Abstract
Global migrations are reaching major proportions that are both beneficial and detrimental in More Developed Countries as when migrants take unskilled jobs, but they also add to social services costs. Jared Diamond in *Collapse* (2005) also maintains that global warming in the next 50 to 75 years will contribute to additional collapses of Less Developed Countries. Local environmental collapses, including their agriculture, have resulted in certain LDCs’ political disruptions whose resulting migrations impact neighboring countries, threatening them to become failed states. Many theorists also argue that environmental degradation from global warming is still reversible, even with available technologies. But costs are massive and political will in both MDCs and LDCs to implement the necessary technologies is barely on the horizon. Further, time may be running out, with 2050 being an agreed-upon breakpoint (four short decades away). Classical Demographic-Transition and Political-Economy Development theories help in understanding these situations, and provide certain policy guidelines for addressing them. To focus on LDCs’ urbanization processes by providing support to their governments in dealing with their many problems seems the best hope for stemming LDC-to-MDC migrations and avoiding further collapses. Much depends on societies’ political organizational capacities to mobilize resources under short-span crisis conditions.

Introduction
Migrations from Less Developed Countries (LDCs) to More Developed Countries (MDCs) have been increasing rapidly since 1990, concerning many people in MDCs for a number of reasons including higher welfare costs since, for example in the U. S., over 30 percent of migrants are grade-school dropouts, and rising violence (Camarota, 2001; Horowitz, 2001; Bawer, 2006). The major issues can be grouped into five key questions:

1) What is the scope of global migration, for documented as well as undocumented migrants?

2) How will global warming affect future migrations?

3) What benefits and detriments are generated due to such migrations?

4) What social theories can be used in understanding, and perhaps in responding effectively to such migrations, in order to avert large-scale detriments and even global disaster?

5) What in these theories can provide policy directions for community and national leaders in dealing more adequately with global migrations?

This paper will address each of these questions.

1) **What is the scope of global migration?**

To characterize global migration involves at least seven major issues. First, in 2000, an estimated 175 million people lived outside their country of birth, 2.7 percent of the world’s population, and more than ever before (Addi, et al., 2003; Doyle, 2004). Of the 175 million about 158 million were deemed international migrants; 16 million were recognized refugees.
fleeing usually well-founded fears of persecution; and 900,000 were outright asylum seekers (Doyle, 2004).

In the U.S., as in most MDCs, the percentages of in-migrants are substantially higher than the worldwide percentages would imply. In 2000, the U.S. had 55 million immigrants, roughly 18% of its population (and increasing annually); 27 million were adults and 28 million children, many born in the U.S. (Hanson, 2005). Further, of the 1.2 million migrants arriving every year in the U.S. alone, and the trend is increasing (Camarota, 2001, an estimated 500,000 are undocumented, up from 300,000 a decade earlier (Hanson, 2005). A small fraction of undocumented migrants are found and sent back, but every year more arrive for longer stays so that in 2004 an estimated 10.3 million people were undocumented in the U.S., 5.9 million from Mexico alone (Hanson, 2005: 1). Currently (2007), estimated undocumented migrants have risen to 12 million (Pear, 2007). Other MDCs are having similar experiences (Bawer, 2006; Bilefsky, 2007; Caldwell, 2007; Fisher, 2007; Landler and Kulish, 2007).

Second, migration from a “typical” LDC especially lures healthy, robust, 20-something, single or married, unemployed, poverty-level, male small-villagers, with elementary education (but more than their neighbors), who know other migrants, and have seen MDC wealth and seeming well-being via the mass media (Zahniser, 2000: 268 f.; Hanson, 2005: 27 ff.). A major motivation is to remit savings to their home countries; for Mexico in 2000, these remittances amounted to levels more than tourism or direct foreign investment (Hanson, 2005; Zahniser, 2000). Wage differentials between sending and receiving countries, then, contribute to migration decisions (Hanson, 2005). For such reasons small percentages of people in LDCs migrate to relatively well-ordered MDCs with their reasonably well-functioning economic and social-services systems.

