

## **The West Indian Diaspora to the USA: Remittances and Development of the Homeland**

Aubrey W. Bonnett, SUNY College at Old Westbury

### **Abstract:**

In a global world in which more than 150 million people migrate from one country to another every year, the new black diaspora, now termed transnational and very circular in nature, is quite different from the initial diaspora born of slavery or that born of colonialism and post-colonialism. It is argued, that within the late twentieth century, and now in the new millennium, the transnational forces of the new migrations have brought into play a different and new diaspora which contributes more money to the homeland, has redrawn the political interconnections between the “homelands” and the host society, and now plays a pivotal intervening role in the reconstruction of “home”.

Finally, it is contended that it behooves the homeland(s) of the sending societies, to establish facilitating, structural arrangements at the national governmental levels, to ensure that there is transparency, mutuality, efficacy and accountability in these evolving relationships, especially in an increasingly globally interconnected world.

### **Introduction and the Concept of Home**

It often is said that you can't go home again. Indeed, was it not Stuart Hall who said that “You can go home again, you just can't stay?”<sup>1</sup> Roy Bryce La Porte continues this argument by contending that because there exists a wide range of differences in the manner and condition in which Blacks have left their ancestral or native homelands in the process of being dispersed all over the world, some rather interesting dimensions have begun to develop among blacks in the diaspora with regard to these notions of “home.”<sup>2</sup>

Hence the concept “home” or “homeland” for Blacks in the diaspora may refer to different places, real or imagined, in their treks across the continent and passages across the ocean to the city or locality of their present abode.<sup>3</sup> Further, for these diasporic Blacks, Bryce La Porte pointedly contends that “home” “ may well be their official country of origin or birth, adopted country of resettlement or nationality, or their intermediate country of passage; for others ,it may be a spiritual or biblical reference.” For those who seek to “return” it may well refer to a set of conditions or state of being, a condition or state to be striven for, emulated, or

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constructed, or a place of destination (not always coincident with their precise place of origin) to which they hope to (re)migrate, (re) settle, prosper and retire. <sup>4</sup>

Contextually, this debate rings true for many in the black diaspora of old. Initially torn from the motherland (Africa) by greed and profit, initialized by slavery and a new world plantation system, diasporic Blacks were forcibly transplanted to strange new homelands in Europe, minimally and maximally to the New World nations of Latin America; North, South, and Central America; and the Caribbean.

During slavery, emancipation and the end of slavery, these diasporic Blacks were so forcibly stripped of their culture that they had no realistic notion of “home”—namely Africa—or in some instances had a distorted, and anglicized or europeanized version of what “home” is (was). To be sure there were exceptions where diasporic Blacks returned to Africa—Sierra Leone and Liberia for example—and became one again with their “sending” societies. And, yes, there were millenarian and nationalistic movements—Garveyism, Father Divine, Black Muslims, and the like—that focused on the glories of the “motherland” (Africa) and worked to spark the liberation of all dispossessed Blacks in the homeland and the diaspora. But, generally, “home” for diasporic Blacks was constituted by the societies to which their forefathers were dragged, subjugated, and resocialized—societies in Jamaica, Brazil, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba for example. This was the homeland for these dispersed peoples. In many of these societies, especially Latin and Central American ones, diasporic Blacks formed a minority; they were marginalized and their cultures amalgamated by massive European immigration or incorporation of Native American elements. This was, generally, not so for those blacks in the Anglo-Caribbean nations of Jamaica, Guyana (formerly British

Guiana), Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Haiti, in whose societies Blacks formed the numerical majority.

Initially ruled by colonial white minorities, these groups became acculturated Creoles, while others held on to remnants or residuals of African cultures—largely nostalgic and symbolic—in societies in geographically-sited areas called the West Indies. Save for the original native Amerindian populations, the West Indies often have been described as migration – oriented societies, inasmuch as they have been brought into being, first by voluntary migrations, later by the process and effects of involuntary forced migrations, and later still by indentured servitude to other immigrants from Asia and Europe. With the abolition of slavery, the formal ending of colonialism, and the granting of political independence and nationhood, many nationals found that this new status did not drastically alter their economic relationship with their international metropolitan former masters in any meaningful way. In some instances, as a result of larger international “macro” forces, their economic situations worsened internally as their now “national” governments were unable to provide them with economic viability, even as they flaunted their political independence and tried to find ways, collectively and otherwise, to become meaningful players on the world stage.

