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INTRODUCTION

Evolutionary changes in the functions of the human brain are extremely difficult to trace, hypothesize, and document. Evolutionary psychology remains a rather rudimentary sub disciplinary field because it is mainly built around two rather simplistic assumptions: that human mental functions are all shaped by natural selection (i.e., reproductive success), and that function is related to form (i.e., anatomy reflects physiology). Thus, evolutionary psychologists take for granted not only humanity's psychic unity, but also our species' psychological continuity, which leads to their interpretation of much contemporary behavior in terms of "just so stories" of its adaptive antecedents (e.g., Burnham and Phelan 2000). A few scholars have attempted to formulate bold hypotheses of functional transformations unrelated to anatomical changes, but their work remains largely conjectural (e.g., Donald, 1991, Mithen, 1996). More promisingly, others have focused on cross-species comparative anatomy in order to illustrate the transitional psychological phases our species may have gone through (MacLean, 1973), or may yet potentially cross (Pearce, 2004).

One of the most interesting theories positing a major psychological transition on the basis of contingent historical evidence--unconventionally analyzed--is Julian Jaynes' view of the "the breakdown of the bicameral mind" (1976). According to this theory, human consciousness as we know it--that is, allowing for introspection and volition--first emerged among members of Mediterranean and Middle-Eastern civilizations only around the end of the second millennium BCE. Before that time, according to Jaynes, the right and left hemispheres of the human brain operated independently (i.e., bicameral) thus generating auditory hallucinations, which were generally shared with fellow group members, and were attributed to supernatural beings. This would explain why early civilizations were theocratic: the gods-kings residing in their subjects' minds could exert perfect and unchallenged control: "In the bicameral era, the bicameral mind *was* the social control, not fear or repression or even law" (Jaynes, 1976:205). However, as the early theocratic kingdoms expanded,

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and as a series of natural disasters affecting the Mediterranean around 1500 BCE created mass migration, the harmonious social control insured by the bicameral mind started to break down. As Jaynes puts it, "in the forced violent intermingling of peoples from different nations, different gods, the observations that strangers, even though looking like oneself, spoke differently, had opposite opinions, and behaved differently might lead to the supposition of something inside of them that was different (1976:217). This gradually led to the ever-increasing repression--and ultimately the loss--of the capacity to "hear" the hallucinatory voices of the gods. Instead, people expanded the narrativization of experience--facilitated by the compilation of epics and by the increased use of writing--ultimately leading to what Jaynes calls the "invention of the soul" (1976:288-292). As a result, the "default modality" of the human brain changed, and consciousness emerged.

This theory is very attractive for cultural anthropologists for two reasons: it introduces the concept of social adaptation as a possible trigger for physiological changes--an issue directly impinging upon the nature-nurture debate--and is greatly relevant to contemporary trends in globalization. In this respect, it could be argued that in the last quarter of the 20th century we have entered a phase of intercultural contact that certainly approximates in magnitude the one Jaynes says may have triggered a fundamental adaptive change in human mental functions in the ancient world. If this is indeed the case, what kind of psychological developments may be catalyzed by the newly emerging social reality people have to increasingly negotiate? More importantly, can we "guide evolution", by educating people in the acquisition of mental functions that would optimize adaptation to changing social conditions?

While these question may probably only be answered in retrospect, it is certainly true that diversity issues have increasingly attracted the attention of educators since the mid-1970s. This is due to two correlated factors. First of all, ongoing globalization trends have dramatically stimulated the movement of individuals and populations, resulting in an overall increase in the ethnic diversity of most nation-states, which *demands* some form of constructive response in educational approaches. Secondly, democratizing processes have favored the development of "identity politics", particularly through the assertion of individual and group rights in reference to perceived discrimination. Within this framework, diversity raises a number of serious ethical and legal issues. In education, these issues have led to complex debates on the role of teachers, and on whether "universalism" or "representation" should define curricular and pedagogical choices. The concept of multicultural education has emerged from these debates, but there is little agreement on whether it should be aimed toward enhancing the equitable representation of minority perspectives or toward the development of intercultural competence. In fact, the very inclusion of education among the universal human rights is being challenged, which in turn brings into discussion the definition of education itself.

UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW

Article 26 of the United Nations' *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (United Nations [1948]1998) states that "everyone has a right to education" and that education should be free--i.e., publicly provided--at least at the elementary and basic levels, with technical and professional education made generally available, and higher education equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. Furthermore, the article states that: "Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms".

There are various ways to look at the UDHR in general and at Article 26 in particular. Some scholars have argued that the establishment of UN declarations, legislation, and enforcement mechanisms aimed at protecting human rights combines with globalization in ushering in the concept of a global community, and that the consequent efforts "to base membership on a universal, but evolving standard of values" constitute one of the greatest social transformations of our era (Messer, 1996:1). On the other hand, a long-ranging scholarly debate has emerged on whether the entire universal human rights machinery is built on "droits-de-l'hommiste" sentimentality, in turn emerging from Western ethnocentrism (Panikkar, 1982).

The basic issue at the center of this debate is that the concept of rights can be understood at the individual or at the social level, and that the two interpretations are often at odds. Western cultures, by and large, share a view of universal human rights as *individual* rights because Western cultures, by and large, emphasize individual autonomy over group embeddedness. This view is basically alien to all of the cultures--i.e., the majority of non-Western ones--in which individuals are always seen as part of a complex web of social relations, and individual agency is considered the outcome of the solidarity ties anchoring all persons to their social matrix. The ideological dialectic between what Galtung calls the "I-cultures" and the "we-cultures" (1998) is profound and pervasive, coloring the construction of all types of social mechanisms, from democracy itself to the separation of church and state, and from definitions of female emancipation to those of children's protection. In fact, because the "we" of we-cultures is typically contingent, solidarity ties may shift (see Ong, 2002) in ways that appear threateningly chaotic and "irrational" to Westerners used to the juridical solidity of the I-subject.

In line with this point, universalism itself could be seen as a product of the ethnocentric Western privileging of the autonomous I-subject as norm object. This, of course, constitutes the first step on the slippery slope of radical relativism, which would ultimately justify a parallelism between "liberalism for liberals" and "cannibalism for cannibals" (Hollis, 1999:36). Admittedly, the relationship between pluralism and liberalism is somewhat edgy. "Pluralists are inclined to thoughts about incommensurability which favor either many ultimate values or none. Liberals offer an alliance, which gives their minimal position universality before allowing plurality. Both parties presumably agree

that a society is viable only where shared values engender trust. But does trust require the liberal minimum or can it be secured by illiberal values and practices?" (Hollis, 1999:41-42).

A possible way out of this impasse is to seek consensus on the parameters by which to sort out those areas of action that are open to various degrees of ethnocentric interpretation and those that are not. Western cultures have proposed that these parameters may be found in rationality, as expressed in logic and applied in the scientific method. In other words, the universalism of universal human rights has been predicated on the assumption of the psychic unity of mankind, and the application of its inherently universal feature: procedural access to the use of reason. It can certainly be argued that liberalism emerges from the very Western, and partly ethnocentric, "Enlightenment Project", but one brand of universalism can only be disputed in the name of another, so it can be safely asserted that "universalism is ethnocentric only if ethnocentricity is universal", which is an easily refutable proposition (Hollis, 1999:42). Nevertheless, liberals and pluralists share the need to develop "a minimalist, procedural thesis about freedom, justice, equality, and individual rights" (Hollis, 1999:42).

This seems particularly necessary if the UN declarations, legislation, and enforcement mechanisms that have been aimed at protecting human right everywhere are to acquire some applicatory robustness. While the privileging of the I-subject in Western cultures may have markedly contributed to the very emergence of the scientific method (see Nisbett, 2003), it has also limited the effectiveness of universal declarations precisely because they are directed at individuals, as citizens of member states. In other words, the present construction of universal human rights is "stato-cratic" (Galtung, 1998:212), and individuals can claim these rights only through the mechanism of citizenship, which frames their claims in the rulers-ruled relationship.

One way to move toward the establishment of both "globalization of human rights" and "cultural equality in human rights" (Galtung, 1998:211-212) is by recognizing that they are "suspended between--and connecting--the global and the local dimensions of social life" (Hastrup, 2002: 30). Therefore, the anthropological view of universal human rights is based on their contextualization within a comparative framework of local discourses and political contexts (Wilson, 1997). This means a recognition of *both* the fact that "we are equally human beyond our diverse vocabularies" (Hastrup, 2002:40), and the fact that legalistic language "skeletonizes" a complex reality (Geertz, 1983:170) which needs to be reconstructed in the process of application of the rules it describes.