Third, although MDC-to-LDC migrants tend to come from small villages, many settle in the biggest MDC cities (Foner, Rumbait, and Gold, 2000b). Of Los Angeles’ 9.5 million people 63 percent (40% children) were of immigrant stock (an immigrant or offspring), 54 percent of New York City’s 8 million, and 72 percent of Greater Miami’s 4 million residents, all increasing annually (Foner, Rumbaut, and Gold, 2000b). Rotterdam is said to have a Muslim majority (Bawer, 2007). Measurable emigration among MDCs (to other MDCs) is virtually stagnant compared to emigration from LDCs to MDCs (Hanson, 2005).
Fourth, LDCs vary greatly from MDCs in their “surplus” populations, from which some migrate. Table 1 shows major differences between MDCs and LDCs on certain major migration-related national indicators. Net Migration per 1,000 people is key. MDCs overall have net in-migration (a positive sign) of 2 percent annually, while LDCs have net out-migration (a negative sign) of -1 percent. MDCs also have much lower birth rates and rates of natural increase (numbers of births divided by numbers of deaths, which indicate rates of annual population growth not accounting for in- or out-migration), and much higher urbanization rates.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Pop Size</th>
<th>%Urban</th>
<th>Birth Rate (/1,000)</th>
<th>Rate, Net Migration (/1,000)</th>
<th>Rate of Natural Increase</th>
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<tr>
<td>More Developed</td>
<td>1.216 Bill</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Less Developed</td>
<td>5.339 Bill</td>
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<td>23</td>
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Fifth, since over 80 percent of the world’s population lives in LDCs, the average negative one percent migration represents an annual migration rate of about 53 million people, a substantial number that would add 4.3 percent to MDCs populations annually if they all migrated to MDCs (which, as seen in Table 1, they do not). LDCs’ birth rates are about double those of MDCs, so that average numbers of children in LDCs’ families are over twice found in MDCs’ families. Further, migrants are likely to continue these higher birth rates while in MDCs, adding greater numbers over their lifetimes to MDCs’ population sizes than do MDCs’ permanent populations. And, since LDCs’ death rates (not shown in Table 1) approximate those of MDCs, LDCs’ rates of natural increase (birth rates minus death rates) are 50 percent larger than MDCs’. The “rule of 70” (dividing 70 by the rate of natural increase) is a convenient way to determine “doubling times” of population sizes (Meadows, et al., 1972). Currently, LDCs’ higher birth rates and low death rates show their populations will double in about 47 years, thus increasing further the numbers of people migrating even if percentages remain the same.

Sixth, since migrants’ education levels are substantially below those in the receiving MDCs, such migrants could eventually overwhelm MDCs’ established institutions (education, health, and welfare,
especially, but also housing and prisons) in accommodating lower-educated, lower-income people as these costs rise and become burdensome to permanent MDC residents (Zolberg, 2000; Horowitz, 2001; Doyle, 2004).

Seventh, with 12 million undocumented migrants already in the U.S. and numbers increasing monthly, the U.S. (among other MDCs) has not recently succeeded in closing its borders to undocumented migrants. MDCs’ records of finding undocumented workers at either the borders or, especially, in the interior are spotty at best, and generally considered failures (Horowitz, 2001; Hanson, 2005; Barbassa, 2007). More effective “interior” strategies probably require changing immigration laws plus massive efforts, costs, and cooperation among employers, local authorities, and communities’ residents, as well as heavy sanctions on local employers for not complying (Lahav, 2000; Horowitz, 2001). A key proposal for reducing the number of migrants overall would change migration laws from emphasizing family reunification to allowing in only migrants with sufficient education (Horowitz, 2001). Yet, such system-wide efforts are not likely to happen (Hanson, 2005). Current evidence for this also comes from the heated debates followed by deadlock on the immigration bill in the most recent U.S. Congress (Pear, 2007; Barbassa, 2007).

2) How will global warming affect these migrations?

Even if exact timings and locations of the effects of global warming are in dispute (deGaetano, 2007), global warming due to carbon emissions from various human activities is now well-established (www. Global Warming and United Nations Framework). It will have significant negative effects on agricultural and other natural-resource dynamics (www. Global Warming and Agriculture, 2007).

Diamond (2005) projects that MDCs, due to their higher-levels of technologies and better capabilities to find new technologies (Martin, 2006) will be able to deal rather well with global warming. But, LDCs’ will probably not be as viable, in part due to mal-distribution of fresh water and their high levels of soil salinity (Vergano, 2007). Thus, Diamond (2005: 449) posits that at least a dozen LDCs will become “failed states,” but others believe such failures could be as high as 60 LDCs, roughly one-third of the world total (Lean, 2007; Stipp, 2004; Doyle, 2007). In the future, surely more than one percent of their populations will migrate. In contemporary Iraq, certainly a failed state, 2 million people, nearly 7 percent of its population, have migrated in the last several years, and currently an estimated 50,000 people migrate from there every month (Bilefsky, 2007).

Most migrants begin their migrations through neighboring states, the influxes threatening receiving states to join the ranks of “failed.” For instance, Jordan with 5.6 million people and Syria with 19.6 million have received the bulk of Iraq’s migrants (Bilefsky, 2007). Adding 500,000 to a million
migrants to Jordan’s small population in only two or three years, thereby quickly increasing its population by 10-20 percent, puts considerable stress on its institutions (www, Jordan and Population, 2007). As global warming continues to pressure environments creating conditions for additional failed states among LDCs, then, more migrations are likely to occur in a kind of domino effect (Diamond, 2005; Lean, 2007).

The implications are that global migrations in the relatively near future have been much underestimated and could reach major proportions in the next 15-20 years (deGaetano, 2007; Gore, 2006). Threats from such migrations could generate large-scale regional collapses, further pressuring MDCs and their ways of life (Diamond, 2005).

3) What major benefits and detriments are generated by such migrations?