In an effort to deal with these dilemmas, West Indians began to migrate to look for work and economic security. First, these migrations focused internally on countries such as Panama, Costa Rica, and even Cuba, and from the smaller islands, such as Barbados and Grenada, for example, to larger land masses such as Guyana where immigrants moved to earn their livelihood. Predominantly, however, the greater migrations were to the United Kingdom, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, prior to political independence, and, in even larger numbers, to the United States , after the passage of the sweeping post-liberal national immigration legislation , known

as the Mc Carran-Walter Act of 1952. The United States after World War II, had replaced the United Kingdom as the undisputed leader of the free world, and, with rapid industrialization and a burgeoning economy, had shifted its immigration policy to capture immigrants coming from the former colonial territories—albeit now touting a new political symbol of independent nation-states.<sup>5</sup>

Specifically, this paper looks at the migration to the United States of black diasporic Afro-Caribbeans from Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, post-1965, their adaptations to their new “homes” and relations with their old sending societies—“back home”. It takes as its point of departure the perspective of remittances, cultural, material and financial; the new political formulations; and the attempt to use human, social, and economic capital to foster homeland development and modernization.

### **The Homelands; Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago: A Brief Overview**

These four nation-states are the four most populous in the Anglo Caribbean, but are quite varied in their populations; their economic, political and demographic formulations; their levels of political legitimacy and stability; the way they relate to their Diasporas; and the levels of interest shown in diaspora development “back home”.

Jamaica has the largest population, domestically, and also has the largest numbers—although not percentage—of migrants abroad in the United States. It also has the largest number of Afro-Caribbeans in its local population base. Its economy currently is not as diversified as Trinidad and Tobago’s, and its economic situation is not as well positioned, in the global arena as those of either Barbados or Trinidad, although much better than Guyana’s.

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Trinidad and Tobago has been called a “plural society”, as is Guyana, in that they both have large segments of East Indians, originally brought to these nations as indentured immigrants to undercut the new, evolving economic and political viability of the emancipated Afro-Caribbean slaves, many of whom had established villages and village systems from which to launch a real version of emancipation.<sup>6</sup> This was not to happen, as the colonial power, England, used both race and ethnicity to “divide and rule” these two groups and to create deep divisions, hatred, and mistrust, much of which still remain in these two nations, and have contributed to large political majorities.<sup>7</sup> Conceptually, a plural society is defined thus by anthropologist and Caribbeanist R.T. Smith “The basic idea is that certain societies, among them those of the Caribbean region, appear to be made up of a number of sub –societies, each of which is an integrated entity with its own culture, while relations between these sub-societies are established and maintained solely by political dominance and force”. He continues: “No peaceful change in the social system is possible because the sections have nothing in common except involvement in economic and political relations which are essentially antagonistic.”

Trinidad and Tobago, with more cross-cutting cultural alliances and allegiances in the form of creolization, a more astute political leadership class, and definitely more geographically relevant natural resources in the form of oil, has been able to build a more robust and economically viable, and less fractious society than has Guyana.<sup>8</sup>

Barbados, like Jamaica, has a sizeable majority of Afro-Caribbeans; however, unlike Jamaica, since political independence, it has had more political stability—the best of the four nations-states under review. Its economy has been vibrant and growing, has drawn many internal migrants from the other Caribbean island nations and Guyana, and has ranked the highest of the four nations on the UN Social Development Index. Barbados, however, is one of the most

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densely populated regions in the world and has a rigid social stratification system based on a color /class dichotomy that has been largely disadvantageous to Afro-Caribbeans. Historically, this has spurred many members of this group to migrate, first to other Caribbean islands and Guyana, then to Panama, Costa Rica, the United Kingdom, and later to Canada and the United States. Today, even with Afro-Caribbeans in Barbados firmly entrenched in control of the political elite, economic control still is vested largely in local whites and foreign hands and, some commentators on the local political landscape argue that the local political elite still fronts as a shadow government for the white population segment.

