, Pakhtuns rely more on Islamic symbols and practice them vehemently as a manifestation of their Muslimness.

Islamic practice based on rituals/symbols forms the second integral part of Pakhtun’s Islam. By placing a lot of emphasis on symbols, Pakhtuns accept Islam not as a theology but as a cultural system. They do not treat symbols as “ritual or religious nor seen as such but signify continuing social tradition….a symbol… acquires a religious significance by its repeated usage and invocation of its derivation from the times of the prophet. These symbols maintain the sanctity in the eyes of the social actor because of their association with the Prophet.” Examples are: growing a beard, dying beard with red henna, treating a fig as a fruit of heaven and the sanctity attached to its branches. Also, the other symbols; four pillars of Islam (Prayers, Fasting, Zakat; Islamic tax paid annually, and Hajj; pilgrimage, are observed religiously. The concept of jihad, though, is not a pillar of Islam, but Pakhtuns attach great value to it—as a true representation of their great martial tradition and an expression of their enthusiasm for Islam. The Pakhtuns are great warriors, continuously engaged in warfare either with each other, or with external enemies—“except at the times of sowing and of harvest.” However, “the unbridled fighting spirit of young men has to be directed to reason and responsibility, and this is where Islam [jihad] comes in.” Therefore, jihad provides legitimacy, as just war, to Pakhtun’s warring expeditions induced by various political and material considerations.

II- Jihadi Tradition: A Continuation?

The concept of jihad has been understood in its different variants as striving in the way of God, against evil instincts, and for self-defense. Nevertheless, there have been differences of opinion concerning the ‘means’ for conducting jihad in the classic Islamic theologians, jurists, and traditionalists who have, largely, understood jihad in terms of military action. By declaring Islamic territory as Dar-ul-Islam; land of peace, Muslims waged an armed struggle in the land of war, Dar-ul-Harb. Nevertheless, “instead of debating whether jihad is primarily warfare or a spiritual struggle, it is intellectually more challenging to contend with its multiple meanings in Muslim thought and practice.” Starting from Ibn-e-Tammiyah (1263-1328), Hassan Al Banna (1906-1949), Mawlana Abul Hassan Maududi (1903-1979), and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), jihad has become an active struggle against the non-Islamic practices and policies of the so called secular Muslim rulers. Instead of modernity, following the true teachings of Aslaf (Prophet Muhammad and four Muslim Caliphs of the first classical period) has been projected as the only guarantor of Muslim’s glory in this world. And to achieve this objective, jihad against the West and its

53 Ibid., 327-28.
54 Ibid., 312, 14.
protégés, the pro-Western Muslim rulers, has become imperative for Muslims. The Pakhtun jihadi outlook has also been influenced by such interpretations prevalent in the larger Islamic world.

The Pakhtun’s jihadi tradition was influenced by the philosophy of seventeenth century Muslim scholar Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi, also known as Mujadid Alf Sani (1564-1624), and his disciple Shah Wali Ullah (1703-1762). The message of Mujadid focused on social reform by implementing the ideals of Islam: *sharia*, in the daily lives of a Muslim. The basic objective behind such an implementation was to recourse back to original teachings of the text, Qur’an and Sunnah, in order to purify Islam from *bidat*; new practices in the religion. This orthodox interpretation of Islam and the movement of religious revivalism, carried forward by Syed Ahmed Bareilly who brought these beliefs into action through jihad. By declaring the British territory as *Dar-ul-Harb*, he started his struggle by waging war against Sikhs at Peshawar in 1826. The war was a success as Bareilly seized the Peshawar city, but outside the battle field, “the war was waxed and waned…was deeply involved with the tribal politics of the frontier.” In 1831, Bareilly was martyred along with comrades, but some of his followers were successful in taking refuge in mountains to relive his ideology. Moreover, his war-time alliance with Abdul Ghaffur facilitated in transmitting his ideals to the tribal society.