For MDCs, increasing migrations resolve two problems, but generate at least five others (Foner, Rumbaut, and Gold, 2000b; see also www, Migration Reform, 2007). The two resolved include: 1) Migrants provide an inexpensive workforce for employers of relatively unskilled labor (Hanson, 2005; Horowitz, 2001); and 2) Migrants provide young adults that require relatively less socialization when workers in MDCs retire. Several MDC sectors benefit greatly from such laborers, especially agriculture and food-and-accommodations services. Relatively low food costs in the U.S. have in large part been attributed to immigration (Hanson, 2005).

For LDCs, migrants provide a third huge benefit since many immigrants send large portions of their wages back to their home country. In 2000, remittances to Mexico reached amounts greater than tourism or direct foreign investment (Hanson, 2005: 2 ff.). In the Philippines remittances are an explicit growth strategy (DeParle, 2007).

Still, large numbers of migrants in MDCs contribute to at least five problems. One is to integrate migrants into MDC institutions, bureaucracies, and systems. Compared to MDCs’ permanent population, immigrants are disproportionately the equivalent of grade-school dropouts with little experience for working in well-organized capitalist-market systems, and keeping them from easily moving up occupationally (Hanson, 2005). Consequently, even moderately educated migrants find themselves unemployed and in poverty, feeling discrimination and resentment that causes alienation from receiving countries’ institutions (Junn, 2000). Such alienation is a basic cause of drug use, violence, crime, and imprisonment (AP, 7-30-07; Horowitz, 2001).

Second, because almost any job in an MDC pays more than immigrants received in their sending LDCs, migrants often work for relatively lower wages (Zolberg, 2000; Hanson, 2005: 43 ff.). Such competition, in turn, reduces pay scales for some permanent MDC working-class
citizens. Such wage differentials also make it easier for employers to undermine union agreements, thus decreasing already low percentages of workers who belong to unions, along with the pay-scales and benefits that formerly accrued to many workers (Hanson, 2005). This contributes to some MDC workers’ resentments, as expressed in their anti-migrant attitudes.

Third, because immigrants have larger families, they tend to put strains on health, welfare, educational, and even prison systems in their new MDC settings, both in terms of numbers to be attended to, and costs of maintaining facilities to serve them (Junn, 2000; Horowitz, 2001). Such costs also make permanent MDC citizens resentful, sparking contentious anti-immigrant sentiments and behaviors on several levels (Letters, 6-3-07; Bernstein, 2007).

Fourth, since many immigrants are undocumented, MDC authorities have had to devise complex and expensive methods to mobilize both public and private institutions to deal with them (Lahav, 2000; Horowitz, 2001, Barbassa, 2007). But, using otherwise well-organized private economic institutions and employers for discovering, and, in effect, policing, undocumented people again strains relations among immigrants, employers, permanent residents and even local authorities in destination communities (Lahav, 2000; Horowitz, 2001; Hanson, 2005). Further, as undocumented workers and use of these tactics continue to increase, relations among employers, immigrants, and community leaders could get even worse (Barbassa, 2007).

And, fifth, some immigrants’ cultures are fundamentally at odds with receiving MDCs’ cultures, for example, on ultimate authority in society (Zolberg, 2000). Current conflicts between radical Islamic movements and secular capitalist democracies in Western Europe are potentially explosive (Bawer, 2007; Landler and Kuldish, 2007). Radical Islamists believe ultimate authority rests in the Koran and sharia law as interpreted by key religious figures. Capitalist political democracies see such authority in secular politically-organized states, their laws, and their courts (see www, Islam and secularism, 2007). Resulting tensions have spilled into violence on both sides (Bawer, 2007; Associated Press, 2007b). Similar questioning of authority also exists in the U.S., for example, over the “rights” of undocumented migrants to live in the U. S. (Horowitz, 2001; McKinley, 2007).

If immigration into MDCs is likely to increase indefinitely, then MDC citizens and policymakers, calling such migration detrimental, will be much more likely to object. Global migration as a detriment would seem to depend, then, on whether undocumented migrants, especially, can be controlled or reduced in numbers.
4) What social theories can be used in understanding the increasing growth in migration, and perhaps can contribute to mitigating such migrations in order to avert larger-scale detriments and even global disaster?

Social theories can provide systematic analysis to social issues (Mills, 1959). On migration issues, two key questions are foremost. One is to identify theoretically why LDCs have more people available for migration than MDCs, and a second is to identify what can be done in LDCs to reduce their migration flows.

On the first question, demographers and geographers interpret migration as an outcome of the well-accepted theory of the “demographic transition” (Montgomery, 2007). Figure 1 schematically depicts the basis that generates this theory. It shows at least four general “types” of societies in history, each with different demographic features that affect migration (Lenski and Lenski, 1987). As seen in Figure 1, these societal types form the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis shows their different birth and death rates.

Figure 1. Demographic Transition as “Development” Using “Idealized” Data.