The relevance of this point can be illustrated by two trends that have increasingly been emerging in American society. The first is the steady growth of the "cultural defense" approach in criminal law, and the second is the insistence on the value of heterogeneity in educational choices and practices, which is sometimes justified precisely by appealing to Article 26 of the UDHR--a supposedly universal principle. On the one hand, the applicability of

American criminal laws is predicated on recognizing the cultural factors mitigating the interpretation of human conduct. On the other, it is argued that the Universal Declaration enshrines the principle that "educational diversity and choice [are] absolute requirements of any reasonably fair, just and democratic American education system" (Clinchy, 2002:133). In other words, the growing attention to universal human rights seems to heighten parallel attention to, and recognition of, the diversity of interpretations they may imply.

These seemingly paradoxical views are reflected in the different ways the anthropological concept of culture has been increasingly understood and applied in recent times. While modern anthropology--emerging at the dawn of the 20th century--was instrumental in defining culture, in the singular, as the major adaptive mechanism of our species, and cultures, in the plural, as the varied but equally valid results of such a mechanism, by the end of the century the very popularization of this view began to call attention to its potential perniciousness. As a result, in the last twenty years--and particularly in the US-- a brand of postmodern anthropology has emerged whose practitioners are "writing against culture" (Abu-Lughod, 1991), now seen as a "totalitarian" concept highlighting differences between peoples at the expense of their common humanity, and denying human agency by subsuming it to essentialized, culture-specific restrictions (see Fox and King, 2002).

The critical stance adopted by these postmodern anthropologists could, of course, be seen as being itself the product of the *Zeitgeist* created by advanced capitalism, in which, as Margaret Thatcher put it, "societies do not exist, only individuals do", and the reality of any constraints on behavior is denied in favor of celebrating the *jouissance* of personal (consumer) choice (Cerroni-Long, 1996). However, this disciplinary trend also usefully highlights the ambiguity of culture, which both constrains and enables individual expression. It is this ambiguity that fuels identity politics, and that has profoundly colored what came to be called the "culture wars" in American education. It is this ambiguity that pits, for example, the most radical feminists against the multiculturalists (e.g., Okin, et al 1999). And it is this ambiguity that drives the increasing use of the "cultural defense" in the American legal system, while also contributing to the erosion of Affirmative Action policies.

What is *not* useful in the postmodern approach to the study of culture is that it endorses popular confusion about the equipotentiality of various forms of diversity, and it reinforces the illusion that the shaping of human agency by social constraints is a matter of choice. This leads to defining the behavioral expression of diversity as a voluntary affirmation of membership, so that the intergroup conflict it often triggers gets blamed on the "cultural militancy" of group members. Accordingly, American ethnicity is often defined as an "identity option" (Waters, 1990) and multicultural education has been applied to issues of diversity not only emerging from ethnic origin, but also from gender and age differences, religious differences, economic disadvantage, sexual orientation, physical disability, and choice of "alternative lifestyle" (Schuman and Olufs, 1995).

Culture certainly *is* a double-edged sword. Appeals to cultural diversity can be used by indigenous populations arguing for the recognition of their territorial and self-determination rights, but they can also be used--as they have been--to justify policies of apartheid or ethnic cleansing on the one hand, and systematic social discrimination or compulsory acculturation on the other. The complexity of culture, however, seems to require a better understanding of its characteristics, rather than a denial of its reality. In particular, cultural, sub cultural, and ethnic types of diversity need to be sorted out and analyzed in their respective dimensions, and multicultural education might be the ideal tool for facilitating a   fuller comprehension of the process by which cultural differences affect behavior,

This, so far, has not been the aim of multicultural education, wherever it has emerged. In the American setting, for example, it has been argued that multiculturalism is "a code word for minority demands for separate recognition in academic . . . institutions" (Turner, 1994:407). In line with this perspective, American multicultural education has generated endless debates on the textual content of school curricula, which have become the "contested space" being claimed by previously unrepresented groups. But should multicultural education be merely a vehicle for group representation? And how does this relate to the aims of education as defined by Article 26 of the UDHR, that is, "the full development of the human personality" and "the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" (United Nations, [1948]1998)? Placing education rights in multicultural context may help provide some constructive answers to these questions.

MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION AND UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS

As stated earlier, moving toward the "globalization of human rights" and "cultural equality in human rights" (Galtung, 1998:211-212) requires the recognition that they are "suspended between--and connecting--the global and the local dimensions of social life" (Hastrup, 2002: 30). This is particularly relevant in reference to education rights, since the implementation of educational philosophies seems to be profoundly affected by culture-specific factors.

The philosophies themselves are broadly shared, and tend to reflect the basic dichotomy represented in ancient Greece by Plato and by his less well-known contemporary, Isocrates. For Plato, philosophy was the only path to true knowledge and the only proper form of education, while for Isocrates all education should instead be based on the teaching of rhetoric, as the most useful skill for navigating public life (Too and Livingstone, 1998). These two approaches represent different views of knowledge: one emphasizing its role in the process of individual growth, and the other focusing on its application in achieving success in public life. In a way, the entire history of Western education has been colored by the dialectic between these two perspectives, which are actually placed side by side in Article 26 of the UDHR.

This is as it should be, since the process of intellectual growth which education should ideally facilitate implies also the acquisition of the skills and capabilities applicable in the world of work and public engagement. Thus, the two perspectives are complementary rather than contradictory. However, the way societies have become structured almost everywhere over the last millennium, and especially the way labor has been allocated and rewarded, have inexorably led to an increasing gap between the two complementary perspectives, now being related to two distinct types of education, which in the US are respectively called "liberal-arts" and "vocational".

It should also be noted that as education became framed by religion, in the European Middle Ages, the academic curriculum was standardized around a set of foundational disciplines, articulated into the *trivium* (grammar, rhetoric, logic), providing a baccalaureate, and the *quadrivium* (arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy), conferring the title of *magister artium* (master of arts). These were disciplinary strands combining the pedagogical perspectives of Plato and Isocrates, but they were all subsumed to theology, since the frame for the Seven Liberal Arts (i.e., the basis of education for the mediaeval *liberi*, or free men) was the great synthesis of Greek science and Christian doctrine formulated by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century. Consequently, by becoming associated with ideological orthodoxy, education acquired a new function, that of being a tool for social control.

This aspect became increasingly prominent as European social elites began to fear the type of violent mass upheavals the French Revolution came to epitomize. As a consequence, the views of education in Victorian times spanned the lofty ideals of Cardinal Newman, celebrating linkages with the Italian humanist heritage, and those of evangelical reformers like Hannah More, whose network of Sunday schools in Somerset had the declared aim "to form the lower classes to habits of industry and virtue" (quoted in Birch, 2005:14). And indeed, as religion's grip on Western societies was loosened by the complex social-change processes brought about by industrialization, "exam-passing gradually replaced church-going as the most important way in which ambitious young people could advertise their worthiness to join the respectable middle classes" (Birch, 2005:14).

In the American setting, the Western pedagogical tradition hooked up with two other complementary--and dialectical--ideological preoccupations: those of social egalitarianism and "self-realization", understood as spiritual empowerment through self-transformation. The result was the emergence of the "multiversity", an educational structure "where populist claims clash with elite values, and where numerous types of education--graduate, undergraduate, research, vocational, professional--contend for resources and loyalties" (Rothblatt, 1993:57).

It is probably not surprising that in such a structure, which for many students seems to simply provide a holding pattern--filled with the busy work of choosing from a smorgasbord of curricular choices--until they enter the labor market, the issue of multicultural education brought into play a different view

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of knowledge. This is knowledge that directly relates to issues of identity and representation, and it is this personal relevance that has attracted so much attention to the multicultural approach in education.

In a way, then, American multicultural education has simply revitalized the view of learning as emerging from personal experience and requiring social and political application that is so central in John Dewey's work. Dewey was the most influential American pedagogist of the first half of the 20th century and did not directly experience the demographic and social changes brought about by globalization. But his insistence on the primacy of experience in the learning process, forging a crucial link between education and democracy (e.g., Dewey, [1916]1997) prefigures the views of Paulo Freire on "teachers as cultural worker" (Freire, 1998). Indeed, various analysts of American multicultural education depict it as the ultimate expression of a truly liberal--in the modern sense of "democratic"--education (see Schoem, et al 1995).