Akhund Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1793-1878), known as Saidu Baba, was a venerated religious leader from Swat valley, with a huge following in tribal areas. He carried forward Bareilly’s message of jihad by transmitting it through an already exiting spiritual mechanism of “*pirimuridi*, a chain of transmission of knowledge from spiritual-religious instructor, the *pir*, to his devotees, the *murids*”, and also “brought commonality of purpose and self-representation to an otherwise highly differentiated groups of leaders.” His message was manifestly expressed through his support to the Afghan Amir, Dost Muhammad, during jihad against Sikhs in 1835. After his death, his disciple Hadda Mulla initiated a struggle against the British forces in 1893. Since he was “an enemy of the *kafir*, [non-Muslim] hence some—rather all his *murids* were enemies of the *farangi*.” After his death, Fazal Wahid (1842-1937) from Uthmanzai tribe, commonly known as Haji Sahib Turangzai, undertook responsibility to continue with the mission of Bareilly of “promoting revivalism and opposition to the British.” Later, by associating with the larger idea of Yaghistan, propagated by Deobandi Jamaat-i-Mujahideen movement, Turangzai extended the scope of tribal jihad to the entire Frontier. During this time, Mullah Powinda,

---

64 Jones, *Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India*, 55.
66 During sixteenth century, Yusufzai *pirs* migrated to the then Pakhtun areas (Swat, Bajur and Peshawar Valley) and settled here. Evidently, the Mughal rulers took advantage of the organisation of society around these *pirs*, and the vested authority in them. They gave them patronage (paying allowances to *pirs* in return of their loyalty to the Mughal Empire) to control the otherwise outlawing and politically volatile Pakhtun areas.
67 Ibid., 47, 48.
68 *Farangi* was a slang word used for the British in the Indian subcontinent.
69 Ibid., 55.
70 This movement was aimed at Indian independence through Jihad, to be started from the free tribal areas as projected by Maulana Mahmudul Hassan, a Deobandi religious leader. He stated that “without violence…..evicting
known as Marobi ShabiKhel Alizai Mahsud, named as Mohiuddin, not religiously trained but familiar with the basic teachings of Islam, emerged as a priest-cum-politician who successfully extended his influence all over Waziristan. He was engaged in plotting and carrying out numerous attacks against British forces and vehemently propagating jihad against them. Being “a self-ordained religious figure, he led a large militia force, “sustained by foreign funds.” Despite his failure to create a united front against the British, by forging unity between tribal agnatic rivals, Mahsuds and Wazirs, his message of holding “their nationality intact,” to “allow neither the British Government nor the Amir to encroach upon their country, to compose their internal differences…to give up raiding, so as to deprive Government of a convenient excuse for occupying Mahsud country,” remained alive even after his death. The tradition of religiously motivated mulla expeditions was carried forward by Haji Mirza Ali Khan (1897-1960), known as Fakir of Ipi, from Waziristan. The Fakir’s lashkar, even though it achieved “quite a few stunning successes by blocking British lines of communication,” failed to achieve its objective “due to the inability of the tribes to combine their considerable fighting power in any common cause under a unified command.” Nevertheless, Fakir of Ipi emerged as a symbol of anti-imperialist struggle against the British. During the World War-II, he was offered money and weaponry by the axis powers; mainly Italy, to intensify tribal uprisings against the British. In the nutshell, mulla-led jihad against the Indian British Empire was inspired by Indian Muslim nationalism and religious revivalism. However, in the context of tribal society, jihad became a symbol of safe-guarding tribal autonomy and independent way of living from the un-Islamic Western influences represented by the British.