The top left in Figure 1 depicts relatively less complex pre-urban societies that make up the bulk of human history. Their very high birth and death rates hovered at about 50 births for every 1,000 people, and about 49.5 deaths per 1,000 (their many perturbations due largely to environmental fluctuations). Hence, their rates of natural increase were very low, and could be easily destroyed through drought, famine, or other natural devastations.
After the last Ice Age, ending about 12,000 years ago, the environment changed rather dramatically, causing migrations of animals and people (Swain, 1950; Diamond, 2000), putting various population groupings in greater contact, as well as conflict, with each other. In these migrations certain tribes began to dominate others, some eventually living in central places (“cities”) from which they reorganized subject tribes’ agricultural production beyond subsistence-levels, thereby stabilizing their food production and distribution systems (Jacobs, 1969; Lenski and Lenski, 1987; Diamond, 2000). A major result was reduced death rates. But, because their birth rates remained high, their population sizes grew (symbolized in Figure 1 by the area between birth and death rates). Some urban-agrarian societies became quite large, such as the Roman Empire, but it also declined when its agriculture deteriorated (Lenski and Lenski, 1987), pushing regions inside it backwards toward ones featuring higher birth and death rates.

Still, after the Roman Empire fell in Italy, certain agrarian societies slowly re-urbanized, especially in Western Europe, once again learning, through social and technological “inventions” (e.g. genetic selection), how to increase food surpluses and their distributions. Eventually, starting around 1750, they also learned industrial techniques that turned them into urban-industrial societies. Further, due to learning more about “public” health, they generated safer water and sewerage systems, thus further reducing their death rates (Polanyi, 1957a; Lenski and Lenski, 1987). But, even in urban-industrial societies, birth rates tended to remain higher than death rates for three to six generations even as their death rates plummeted. As more applications of “science” took hold, these societies saw declining rates of natural increase and population growth, while also rapidly producing surpluses in goods and services.

Finally, due to a variety of factors connecting urbanization and industrialization, most urban-industrialized countries moved into “post-industrial” MDCs of low birth rates (at about 10 per 1,000), and low death rates (just below 10 per 1,000) that keeps their rates of natural increase quite low or even negative (Fig. 1, lower right). Birth rates probably declined because, after about three generations in cities, families recognize that raising children in cities is an economic liability (due to their long periods of “unproductive socialization”) rather than economic assets (even young children in urban-agrarian societies are “productive” in tending chickens, sheep, cattle, etc.). With higher educational levels and more complex technologies that apply outcomes from formalized science (Lenski and Lenski, 1987), post-industrial MDCs enter services phases
Demographic-transition theory, then, helps to explain why LDCs, which are essentially urban-agrarian societies, have surplus populations from which small percentages migrate as well as how such population surpluses might be reduced, that is by becoming urban-industrial (or even post-industrial) societies. In the current global world, most LDCs have stable food supplies, and increasingly modern sewerage and health systems, that lower their death rates to virtually the same levels as MDCs. But, due in large part to their large agrarian populations and traditions, as seen in Table 1 their birth rates remain higher, also keeping their rates of natural increase much higher than MDCs. About 50 percent of their populations are age 20 and younger (hence highly fertile), among whom poverty and unemployment rates are also very high (estimated at between 20 and 50 percent), from which some migrate (averaging 1 percent), especially when wage differentials between MDCs and LDCs rise, as they have in recent years, which people in LDCs recognize through their global media.

Still, movement from one societal type to another is not automatic, and demographic-transition theory does not explain why industrialization happens in certain LDCs and not others. A key difference may be the percentages of people in urban settings. As seen in Table 1, an average over 75 percent of MDCs’ populations live in urban places, while LDCs average only slightly over 40 percent. In contemporary LDCs, most rural people migrate to urban centers largely due to being “pushed” from subsistence agriculture by “industrialized” agriculture that employs fewer people, while some are pulled to urban settings by job opportunities. Yet, even cities as large and powerful as those in the Roman Empire urbanized without industrializing. Thus, the connection is not automatic. A theory additional to demographic-transition theory, then, has to be found to make the connection.

The second theory should be about the transition from urban-agrarian to urban-industrial societies. Although most scholars probably look to macro-economic theory to explain such “development” (Heilbroner, 1953), sociologists tend to rely more on political governance as the stage-setter for economic life. Classical sociologists Emile Durkheim (1933) and Max Weber (1928, 1947, 1958, 1961) both addressed these issues. Weber, especially, delved deep into the histories of every major civilization to uncover why certain civilizations in Western Europe industrialized, thereby taking major proportions of their populations out of agriculture and
putting them into manufacturing and services industries in urban settings (Weber, 1961; Collins, 1980).

His conclusion was that, only when a series of events occurred were societies likely to move from urban-agrarian to urban-industrial societies (Weber, 1961, esp. chs. 7-9; Yinger, 1957). The most proximate cause of industrialization was the generation of capitalist conditions. Capitalism features, mainly, the three major factors of production (land, labor, and capital) being subjected to the interrelations of private enterprises under “market conditions.” In other words, to Weber capitalism was probably a precursor to industrialization, or at the very least they emerged nearly simultaneously (Yinger, 1957). Capital was the first in history to go “onto” the market (Polanyi, 1957b), followed by land, and finally by labor (Weber, 1961), the latter two happening infrequently in history, but almost simultaneously in England in the early 18th century and Western Europe only a bit later (Polanyi, 1957a).