Nevertheless, American multicultural education seems limited to an attempt "to provide therapy for individuals' and society's perceived ills" (Pangle, 1998:183). As a consequence, it may exacerbate interethnic conflict rather than assuage it, and it may promote a shallow relativism leading to apathy and indifference rather than inquiry and engagement. Above all, American multicultural education is so narrowly focused on giving attention to previously unrepresented American groups that it becomes a vehicle for sub cultural chauvinism, rather than a tool for broadening the appreciation of what Justice William O. Douglas poetically called "the flowering of man and his idiosyncrasies" (quoted in Pangle, 1998:189).

The fact is that, wherever it has emerged, multicultural education has been chiefly the response to contingent--and in many cases traumatically abrupt--demographic and structural changes. It is not surprising, therefore, that its various forms are characterized by an ad-hoc, problem-solving functionality. In other words, multicultural education has not been built around well-developed philosophical convictions, or, at least, not convictions incorporating the perspective expressed in Article 26 of the UDHR. Thus, there is very little general consensus on the aims of multicultural education, on how it should be implemented, and on what outcomes should be expected from it. In fact, even the term "multicultural education" is not generally adopted. Alternative terms in use, such as "intercultural", "multinational", "pluralistic" "interracial", "ethnic", and "minority education" clearly point to the fact that diversity is variously defined.

A recent anthropological survey of multicultural education in ten different national settings (Cerroni-Long, 2002), and my own ethnographic study of the impact of multiculturalism on teacher-training programs in Canada, the US, and Japan, clearly indicate that there are at present two major approaches to multicultural education, which I respectively define as "therapeutic" and "managerial". The therapeutic approach has already been discussed in reference to the prevalent characteristics of American multicultural education, but it should be added that its application oscillates between the use

of strategies aimed at boosting the "cultural prestige" of particular minority groups, and attempts at providing all individuals with the "cultural space" in which they can define their own personal identity and socially express it under protective guarantees. The application of this approach generally leads to correlating multiculturalism to issues of social equity and identity politics (Cerroni-Long, 2004).

The "managerial" approach, on the other hand, is the one most closely related to language teaching and learning, and it aims at fostering the acquisition of skills that can facilitate interpersonal relations across cultural, sub cultural, and ethnic boundaries. In the US, this model has a fairly long history of application in the business world, being implemented through total-immersion workshops and "diversity training" programs, designed specifically for the needs of a particular corporation or other work setting. This is also the model most often used in the tourist industry and in a number of service professions with international or markedly interethnic focus (e.g., Tayeb, 1996). Generally speaking, the disciplinary foundation of this approach combines psychological and management components, and the concept of culture it adopts is a typically "thin" one: culture is mainly defined as ethos, a series of values and beliefs that get expressed in idiosyncratic patterns of communication. The application of this approach reduces all cultural differences to matters of superficial variation, and while it implies a belief in the psychic unity of mankind, it also discounts the imbrications of culture with identity, and thus its relevance to universal human rights.

In terms of teacher-training and other applications in academic settings, this model of multicultural education is chiefly found in societies that have not had a long or particularly impactful tradition of immigration, while the "therapeutic" one particularly characterizes the nations that have emerged from processes of Anglo-majority colonial settlement. Also, the "managerial" approach characterizes we-cultures--such as, for example, Japan--while the other one is more typical of I-cultures, and especially extreme examples of them, such as the US.

This may seem paradoxical until one realizes that the group militancy engendered by the "therapeutic" approach emerges from the need to compensate for personal identity problems caused by minority status, while the cosmopolitanism promoted by the "managerial" approach is buttressed by the social support systems always available in societies of the we-type. In fact, the way diversity is defined serves as a metaphor for collective identity. Thus, I-cultures should be expected to consider any type of diversity as a potential source for group identity, while we-cultures should be more integrative and elastic, given their ability to re-frame the boundaries of the we-group to include new types of membership. This is precisely what the ethnographic evidence seems to indicate, in turn highlighting how the individual/group dynamic gets crucially affected by differences in social structure (Brislin, 1981). Thus, the globalization of rights does not simply require an understanding of the dialectic between individual and group dimensions of social life; rather, it requires that

the concept of human rights itself be clarified in the light of culture-specific differences.

CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE AND JURIDICAL SOLIDARITY

A striking illustration of this issue was provided in the US by a legal case involving Mrs. Fumiko Kimura, a Japanese immigrant who at the time of the event had resided in the Los Angeles area for about 16 years. In January 1985, Mrs. Kimura walked into the ocean, carrying with her a four-year-old son and a six-month-old daughter. Passersby who witnessed the scene soon intervened and managed to rescue her, but her two children died and she was charged with two counts of first degree murder. However, Mrs. Kimura explained that her action was the result of blaming herself as a bad wife and mother on account of having recently discovered that her husband had been keeping a mistress. As a result of the feelings of shame the situation had engendered, she attempted to commit *oyako-shinju* (parent-child suicide), a not uncommon choice of behavior in Japanese tradition. The cultural logic behind such a form of suicide is that a "child is not an individual human being but a family member, . . . and that it is more merciful to kill children than to leave them in the cruel world without parental protection. The mother who commits suicide without taking her child with her is blamed as a demon-like person" (Woo quoted in Norgren and Nanda, 1996:269). Thus, in Japan Mrs. Kimura's behavior might have led to a suspended sentence with supervised rehabilitation, while in the US she faced the death penalty. Interestingly, over 25,000 people of Japanese nationality or ancestry rallied to her defense, petitioning the LA district attorney for leniency, and this would indeed seem a classic case demanding the "cultural defense" approach. However, Mrs. Kimura's attorney felt that the concept of parent-child suicide would indicate intent to kill and would therefore support a first degree murder conviction. Instead, a plea of "temporary insanity" succeeded in reducing her charge to voluntary manslaughter, leading to a light sentence of one year in the county jail, five years' probation, and intensive psychiatric treatment.

Two issues are of special interest in this case. One has to do with the recognition of the need to consider cultural background as the context for behavior on the basis of the growing cultural heterogeneity of most nations. In the words of legal scholar Lawrence Sager: "Epistemic concerns and the principle of equal liberty require that we be slow to judge the unfamiliar, and that we take a hard look at our own factual beliefs and normative judgments before we condemn culturally endorsed practices" (2002 :174). Or, as more bluntly put by Deborah Woo, in her analysis of the legal case described above: when we define the case as "the people v. Fumiko Kimura" which people do we intend? (Woo, 1989). The other important issue highlighted by the Kimura case is that in cultures such as Japan the boundaries of the self, and therefore the legal definition of the individual, are much more permeable and shifting than in

cultures such as the US. This creates some important consequences in reference to diversity.

In my study of the impact of multiculturalism on teacher-training programs in Japan what I consistently found was an emphasis on the fact that it is considered the responsibility of the teacher to surmount any possible interactive obstacles created by the students' cultural differences in order to reach the common core of human potential that education aims at developing. Nevertheless, apart from practical information about linguistic differences that may be encountered among a diverse student population, teachers are not offered any special training that would facilitate the fulfillment of their responsibility (Yoshida, 1999).

This could be seen as a byproduct of the lack of experience with intra-cultural diversity typical of a society with a long history of ethnic homogeneity. However, this interpretation is contradicted by the keen perception the Japanese generally have of their own cultural characteristics and of how they differ from those of other cultures. On the basis of this paradox, then, it could be hypothesized that members of cultures which foster reflexivity--at the level of the individual, group, and culture as a whole--acquire a certain aptitude for navigating intra-cultural diversity without feeling personally threatened by its expressions.

This aptitude is increasingly being defined as "cultural intelligence" in organizational studies (Early and Ang, 2003, Peterson, 2004) and is usually correlated to dispositional characteristics that include: self-confidence, self-awareness, tolerance for ambiguity, and empathy. These dispositional characteristics are themselves much influenced by culture-specific values and practices, and they are generally more strongly favored in we-cultures than in those emphasizing rugged individualism. Also, these characteristics are likely to facilitate the teaching and learning process in general, and thus favor successful educational practices. It could be argued, therefore, that members of some societies are better-equipped for successfully addressing diversity, at least in the context of educational structures. In the case of Japan, at least parts of this argument are consistently supported by the ethnographic evidence (e.g., see Benjamin, 1997, Rohlen and LeTendre, 1996).