During expeditions against the British, mulla, emerged as the commander, religious master and mobilizer using Islam primarily as a shield to carry out his political objectives. His influence, though time and personality oriented, could be driven or modified by rewards and subsidies, but his idea of jihad had great following among Pakhtuns; he used to quote Quranic verses for jihad to mobilize tribesmen against the British. Pakhtuns, though, by virtue of their ethnic diversity, are subject to “paradoxes”—neither subjected to any rule nor united in themselves, but for the cause of Islam, and in the presence of a

the angrez from Hindustan was impossible. For this [violent eviction of the angrez] a centre, weapons and mjahideen were necessary. Hence it was thought that arrangements for weapons and recruitment of soldiers should be conducted in the ‘area of the free tribes’, Yaghistan.” Haji Turangzai not only supported this cause but also created a link between Deobandi ulema and mullas, belonging to the same chain, silsila, of mullas dating back to Mulla Hadda. After helping in settling Deobandi mujahideen in tribal areas, Haji Turangzai was designated as the head of Jamaat, a commanding authority to lead jihadi activities in tribal areas. Along with Haji sahib, Mulla Chaknawar in Mohamand, Mulla Sandaki and Mulla Babra in Swat and Bajaur, Mulla Sayyid Akbar, Mulla Mahmud Akhunzada among the Afridis, were also assisting in spreading the message of jihad. Therefore, during the third Anglo-Afghan war (1919), three hundred jihadis sworn in to fight under the leadership of Mulla Chaknawar, as an additional force to the Afghan Amir against British. For Reference, see ibid., 93, 95-96, 98, 100.


71 Evelyn Howell, Mizh: A Monograph on Government's Relations with the Mahsud Tribe (Oxford University Press, 1979), 60.


73 Ibid., 199.

common enemy under leadership of a mulla.\textsuperscript{75} Therefore, Pakhtun’s “uncompromising devotion to Islamic cause, as interpreted by mulla, and consequently its militant expression provided the British with a prototype of what became popular as the fanatically mad mullah or the mad fakir.”\textsuperscript{76} Nevertheless, “the role of the mullah is negligible when the invading army is Muslim. In such a situation an ambiguity is inherent in the conflict, since Jihad cannot be invoked against Muslims. When the Pakhtun tribes fought Mughal armies representing a Muslim dynasty, they were led by traditional tribal leaders rather than by mullas.”\textsuperscript{77} Therefore, “the raison d’être for invasion, the rationale, the obviously rallying point, the logic, that is the religious motive, was abruptly removed. The jihad argument, therefore, ended in 1947 to the south and west of the Durand line.”\textsuperscript{78} It implied that one of the important characteristics of Pakhtun tribal society ‘Muslimness’ was secured by incorporation into the Islamic state of Pakistan in 1947.

A shift in mulla-led jihadi tradition was observed during 1963-79. In the backdrop of agnic rivalry between Mahsuds and Wazirs, Mulla Noor Muhammad emerged as another powerful religious leader. Noor Muhammad strived for social uplift of Wazirs by projecting his persona as a “saviour figure” and by declaring Mahsuds kafir, he urged Wazirs to wage jihad against them.\textsuperscript{79} In his proclamations, he prohibited using radio in adda; a market established around his mosque, by calling it un-Islamic.\textsuperscript{80} The teachings of Mulla suggested that the rudimentary ideas of Takfir, having roots in the teachings of Ibn-e-Tammiyah (1263-1328) and later propagated by Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, were not new to the tribal society.\textsuperscript{81} Also, the proto-Taliban type activities, demonstrated by tribesmen during the late 1990s, have roots in tribal society itself. The jihad was instrumentally used by religious leaders to achieve certain political and material rather than religious objectives in tribal society. Therefore, the tribal jihadi tradition continued either by declaring tribal rivals kafir or waging jihad for the protection of regional and global objectives of the state. Subsequently, in the context of the U.S. led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, tribesmen initiated a militant jihadi struggle against the alleged infidel forces; the United States led Allied Forces and their Pakistani allies.

**War on Terror and Tribal Jihad**

After the Operation Enduring freedom in Afghanistan, most of the members of Al-Qaeda, and Taliban took refuge in Tribal Areas of Pakistan. These militants not only get settled here but also re-organised themselves to initiate a resistance movement against the international forces in Afghanistan. In this context, Islamabad, on behest of the United States, initiated a military operation against the foreign militants in FATA. The first military operation by the Pakistani army was launched at Azam Warsak, South Waziristan in June 22, 2002. During this operation, twenty-eight security personnel were killed in


\textsuperscript{79} Ahmed, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, 50.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 56.