Further, Weber asserted that these conditions only happened, first, when societies feature relatively large urban areas; and, second, when these urban places generate relatively autonomous accountable (democratic or proto-democratic), rational-legal secular governments which had widespread legitimacy among wealthier merchant (upper-middle) and land-owning (upper) classes (Weber, 1961; Swanson, 1967). Struggles for such autonomy often involved considerable violence, as in the Protestant Reformation and Counter Reformation (Swain, 1950; Latourette, 1952; Polanyi, 1957a; Swanson, 1967). The third essential condition was when cities featured a culture of widespread literacy (from which science evolved) and social ethics of mutual obligation, as provided through the Protestant Reformation, largely in countries, or parts of countries, whose “final” religion was Protestant (Swanson, 1967; Parkin, 1982).

Figure 2 summarizes these arguments in a schematic path-analytic form (common in sociological analyses). It shows the five essential features that in history stand in causal order to each other (the arrows indicate “causes over time” on a probabilistic – stochastic -- basis, since their appearance is not automatic). A capitalist economic system was essential for industrialization, with its accumulation of surpluses of goods and services for fulfilling people’s everyday needs (bottom of the diagram). No non-capitalist civilization ever industrialized (Weber, 1961).
A capitalist economic system has several essential features, including: 1) privatizing the appropriation of most natural and built resources; 2) putting capital, land, labor, and other commodities under largely unrestricted market conditions, whereby prices were generally set by demand for a product and costs of production (supply); 3) widespread and stable extension of credit systems through banks and other institutions, that are “openly” accessible to a variety of private enterprises; and 4) applying rational calculable accounting systems to the various forms of capital generated by organizations (Weber, 1961). When these conditions were met in the Western European LDCs of the 18th and early 19th centuries, then these LDCs tended to become MDCs, with greater quantities (and increasing quality) of goods and services produced in them.

People and institutions in MDCs currently take these practices for granted in making the myriad of decisions that determine distributions of goods and services in them. But, such conditions stand in stark contrast to how people in LDCs make decisions. In general, LDCs (including feudal societies in Western Europe) feature huge inequalities in wealth, power, and
decision making, and the very wealthy and powerful (patrons) make key decisions, while their clients follow (Weber, 1947; Rashid, 2005; Packer, 2005, 2006).

Although three essential factors cause a capitalist system (urbanization, autonomous accountable governments, and a culture of literacy), they also have essential elements of their own (Weber (1961). Urban places (upper-left in Figure 2) have: 1) Large numbers of people available to work, as a labor supply, in various ways in complex political and economic systems of relationships; 2) Numbers of people sufficient for generating “demand” for various commodity markets; and 3) Trade by private entrepreneurs within and outside their borders (“linkages”). These three features are general in cities throughout history. But, urbanization, without “popularly” accountable governments and widespread literacy and widespread literacy, is insufficient to produce industrialization. In general, in urban-agrarian societies only seldom were merchants and craftspeople entirely free to supply products -- production and distribution were usually officially controlled by political-economic elite patrons, and thus comparatively haphazard (Weber, 1961; Polanyi, 1957b; Packer, 2005).

Autonomous, Secular, Accountable, Rational-Legal Political Systems were also seen by Weber (1961) as well as Brooks (2007), Friedman (2007), and Packer (2005) as essential conditions for the appearance of capitalism followed by industrial surpluses (Helliwell, 1992). These political systems were characterized by a stable set of laws enforced by government agencies that were based on bureaucratic principles (continuity, training, merit, and levels of management; Weber, 1946, 1947). The laws themselves came, usually, from democratically elected “representatives” of the people, and were generated in a “rational” manner, that is, guided by the principle of cause and effect – the major laws were put in place in order to produce specific sets of results (and not due to the whimsy of government officials appointed by “higher” authorities who want to enhance their control over people and resources). Moreover, such laws were changed or rescinded only after thoughtful consideration, so that they were also “calculable.” Thus, these societies were based on “calculable rational laws,” not on “great men” (patrons). The laws were also enforced through a series of relatively autonomous courts that “interpreted” the laws for specific situations when disputes arose rather than courts whose judges served at the “pleasure” of powerful patrons (Weber, 1961). Once a democratic system was in place, then economic growth could happen (Helliwell, 1992).
“Rational-legal” types of political systems again stand in stark contrast to societies dominated by “Great Men,” whether these men were called Kings, Lords, Counts, Barons, Caesars, Pharoahs, Sheiks, Presidents (for life), or any other “traditional” type of authority. In traditional societies, authorities (great men or “patrons”) negotiate with each other (patron to patron), or with those beholden to patrons (patron to “clients”), in establishing patterns of relationships (Packer, 2005: esp. chs. 7, 8; Gordon, 2007).