In summary, what happened in these four nation-states, and generally in the other micro states in the West Indies, is that the attainment of political independence did not radically improve their economic situation. This became a tremendous and formidable push factor in the migratory thrust. But why choose the United States, given its long history of hostility toward people of color? Historian Calvin B. Holder puts it this way: “Why, given the long history of American hostility toward people of color, have hundreds of thousands of Blacks and other people of color voluntarily emigrated to the U.S.? Economic factors have always been the major motivating reason. Simply put, the U.S., and particularly its northern states, has offered these immigrants opportunities for self-improvement and material advancement that their homelands have proved incapable of providing.”<sup>9</sup> Because of this, he continues, immigrants from the West Indies have generally put aside their concerns and reservations about American racism and flocked here when the opportunity has presented itself. And, once in the United States, they have held steadfastly to the view that racism should not be accepted as a legitimate reason for the failure of people of color—foreign or native born—to succeed.<sup>10</sup> This view, he contends, is

especially entrenched among the post-1965 immigrants, now that legal segregation has been dismantled.<sup>11</sup>

To summarize, for Afro-Caribbeans—the modal ethnic grouping in what is commonly known as the West Indies, and clearly a sizeable numerical demographic proportion of the four nations (homelands) under review—poverty, and to a lesser extent political instability and class/color prejudice in their homelands, also have been instrumental “push” factors for immigration to the United States.<sup>12</sup>

### **West Indian Immigration to the U.S. 1965: A Brief Overview**

Voluntary migration to the U.S. from the Caribbean began in the nineteenth century, primarily after the abolition of slavery in the U.S. in 1865; by the end of the nineteenth century several thousand immigrants from the English and French West Indies resided in Boston, New York City, and Miami.<sup>13</sup> However, it was the twentieth century that witnessed the full bloom of this movement of peoples.

Between 1900 and the Great Depression, well over 150,000 migrated. Migration was halted by the restrictive Immigration Act of 1924 and the subsequent economic crisis, but resumed after World War II though it was quickly terminated with the passage of the conservative 1952 Immigration Act. The 1965 Immigration Act liberalized the nation’s immigration policy, resulting in new immigration, which still continues today.<sup>14</sup>

As indicated earlier, the major push factors were (are) overcrowding (save for Guyana); a rigidly stratified economic system leading to unequal distribution of wealth and land; limited economic opportunities; poor economic conditions; and, at times, harsh political realities that

resulted in perceived political persecution.<sup>15</sup> And it is largely in the United States, and then in Canada and the United Kingdom that West Indians have sought refuge.

Generally the term “West Indian” refers to immigrants from the Anglophone Caribbean, including Anguilla, Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, Montserrat, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Vincent and the American and British Virgin Islands.<sup>16</sup> The immigrants themselves use this appellation, and so do others.

Since 1965 most of the immigrants have settled in the Northeast corridors, creating urban communities in Boston, Newark, (New Jersey), Hartford (Connecticut), and New York City, with large communities in Miami as well. They settled in Brooklyn and Queens and formed ethnic enclaves in East Flatbush, Flatbush, Crown Heights, Canarsie , Midwood(in Brooklyn) ,South Ozone , Cambria Heights, Laurelton and Richmond Hill(Queens) for example, and in the suburbs Elmont, Uniondale, Hempstead, and Baldwin on Long Island.<sup>17</sup>

Currently, the United States has two groups of West Indian communities. The first has an Afro-West Indian (Caribbean) majority; small numbers of Indo-West Indians, who are mainly Muslim and Christians; and an indeterminate number of persons of “some other race” or “two or more races”. This group was the first to settle, and is found in Fort Lauderdale, Miami, Boston, and in the greatest part New York City. The second group which did not become naturalized until the 1990s , is comprised mainly of Hindu and Muslim Indo-West Indians, and some multi racial persons who are mainly of Indian/ Black descent , sometimes referred to as “doughlahs”<sup>18</sup> Its residents have come mainly from Trinidad and Guyana. Richmond Hill in Queens and Ozone Park are the best example of this kind of Indo-West Indian ethnic enclave. This group has not had as overwhelming a presence in the United States as have Afro-Caribbeans, especially in their

relations with native African Americans. However, whether skilled or unskilled, Afro- or Indo-West Indians, these West Indian Americans in the United States tend to emphasize a few key goals: education for themselves and their children, social and economic betterment, family unity, and home ownership.<sup>19</sup>