\textsuperscript{81} Appleby, "History in the Fundamentalist Imagination," 508-9. Takfir is a process of declaring someone as unbeliever and thus impure/infidel to justify jihad against them. Ibn-e-Tammiyah (1263-1328) is known as the founder of modern Islamic fundamentalism for his interpretation of jihad. By declaring Muslim Mangols apostates, for their alleged anti-Islamic practices, he justified jihad against them.
comparison with six Chechen and Uzbek militant casualties. The rest, due to the sympathetic tribal attitudes towards Taliban and their allied foreign friends, fled away. Conversely, tribesmen expressed stern resentment and declared military operation as an assault on tribal autonomy and a violation of terms of incorporation into Pakistan. In a jirga meeting, they warned of retaliation in case of any other military operations in FATA. Despite assurances that "tribes would be given an opportunity to handle the issue themselves," the Pakistan army launched various military operations in the subsequent years: Al-Mezan in North Waziristan (2002-2006), Zalzala in South Waziristan (2008), Sher Dil in Bajaur Agency, Rah-e-Haq and Rah-e-Rast in Swat Valley (2007-2009) and Rah-e-Nijat in South Waziristan (2009-2010). These operations were followed by peace agreements; Shakai Peace Agreement 2004, Sararogha Peace Agreement 2005, and the Swat Agreement 2008. However, no major tribal militant activity was observed until the Red-Mosque incident in July 11, 2007.

The Red Mosque and affiliated madrasa’s students were attacking massage centers and CD shops in an attempt to implement Taliban styled Islamic state system in Islamabad. On failure to achieve a political solution, the then President Musharraf-led Government of Pakistan launched a military action; Operation Silence, against the students and the religious clerics of the mosque. During this operation, around seventy percent of the student causalities belonged to FATA and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. Consequently, when Osama bin Laden and his deputy Aymen al-Zawahiri were condemning this operation and pledging to retaliate, thousands of tribesmen, including hundreds of masked militants wielding assault rifles, demonstrated in northwest region of Bajaur Agency, chanting, “Death to Musharraf and Death to America.” This operation not only ideologically glued tribesmen with Taliban and Al-Qaeda, but also signaled beginning of the tribal jihad against the Pakistani state. Therefore, “within a matter of days, the peace agreements in the tribal areas were annulled in the wake of a string of revenge attacks and suicide bombings throughout Pakistan. Within the same month, a group of about seventy men stormed a mosque and shrine in Mohmand Agency and renamed it Lal-Masjid….. the eighteen year old brother of a female student killed in the operation blew himself up in the army’s Tarbela Ghazi mess south of Islamabad, taking with him twenty-two commandos of the Special Services Group that had participated in the Red Mosque raid……TTP was established… a union of Taliban from various tribes that temporarily transcended traditional tribal agnatic rivalries.”

It implied that the student causalities during Red Mosque operation were perceived as an un-Islamic act and a direct assault on the Pakhtun tribesmen. Induced by the sentiments of badl, revenge, Wazirs and

---

83 Ibid., 4.
84 On April 17, 1948, the first Governor General of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, while addressing to a jirga attended by almost two hundred Malik, at the Government House, Peshawar, greeted the tribesmen for joining the dominion of Pakistan and assured tribal independence in return. For reference see "Speeches and Statements of Muhammad Ali Jinnah," http://www.humsafar.info/480417_fro.php.
85 Jirga stands for ‘Council of Elders,’ a significant cultural institution for decision making related to socio-political aspects of Pakhtun society.
87 Zahid Hussain, The Scorpion’s Tail: The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan-and How It Threatens America (Free Press, 2010), 114.
88 Ibid., 119-20.
Mahsuds, by putting aside their agnatic rivalry, formed the TTP under a joint leadership of Baitullah Mahsud. This “brief unity fell apart, however, ostensibly because…Wazir’s number one goal was to target NATO forces in Afghanistan… Mahsuds, on the other hand, were determined to focus on activities in Pakistan.”