In other words, in getting things done people in LDCs rely more on personal networks than people in MDCs who rely more on formal organizational, institutional, and/or bureaucratic networks (Weber, 1961). Due to their “gentlemen’s agreements” and their networks, certain LDC population segments can turn local environmental disruptions into “political” disruptions as in Rwanda (Chossudovsky, 1995), and Uzbekistan (Rashid, 2002), which, when given support from international terrorists like Al-Qaeda or other Jihadists, turn them into international issues (Rashid, 2002; Packer, 2006). Especially since their national authorities are not equipped to generate local-level alternate responses reasonably quickly or even at all, such causation chains appear widespread in LDCs (Packer, 2005).

The arrow from Cities to Autonomous (although not initially Secular or Democratic) Political Systems (as well as Capitalist Economic Systems) indicates that, throughout history, larger cities had strong tendencies to struggle for political and economic autonomy, and expanded trade by private entrepreneurs, even if mostly with unsuccessful overall results due to regulations and controls by kings, lords, patrons, or other “strong men” (Weber, 1958; Polanyi, 1958b).

In the contemporary world, most LDCs are still governed through “traditional” forms (Rashid, 2005; Packer, 2005, 2006), where “strong-man” patrons are key. They are the local power elite, and those in the largest cities are the national power elite. This form of governance has become increasingly clear in Iraq (Packer, 2005; Gordon, 2007), but even in Ghana as well (Quashie, 2003). Yet, without a “society of laws” that at some point supersedes a “society of men,” it is probably impossible for an LDC to become an MDC (Weber, 1961; Tausch, 2006). Giving control to a U.S. Constitution, for example, which is based on a set of ideas that establishes a “process” of individualism, equality, liberty, democracy, justice, and mutuality (“general welfare”) under laws for resolving conflicts and generating development, is a huge step for LDC strong men to accept (Packer, 2005: esp. Epilogue).
A particular kind of culture is a third essential condition that preceded capitalism. Although cultures come in many forms, the culture which preceded the initial appearance of capitalism featured: 1) Widespread literacy (education); 2) Mutual ethical obligations between people in society; and 3) Devotion to innovation and social change, hence invention and science (Weber, 1961; Parkin, 1982). These principles were also consistent with those of the Protestant Reformation (Weber, 1930; Parkin, 1982).

The relatively simple theoretical model in Figure 2 has, in general, had large impacts in contemporary LDCs. Still, two essential aspects have been omitted. One is the equality-inequality variable (the social-justice variable), and the second is the social-disruptions (social order) variable (Huntington, 1968; Packer, 2005). Indeed, it is widely held that disruptions in social order are often caused by social injustices (Rashid, 2005; Packer, 2005, 2006). The distribution system is quite contentious in contemporary MDCs as well, generating actual and perceived inequalities and injustices (among others, Grusky, 2001; DeNavis-Wait, Proctor, and Smith, 2007; Roberts, 2007; Lowenstein, 2007). Such injustices range from those of institutional discrimination to inequalities in taxation. In contemporary MDCs, these issues, along with adaptation to technologies, are driving forces in social change (Grusky, 2001). Yet, compared to employment, poverty, and other distribution issues in LDCs, people in MDCs are doing much better, which is one reason LDCs contain strong forces seeking development despite the huge disruptions and dislocations many experience, including control by mostly inaccessible Patrons, in moving toward development (Leonhardt, 2007).

In any case, if LDCs would experience the confluence of the top four variables in Figure 2, as, for instance, MDCs have done previously and the “Asian Tigers” have done more recently, then they are much more likely to become capitalist-oriented MDCs that produce many surpluses, and less migration, among their people.

5) What in these theories can provide policy directions for dealing more adequately with global migrations?

Demographic-transition theory informs us that: 1) LDCs will continue to produce surplus populations some of whom will migrate (and increasingly if wage differentials increase between LDCs and MDCs); 2) Birth rates will not decline until LDCs become urbanized and industrialized enough to produce surpluses in goods and services; and 3) Transitions from LDCs
to MDCs do not occur automatically. Political-economic development theory adds three further conditions necessary for capitalism, industrialization (and increasing surpluses of goods, services, and incomes) to occur: 1) Widespread urbanization; 2) Widespread education (literacy) along with ethics of mutual accountability, and commitment to innovation and social change; and 3) Widespread autonomous, accountable, and secular local governments. Diamond (2005) further adds that neutralizing (or reversing) global warming to reduce migrations that, both directly and indirectly, put increasing financial and social pressures on MDCs. Without moving LDCs toward greater development will only increase migrations from LDCs to MDCs that can overwhelm MDC institutions and lifestyles (DeParle, 2007).

Both theories would use urbanization in initiating LDC development strategies. No matter what a society’s religion or stances on birth control, urban people who receive more education, especially for females, increase employment and income, eventually reducing their birth rates, as well as incentives for migration (Jejeebhoy, 1996; Hanson, 2005). Further, internal migrations to urban centers in LDCs are often linked to global economic activities in which some LDC people find opportunities, even if global contacts with MDCs’ multi-national corporations (MNCs) may be initially disruptive to others in LDCs (Leonhardt, 2007). Reduced out-migration rates probably help both MDCs and LDCs in their ultimate goals of substantially providing for their people.