Historically, many West Indian Americans have allied themselves with native African Americans and other dispossessed Americans in the political fight for civil and economic rights, and still play that role, although their interactions over the years have not been without conflict. Many of their children—second and third generation Americans—along with the children of African immigrants, have outperformed Whites, and certainly African Americans, in their entry and success into elite professional colleges.<sup>20</sup>

I have argued, elsewhere, that this portrait of earlier educational exceptionalism is only part of this group's profile, for structural shifts in the United States economy mean that segments of this community will suffer negative socio-psychological and economic adjustments to migration, coupled with constricted assimilation to American society.<sup>21</sup> Pressures against full assimilation are also greater for lower-class West Indians; while typically middle- and upper-class professionals alternate between a more inclusive West Indian American or particularistic African-American identity, the lower /working class chooses a more "ethnically focused, West Indian one".<sup>22</sup>

West Indian immigrants have made New York State and New York City their principal settlement sites with more than half of Barbadians, Guyanese, Trinidadians, and Jamaicans settling in New York, especially Brooklyn and Queens.<sup>23</sup> Today, the United States has approximately 2.6 to three million West Indians (of all races) or about 1 percent of the population.<sup>24</sup> More than seventy-two percent of the Afro- Caribbean (West Indian) population is

foreign –born, and they represent 4.6 percent of the black population. Entrepreneurs continue to flourish in the community, and the 2000 census shows that the median household income of Afro-Caribbeans is \$40,168 which is higher than that of African-American households, but lower than that of immigrants from Africa.

Within this context, we look briefly at this group’s occupational concentration. Professor Calvin Holder, in a recent analysis, points out that West Indians generally have been employed in the private sector of the American economy.<sup>25</sup> According to the 2000 census, he states, 78.6 percent of the 352,770 employed West Indians sixteen years of age and over were private wage and salaried workers, 16.5 percent were government workers, 4.7 percent were self employed and 0.2 were unpaid family workers. By 2000, the census shows, 28.7 percent of West Indian immigrants worked in managerial, professional, and related occupations; 27.2 percent in service occupations; and 28 percent in sales and office occupations. West Indians also found work in construction (9.3 percent) and transportation (1.3percent).Holder continues:

West Indians have achieved greater economic progress in New York City than elsewhere in the country. Tens of thousands of West Indian lawyers, physicians, nurses and medical technicians, teachers and middle –level managers have worked in the city since 1965. Even larger numbers have been employed in the skilled trades. A small class of entrepreneurs and business people has also developed their enterprises to cater to West Indians, and to a lesser degree to African Americans and Whites. The unemployment rate for this group was 7.3 percent.<sup>26</sup>

Analyzing household income provides insight into this group’s current socio-economic situation. The 2000 Census shows that the median household income for West Indians stands at \$40,168<sup>(27)</sup>, which Holder comments, “compares quite favorably with the median household income from the general population, \$ 41 190.” He continues: “A noticeably different picture emerges, however, when West Indians’ median family income is examined: it was \$44,959 as

compared with a median family income of \$ 50,732 for the general population.”<sup>28</sup> He argues, and I concur, that the larger household income for West Indians is likely due to larger number of earners in their households.<sup>29</sup> The census also indicates that twelve percent of 184,395 West Indian families lived below the poverty line.

Before we examine, “remittances sent home,” I should comment on the naturalization of West Indian immigrants, which is historically low, for many saw themselves as sojourners, although the rate has increased dramatically in the past decade. For example, of the 359,181 West Indians in 1990, thirty-five percent were naturalized American citizens; a decade later, when their population reached 550,480, 53.4 percent were naturalized, Professor Holder reports in a recent article.<sup>30</sup> While continuing to give varied and correct reasons for this shift, he asserts unequivocally, that evidence suggests that Afro-West Indians and Indo-West Indians (both Caribbeans) have different attitudes toward naturalization. He states, that because racism is less problematic for Indo-West Indians, they feel a less visceral opposition to becoming American citizens. In contrast, Afro-West Indians have been notoriously reluctant to become naturalized citizens, because they abhor racism and the negative images it has created of African Americans and Blacks generally, but they also believe that by retaining their original citizenship, they disassociate themselves from these dehumanizing images.<sup>31</sup>

This is the context in which one should see Afro Caribbean’s (West Indians) close connections and strong emotional attachments to their homelands. As Holder sees it:

West Indians close and continuing ties to their homelands have also shaped their assimilation into American society. Each year tens of thousands of immigrants, many of whom have been in the U.S. for decades, regularly travel to their homelands. They go for Christmas; carnival and the Independence celebrations of their native countries; to see their relatives; to reside in their homes during the winter months; and to conduct business. Some have professional practices and businesses in both the U.S. and the West Indies.<sup>32</sup>

Against this backdrop, the following discussion on remittances to the homelands, and their salience, regularity and applicability to homeland development, takes on added meaning.