This division among the Mahsuds and Wazirs was acknowledged by the Pakistani state as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban. The major aim of Pakistani military operations in FATA therefore has been to fight ‘bad’ Taliban who have been inflicting harm upon the state and society of Pakistan. Nevertheless, the TTP, as an umbrella organisation, based on twenty seven militant groups, was launched in a secret meeting of senior Taliban commanders hailing from South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Orakzai, Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur and Darra Adamkhel tribal regions and the districts of Swat, Buner, Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank, Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Mardan and Kohat on December 13, 2007.

It aspired to achieve higher objectives than merely fighting a defensive war in FATA; enforcing sharia, Islamic code of life, fighting against infidels; foreign forces in Afghanistan and their protégé, the Pakistani state. Consequently, a sudden rise in militant activities, protests, bomb blasts and suicide bombings were recorded all over Pakistan. The militant tribal jihad thus launched irrespective of the subjects of their attacks, “whether in attacking defenseless school girls or military and political officials…Pakhtun targets individuals as symbols of something bigger than the victim represents, such as the state itself.” Later, militant groups from other provinces of Pakistan, mainly from Punjab, also joined TTP’s ranks. The representation of militant groups from settled areas of Pakistan thus demonstrated the wider ideological appeal and operational scope of this organisation.

Conclusion

The major thrust of Pakhtun jihadi tradition has been to retain tribal independence and unique way of living. The mulla, by declaring British as infidels, provided a religious framing to an otherwise political movement—as jihad—which eventually mobilized tribesmen against the British Indian forces. In the same fashion, TTP has emerged as an embodiment of jihad against infidels; international forces in Afghanistan and their Pakistani allies. This framing accorded TTP a wide appeal, as many jihadi groups not only from across the Durand Line, but also from the settled areas of Pakistan have joined this organization. Despite having similarity in objectives, jihad against non-Muslims/infidels, TTP do not represented traditional mulla-led jihad. Most of its leadership came from non-religious Pakhtuns with ordinary social backgrounds, Baitullah, and Hakimullah Mahsuds, till taken over by a religious leader of Swat Maulvi Fazlullah in December 2013. Unlike mulla, TTP has projected jihad against tribal elders in a surge to consolidate its power and position in an otherwise divergent Pakhtun society. For this purpose, it has killed around eight hundred tribal elders by declaring them infidels, protégés of the Pakistani state and a major irritant in enforcing sharia in the tribal society. It suggested that TTP also represent an intra-

---

90 Ibid., 73.
93 Siddique, "Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan ", 4-5, 7.
95 Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam, 76.
tribal struggle for socio-political uplift of under-privileged factions of the Pakhtun tribal society. Nevertheless, TTP may continue exerting influence as long as the religious appeal of its jihadi movement stays relevant. Moreover, by focusing its struggle against the Pakistani state, it has revived the rationale for jihad, against the larger state, which became irrelevant after 1947.

References

Abbas, Hassan. Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror: ME Sharpe Inc, 2005.


"Babar the Great": An Extensive Interview with One of Pakistan’s Real Warriors, Maj Gen (Retd) Naseerullah Khan Babar. 2001.


A Conversation with Lt. General (R) Shahid Aziz with Nadeem Malik in Islamabad Tonight on Aaj Tv, Pakistan.


Personal Communication with the Former Ambassador and an Expert on Fata Mr. Ayyaz Wazir. February 23, 2013.

Personal Communication with the Former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Abdul Sattar. March 28, 2013.


Rizvi, Saiyid Athar Abbas. Muslim Revivalist Movements in Northern India in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Agra: Agra University, 1965.