Urbanization also tends to cause people to come together to resolve their mutual problems, generate proto-markets and trade, education, and even governments with rational-legal institutions (Polany, 1957b; Weber, 1958). Diversity in cities seems to cause pluralism, which encourages tolerant and responsive governments, even if, throughout history as well as in contemporary LDCs, cities are seldom permitted the autonomous, accountable, and secular conditions necessary that would generate capitalism, industrialization, and resulting surpluses for providing a majority of people with greater income, more employment, reduced poverty, and, hence, disincentives for migration (Packer, 2005: ch. 5, esp. 341 ff.; Rashid, 2005). Further, accountable secular governments induce literacy and a commitment to social change, things generally desired by LDC populations (Tausch, 2005; Leonhardt, 2007).

Moreover, sufficient green technologies are already known, even if not fully operational, so that in relatively short timelines they could be made available to reduce global warming (Martin, 2006). Despite attempts by the petroleum-industry funded “denial machine” that global
warming exists (Begley, 2007), many MDC political and economic leaders have initiated national efforts to find and implement efficient green technologies (Begley, 2007; Reichman, 2007; Quinn, 2007; Kugler, 2007a, b; Breslau, 2007; Johnston, 2007). Thus, certain MDC power elites are both getting the green message, and acting on it (Begley, 2007). If they would share these technologies with LDCs, then clearly MDCs strategies for reducing global warming and LDC development would be closely intertwined.

Dealing with Migration: Conclusions

Can people, policy leaders, and institutions in both MDCs and LDCs bring about these conditions? Although a place for both LDC and MDC policy leaders to start is with growing urban places in LDCs, in moving LDCs toward becoming MDCs, their political and economic leaders face at least six huge challenges.

1) Four-fifths of the world’s populations live in LDCs, a few of them emerging MDCs (India and China being the largest with Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and a few others farther ahead). These LDCs are often suffering from fresh-water problems, over-high salinity in their soils, and current inabilities to be agriculturally self-sufficient (Diamond, 2005; Carmichael, 2007; Lean, 2007). MDCs’ MNCs relish the profits from supplying such food while other MNCs extract natural resources from the LDCs, representing two major reasons for resentment by LDC peoples. These LDCs also have many unemployed, restless, young people, poorly educated often in religious rather than secular schools, some seeking to blame others for their poverty-level conditions, a small but committed number bent on destroying MDCs’ institutions in whatever ways they can, and still others seeking to migrate to MDCs for a better life for themselves. In other words, most LDCs have many “local” problems needing to be addressed, that is unlikely to happen, and thus are ripe for fomenting extensive violence as well as increased emigration (Rashid, 2002; Diamond, 2005; Packer, 2006; Biden, 2007).

2) Costs are massive, both to effectively undertake LDC urban development and to reduce global warming. A recent report by the Electric Power Research Institute estimates the costs to make energy technologies green (about one-third of the U.S. total carbon emissions) at $400 billion to $1.8 trillion over the next four decades (Zibel, 2007). This $45 billion per year is only 1.7 percent of annual U.S. national expenditures (totaling $2.7 trillion), 0.34 percent of U.S. annual gross domestic product ($13.2 trillion), and just over 10.7 percent of the U.S. annual
growth to GDP ($422 billion). Adding to these the costs for reducing the remaining two-thirds of carbon emissions, and for urban development in LDCs, makes the costs rather overwhelming. Still, to deal with both global warming and migrations, enduring these costs may the least expensive ways to reduce both carbon emissions and LDC-to-MDC migrations.

3) MDCs’ own “dirty” technologies currently ignore the important system-level consequences that link global warming to LDCs’ political failures, thence to greater migrations, and needs for greater overall use of green technologies. To bring LDCs and their four-fifths of the world’s populations quickly into high energy-consuming, carbon-exhuming industrial systems under existing dirty technologies would be a global-warming environmental disaster. China’s urban atmospheres, for example, are already close to being lethal and its rivers are saturated with industrial wastes (Kahn and Yardley, 2007). To foist other LDCs into an industrialized world under existing technologies would greatly contribute to global-warming disasters, creating even more conflagrations and migrations (Diamond, 2005). Whether LDCs obtain green technologies, then, depends upon when MDCs get green technologies, and their willingness to readily share them with LDCs (or only make them available at similarly huge costs in a capitalist-market system to the detriment of the world’s environment).

4) MDCs’ people’s preoccupation with maintaining current lifestyles (while ignoring or opposing effective foreign policies) generate huge reluctances to radically tax themselves or change their lifestyles, thus casting doubt that the massive but necessary expenditures to bring LDCs into a post-industrial green world can be mobilized (Begley, 2007). If global warming due to industrial development in both MDCs and LDCs is not addressed, then, as noted above, migrations will become exacerbated in the future. MDCs’ choices are to address costly green technologies very soon, or face increasing welfare and other costs due to increased migrations in the near future.