### **Remittances and Development: Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago**

Writing for the World Bank in October 2004, economist Dilip Ratha, indicates that workers' remittances have become a major source of external development finance, providing a convenient angle from which to approach the complex migration agenda.<sup>33</sup> He adds that officially recorded remittances received by developing countries exceeded \$93 billion in 2003, with the actual size of the remittances, including both officially recorded and unrecorded transfers through informal channels, being even larger.<sup>34</sup> Remittances are now more than double the size of net official flows (under 430 billion), and are second only to foreign direct investment (around \$133 billion) as a source of external finance for developing countries.<sup>35</sup> In thirty-six out of 153 developing countries, remittances are larger than all capital flows, public and private.<sup>36</sup> In short remittances have become a significant source of funds for some developing countries.

As one of the most important destinations of world immigration, the United States has emerged as the single largest source of reported remittances –payments sent by immigrant workers to their home countries.<sup>37</sup> For example, remittances sent from the United States grew six fold from \$4.1 billion in 1981 to \$25.5 billion in 2003, when they accounted for about one-third of measured global remittances.<sup>38</sup> One of the major areas affected by the sending of remittances has been Latin American and Caribbean nations, and this a natural consequence of the large numbers of these immigrants- both first and later generations- residing in the United States. But before we examine the case of the four West Indian nations, one needs to define remittances.

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Remittances are basically now seen as money transfers sent to the Caribbean by diasporic others residing abroad. In fact, remittances always have existed as part of the West Indian migratory thrust. Internally, as immigrants left their islands—Barbadians, for example, who would migrate to Guyana (then British Guiana)—they would send barrels with food stuff and money back to their societies of origin. The large migration of Jamaicans, Barbadians, and other immigrants to Panama also resulted in the sending of barrels back home. However, it was the migration to England, during the 1940s and later, that caused an upsurge in the analytical and scholarly treatment of remittances studies. Anthropologists Stuart Philpott and Philip Manners, for example, writing of the West Indian immigration to England, talked about both the “money order” economy, and the barrels that were to become a pivotal part of the remittances paradigm. And Bonham Richardson describes the process and practice this way: “Material goods from abroad, sent and brought back by migrating men and women, help reduce spot shortages of staple items at home but, more often represent a quality and diversity of commodities otherwise unavailable or prohibitively expensive in the islands.” Indeed Richardson opines, that “remittances of money and gifts play a functional role for migrants themselves, especially if external circumstances force them to return. And those men who have regularly remitted money in their absence invariably receive warmer homecomings than those who have not.”<sup>39</sup> So remittances are not only the money transfers but also the large number of foods and sundry other items sent by barrels to the Caribbean. Indeed, many West Indian businesses in the United States and other host societies, now specialize in this market niche, and are slowly challenging multinational organizations such as Western Union for their place in the money transfer “niche”.<sup>40</sup>

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But another view of remittances is more relevant to a cultural interpretation. For although remittances are largely viewed as monetary or in kind contributions, they also can be viewed as cultural and social transfers, argues Puerto Rican sociologist Juan Flores. He describes the process this way:

Whether in the luggage of exiles or emigrants returning to visit or stay , or in stories and experiences recounted by friends and family, diasporas carry and send back more, however, than money and material goods. Ideas, values, political causes and cultural styles and preferences all make their way from diaspora to homeland settings. In many instances, the financial remittances themselves come with political intentions attached, as in cases of community-to- community monies or resources sent for civic and other benevolent projects to hometowns or regions of origin. Local political participation is often maintained, and even increased, across borders and geographical distances.”<sup>41</sup>

And this form of cultural remittance is also circular; in that while hip hop, soul music flourish in Trinidad and Barbados, so do reggae, salsa, and calypso in Miami and New York, for example. Noted diasporic scholar Bryce La Porte describes it thus:

“The caribbeanization of carnival and the calypso, the internationalization of reggae, Rasta, Rapping, Afro hair styles and soul music, the ghettoization of Santeria, Susu, and capoeira (break dance) and Salsa are outstanding cultural examples. They demonstrate how due to intense interpenetration and continuous cross-fertilization which have resulted principally from migration and mass media, Black people from different parts of the Diaspora have begun to share broader concepts or multiple references of “home” which transcend both place and time.”<sup>42</sup>

“In some ways ,” Bryce – La Porte continues “home”, both as a reference and reality has become so transplanted , so diffused , among Blacks that the scope of the black Diaspora may eventually take on new meanings, bring on new tensions, and point to new possibilities.”<sup>43</sup>

We have not dealt with the costs of sending these remittances “back home” which can be prohibitively expensive, although much has been done in both the Clinton and now Bush administrations to help provide more competition from credit unions, some national banks, and

the selected foreign nationals trained in the money transfer business and banking. Nor have we addressed the security concerns and new regulations designed to thwart the use of these money trails (sources) by terrorists, and supporting procedures and operations now instituted by the United States, Canada and, to a lesser extent, United Kingdom. But these are the new realities of a post 9/11 era.

As indicated earlier Afro-Caribbean immigrants in the United States have strong attachments to their homelands, now manifested in many ways including the transmission of goods through the sending of barrels, and the remitting of money transfers. Scholars including Manuel Orozco (The Inter American Dialogue), Claremont Kirton (the University of the West Indies- UWI), Debra Roberts (Bank of Guyana), Keith Nurse, (UWI), for example, have done extensive research and compiled numerous data on this process and its importance to the Caribbean and Latin American regions, indicating that these regions send the largest amount of money to their homelands— in 2000, more than seventeen billion U.S. dollars compared with Europe and Central Asia (more than \$16 billion); and south East Asia (more than \$15 billion).<sup>44</sup> For purposes of this paper, I have extracted some relevant data with specific applicability to Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Here are some highlights:

- a) Remittances to Guyana totaled \$120(U.S Million) in 2002, and 201 (US million) in 2005.
- b) Remittances to Barbados totaled \$84(US million) in 2002, and \$131 million in 2005.
- c) Remittances to Jamaica totaled \$1.2billion in 2002, 87 billion dollars in 2005.
- d) Remittances to Trinidad and Tobago totaled 50(U.S. million) in 2002 and \$97 million in 2005.
- e) In 2003 remittances increased these nations GDPs by 18.3 percent for Jamaica; 36.9 percent for Guyana; 4.3 percent for Barbados, and 0.77 percent for Trinidad and Tobago.

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- f) Manuel Orozco (the senior and most prolific researcher on this topic) labels the impact of remittances on these nations as “strong” for Jamaica and Guyana, “moderate /medium” for Barbados, and “low” for Trinidad and Tobago.
- g) In all of these nations remittances have been used to strengthen Hometown Associations (HTAs) although this is more pronounced in Guyana and Jamaica.
- h) Remittances in all four nations have had a multiplier effect on the economy leading to an overall expansion in economic health.
- i) From a macro economic point of view, remittances have acquired as much importance as exports, traditionally considered the most important determinant of gross domestic product, (GDP).
- j) Although remittances have been used to aid the lower middle and working classes in these nations, in some—especially Guyana—it has been reported that among Afro Guyanese they have created a sense of dependency –almost as did welfare among African Americans in the United States in the 1960s— thereby depressing initiative and stultifying the desire to seek gainful employment.
- k) Although remittances have had a positive effect in reducing poverty, the impact is temporary and does not replace the need for long term structural reform to reduce rampant unemployment and cognate inequality in the region.
- l) Although remittances generally are quite small and are used to help finance basic living expenses of families in the sending societies, small but increasing portions are used for investment purposes and for development.
- m) Remittances also have been used to alleviate suffering resulting from floods, and other natural disasters, which often befall these developing nations.