Placing education rights in multicultural context gives new relief to the complexity of diversity issues in education. This complexity involves a recognition that if human rights are to be globalized, then globalization demands that the acquisition of cultural intelligence be one of the major aims of multicultural education. Reaching this aim might require a deliberate structuring of educational practices toward the acquisition of skills I summarized in the acronym REACT: reflexivity, empathy, awareness, conciliation, and tolerance (Cerroni-Long, 2001:59). Some of these skills closely approximate the dispositional characteristics associated with "cultural intelligence". But while it is uncontestable that cultural membership facilitates or impedes the development of these characteristics, appropriate educational practices--especially if applied quite early--can also foster their growth.

Furthermore, these skills are integrated and sequential, so once habits of reflexivity, empathy, and awareness are acquired, conciliation--based on recognizing the commonality of the human needs and desires underlying culture-specific expressions--can be encouraged through the exploration of wholly different traditions. This knowledge in turn will facilitate the acquisition of tolerance, understood as the ability to monitors one's expressions and adjusting their appropriateness by assessing behavior through a multiplicity of perspectives.

This calls for a universalization of educational approaches at the foundational level, but it also highlights the need for all cultural traditions to be documented, preserved, and made available for pedagogical purposes. In turn, this requires precisely the availability of "cultural space" that is now being increasingly demanded by cultural, sub cultural, and ethnic groups wishing to affirm their identity by expressing themselves in their own voice (e.g., see James, 1995, Nieto, l992). At the moment, these demands are necessarily addressed to the nation-state, which in responding to them is increasingly losing its cultural cohesiveness, so that, eventually, the state might simply become the political scaffold for a number of culturally distinct "nations".

This possible development is profoundly worrisome to many, and, indeed, fear about the socially centrifugal potential of identity politics is at the core of the American "culture wars" (Hunter, 1991). But, from an evolutionary point of view, this development might be a very positive one. It would lead to the emergence of a number of loose sociopolitical organizations--in a process similar to the formation of the European Union--which would gather under their jurisdiction various culturally heterogeneous units, allowing them to operate independently in most areas affecting the everyday life of their members. This would reestablish a form of tribal organization--which has been the most stable and long-lasting form of social structure adopted by our species--but it would adapt it to current population densities and to the worldwide economic system, so that competition and conflict between tribes can be minimized.

In a world becoming increasingly interconnected at the economic level the emergence of such supranational blocks might not necessarily lead to the type of "clash of civilizations" hypothesized by Samuel Huntington (1996). Rather, a new type of social solidarity might emerge. Durkheim theorized that in the transition from early tribal life we moved from mechanical solidarity--based on the fact that all members of a tribal society were essentially similar--to the organic solidarity of societies in which power hierarchy and division of labor bound people together in mutual complementarily ([1893]1933). The type of sociopolitical organization described above might catalyze a form of solidarity which could be described as "juridical". Its basis would be a truly globalized system of human rights and robust structures for their implementation, combined with universalized educational practices aimed at the development of foundational multicultural skills. In such a framework the type of rights themselves might evolve, as they already have, moving from civil

and political on to social, economic, and cultural. A globalized world might require "solidarity rights", demanding a clean environment and preservation of natural resources (Hastrup, 2002:31), and guaranteeing cultural heritage preservation and transmission.

All of these possible social developments, and especially the effective implementation of foundational multicultural education, might also trigger evolutionary changes at the level of mental functioning. Whether or not the breakdown of the bicameral mind and the emergence of consciousness were the byproduct of intense and traumatic processes of culture contact in the ancient world (Jaynes, 1976), it is conceivable to theorize that in a globalized world of great cultural diversity, coordinated through juridical solidarity and stabilized through multicultural education, the cultivation of reflexivity and empathy might make us capable of "reading" other people's behavioral matrix, thus facilitating a transition from the golden rule--by which we try to treat others as *we* would like to be treated--to the platinum rule, that is, treating others as *they* would like to be treated.

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