5) MDCs’ Multinational Corporations’ (MNCs’) concerns for profits rather than for LDC development tend to undermine rather than support LDC governmental- and economic-system investments, capitalistic “free markets” (for land, labor, and capital), and LDCs’ national and local governments’ capabilities in using investments effectively for dealing with people’s major problems on a routine rational-legal basis. Instead, MNCs tend to “buy off” local patrons in order to extract LDCs resources at a fraction of their worldwide market value (Barnet and Mueller, 1974; Sen, 1999; Weisman, 2007).
6) According to the political-economic development theory underlying Figure 2, a key issue will be to get aid to the local level (Rashid, 2002; Packer, 2006; Biden, 2007). The Grameen Bank and its micro-financing has had decent success with such strategies, at least enough for its founder to receive a Nobel Prize, and induced the World Bank to change strategies somewhat (World Bank, 2007; Leonhardt, 2007). Such evidence and reasoning also seem compatible with tribal realities in LDCs (Rashid; Packer, 2005), and Biden, 2007). But, LDCs (tribal) leaders at some point will have to be induced to give up large parts of their local control to more rational-legal systems (Weber, 1961; Packer, 2005; Liu, 2007; Gordon, 2007; Brooks, 2007).

To implement effective multi-pronged development strategies to meet these challenges will not be easy. Our findings indicate, for instance, that, even if global warming is neutralized, and many theorists believe it can be, increasing emigration from LDCs to MDCs will continue into the foreseeable future. Growing differentials in wages, lifestyles, and political-economic rational orderliness in MDCs continue to lure increasing numbers of people to migrate legally and illegally. To integrate more lower-skilled migrants into lower-paying jobs in MDCs’ institutions and economy will financially and logistically stress MDCs’ educational, health, and welfare institutions.

If MDCs can’t control their borders for undocumented immigrants (and they haven’t been able to), if green technologies are too expensive for MDCs’ populations’ lifestyles, including increasing costs for life’s essentials (food, housing, and transportation, especially), and if MDCs’ MNCs’ profits continue to increase while MNCs’ peoples demonstrate little commitment to bring LDCs into a post-industrial, urban, green world, then it appears the increasing global migrations already underway will continue largely unabated despite their contentiousness (Bernstein, 2007). If uncontrolled, they both gradually threaten MDC lifestyles, and probably challenge MDCs’ traditional secular political economies.

From these analyses, four priorities in MDCs’ policies stand out, each one very expensive, but perhaps not overwhelmingly costly.

First, the generation of policies in MDCs to produce more effective green technologies in counteracting global warming is imperative.

Second, unless these green technologies are shared with the rest of the world (China, India, Indonesia, Russia, Eastern Europe, even other MDCs, etc.) as quickly as possible,
migrations will also continue. If the world’s countries do not implement such green technologies soon, then it will not matter much if the U.S. adopts them – global warming with all its unthinkable attendant consequences will overtake us anyway.

Third, to resolve major developmental problems in LDCs, especially for more extensive education, especially of women, will require massive MDC aid. Such education in LDCs, and especially women’s education, seems essential for reducing birth rates and for overall LDC development.

Fourth, focusing on adequately rationalizing the increasing urbanization occurring in LDCs is probably the place to start. Urbanization plus rationalized, autonomous (and secular) governance systems produce population densities that enable people to form various collective social, political, and economic associations empowering them to deal more adequately with their people’s individual and collective problems (Tocqueville, 1835; Packer, 2005; Friedman, 2007). Sharing MDC experiences and resources on these issues by helping LDC officials and people make accountable governments work effectively in mobilizing resources to resolve their basic education, health, welfare, and economic development could ultimately mitigate migrations and their effects. Although such a program has not been undertaken previously, based on both the historical and contemporary records, it seems promising for the future.

Costs for such cooperative development will be very high, especially for people and organizations in MDCs, and so far political leaders have not publicly addressed such costs. Yet, a concerted world effort, for instance whereby each MDC would become responsible for bringing 10 or more LDCs into a post-industrial world in two decades, seems essential and possible (just as the Asian Tigers did it). Such costs would surely disrupt many lives in MDCs, as well as MNCs’ their World Trade Organization sponsored “global markets.” Burdening MDCs with such costs at present seems implausible. But, without such burdens the trends noted above seem inevitable.

As the last few minutes of the eleventh hour are upon us, the outcomes of these trends will undoubtedly become even more clarified. Along with Diamond (2005), Gore (2006, 2007), and others, we only hope that worldwide political and economic leaders cooperatively will have guided major effective steps for addressing these major trends. Much in the coming crises will induce major changes; but it is a leap of faith in the processes the MDCs, and the U.S. in particular created through the liberty-equality-mutuality-democracy-justice ideas behind its
Constitution, to which we all in MDCs have, in effect, taken an oath of allegiance that ultimately “good things for all” will be the major outcomes of these processes.

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