In summary, Afro –Caribbean nationals, in their attempts to reconnect with or to reconstruct “home”, have used their remittances , first to aid their less fortunate brethren and, more directly now to aid the nation-states, formed after the granting of political independence .This concept of “home” is more linear for Afro-Caribbeans than, say for Indo- or Asian (Chinese) Caribbeans, in that Afro-Caribbeans now domiciled in the new world nations were taken from many countries in Africa (a continent)—albeit from the west coast . In contrast, Indo and Chinese born Caribbeans can refer to specific and somewhat unitary nations—states outside the Caribbean in their “other” or alternative construction of “home”. This has been made more complicating or enticing, recently, by India’s and China’s active roles in reconnecting with their overseas diasporic communities in their quest to maximize national and global development. Lacking this strong linear connection, Afro-Caribbeans and creolized Indo- and Asian Caribbeans focus on their new Caribbean civilization, (*sui generis*), and the new nations thus formed in this hemisphere.

How then does all this affect development in the Caribbean diaspora?

### **Diaspora, Development, Remittances: Renegotiating Home**

The regional organization CARICOM has been instrumental in laying the foundation for a more interconnected structural approach with the overseas diaspora, led by its Secretary General Edwin Carrington aided by Dr. Edward Green, assistant secretary and former Head of the Caribbean Studies Association, as well as a former university administrator.<sup>45</sup> And former Jamaican Prime Minister P.J .Patterson has played a pivotal role in charting a new, viable direction for using the overseas diaspora, in a positive way. In short, these individuals have acted on the realization that there is a critical need for using immigrants from the diaspora as

“development actors,” namely persons devoted to catalyzing development activities for their native homeland societies.<sup>46</sup>

The English speaking Caribbean has been blessed with language facility, and many of its first, second and third generation “nationals”, are well placed in private and public bureaucracies, in state and local governments, and in American colleges and universities as professors and administrators. Some are successful business men (women), and others handle large (at times multi-billion dollar) portfolios for global agencies and organizations. So the challenge is how to tap this reservoir of talent, and at times goodwill, to the benefit of former “homelands”?

Many scholars and policy makers, including the author, have written on various modalities and paradigms that can serve the Caribbean well as that region looks to capitalize on remittances flows and untapped human and capital resources, in the face of a massive brain drain at the secondary and tertiary levels of education, and a similar brain drain of trained personnel such as doctors and nurses.<sup>47</sup> I will highlight some of these recommendations, which in my opinion, have much merit for national leaders in the region :

A) Ministries or sub ministries should be created in the Prime Ministers’ or Presidents’ cabinets with primary responsibility for overseeing efforts at engaging the Diaspora. This had been advocated by the Caricom Secretary General Edward Carrington, and by former Jamaican Prime Minister P.J. Patterson. Jamaica is the first national government to take the lead in this regard, by establishing a Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a lecture at Medgar Evers College /CUNY, In Brooklyn on October 30th 2005.<sup>48</sup> PJ Patterson talked about an “engaged Diaspora” as opposed to a “passive Diaspora.” He sees “the connectedness of the engaged Diaspora manifesting itself through one or more of several ways, leading to what he called “an emotional attachment

to sustain connectedness.” So far, Guyana and Barbados have established similar ministerial “structural” arrangements, and Trinidad and Tobago is set to follow suit shortly.

- B) Another key issue is strengthening the collaboration and maintenance of stakeholders in the diaspora by intertwining them via the use of dual citizenship between host and home (sending) societies. Connecting Caribbean diasporas in a practical way via the electorates will bring greater demand for support of transparency in the political process and a greater level of activity.<sup>49</sup> In some instances this connection has led to diasporic nationals assuming political office in the home country, with varying measure of success, but, more importantly, it allows for collective lobbying interests between political elites here in the United States and elsewhere in North America ,on behalf of the homeland nations.<sup>50</sup>

This position has been supported by several scholars. Anthropologist Linda Basch has argued that dual citizenship augments the power of Caribbean politicians by providing them with a political base in both New York and the Caribbean, each buttressing the other in a transnational social field<sup>51</sup>. Sociologist Nancy Foner also supports this view, positing that extending dual nationality or citizenship provisions may be a way of trying to secure the role of overseas nationals as “advocates of La Patria’s interest in the USA.”<sup>52</sup> And even a formidable critic of the new immigration, noted political scientist Samuel Huntington concedes that adoption of dual citizenship by the sending country has been followed by a doubling of these individuals’ naturalization rates, with higher increases among citizens of those countries where the initiative has come from the immigrants themselves.<sup>53</sup> These connections would not negate other political associations with the home country; rather, they would invigorate them by giving the diasporic others a stake in the consequences of the political decisions, challenges and the controversies of

the home societies. In the final analysis, such efforts would enable the homeland governments to initiate the political integration of the diaspora and, hopefully, build a positive attitude between host governments and diasporic populations toward vibrant, and socially-aware ethnic nationalities.

Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago now boast dual citizenship for their diasporic nationals, however, Guyana does not. One could surmise that the current Guyanese government may recall its charges that the previous PNC government, which lasted for 25 years, was reputed to have extended its political life by using the “overseas vote” to retain its tenure in office.<sup>54</sup> While many Indo-Guyanese are migrating in hordes to the United States, Afro Guyanese are migrating in proportionately larger numbers, and it may be feared that extending this option may shift the political balance in a closely-fought election in Guyana?

C) National governments and the diasporic communities need to both co sponsor and facilitate Hometown Associations (HTAs), which have worked well in the Latin American context, especially in Mexico. This concept emanates from a new development concept, “virtuous circle,” introduced by Dr. Patrick Mendis in 2002 as sustainable development that goes beyond per capita indexes and the calculus.<sup>55</sup> Professor Simon Tay, a Singaporean scholar, further explicated this concept when he contended that the “virtuous circle” would include an activism in development that includes the—“little people”—such as women, children, the undereducated and the rural poor.<sup>56</sup> The point is that development ideology and models must be tied to a sort of growth equity, bringing segments of the society together so that they interact with the various engines and resources of development at their own levels of empowerment,<sup>57</sup> in short to use the late Caribbean scholar, Lloyd Best’s dicta, helping to “make the small man, a real man.”<sup>58</sup>

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This thematic concept has formed the basis for the national co-operative post-independence banks of Trinidad /Tobago and Guyana.

HTAs result from work between home governments and local participants to extend the development imperative by collaborating on projects that bring needed relief to affected areas identified by local participants. These associations also inculcate a sense of civic involvement and participation by rewarding creativity and innovation. Many such small-scale development projects—wells for potable water, and health centers, for example—have resulted, and Guyana and Jamaica have reported much success and high usage of HTAs, with only moderate usage in Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago.

D) The region needs to provide more access to secondary and tertiary education. In addition to trade relationships, remittances, and banking relationships, education and an investment in it, also can be a clear economic multiplier. A hallmark of the Caribbean Diaspora and Guyana has been its superlative education at all levels, given the size of its demographics ,as compared to India, China, and other land masses .Caribbean diasporic nationals (especially first, second and later generations) generally have excelled in student bodies and faculties in many elite private and public universities, which are characterized by meritocracy and universalistic criteria.<sup>59</sup> Much of this earlier educational success was based on the strong skills sets and knowledge base of the region's highly competitive secondary and primary schools. Unfortunately, this competitive edge has been lost at the primary and secondary levels, with a precipitous drop in the universal completion of primary education —one of the ten Millennium Development Goals, that has not been achieved in Guyana, for example. This drop has been further illustrated, in a World Bank report that notes a diminishing quality of education in segments of the

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region's primary schools, the existence of "barrel children", (those who are abandoned by parents who go abroad to seek a better life), and a low enrollment in tertiary education, with only Barbados succeeding in continued expansion of tertiary education.<sup>60</sup> Under previous arrangements, Caribbean secondary schools could send their "best and brightest" to study at American and Canadian universities, primarily for their undergraduate degrees, with a view to returning home for some period, after completing their studies. The Burnham regime of Guyana, for example, enjoyed such a cozy and profitably privileged relationship in the 1960s when it was in the political opposition, and the U.S. feared Marxist Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan, and hundreds of US Immigration Service scholarships were offered to colleges and universities in the United States and Puerto Rico. The students who received J1 visas were supposed to return home to help in spreading democracy and aiding development.

Jagan, who was courted by the USSR, sent many students to Eastern Bloc, and to Cuban and Soviet Universities, as the Cold War waxed.<sup>61</sup> So did the island of St. Vincent and the Grenadines which, during that period of the 1960s, sent its best students to Yale on similar arrangements for undergraduate study. One successful graduate of this arrangement is the current U.S. Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago, the Honorable Dr. Roy Austin, who attended Yale University, where he met and befriended President Bush, and was tapped to join the prestigious but secret Skulls and Bones society, whose membership include many members of the world's business and political elites.<sup>62</sup>

It would be advantageous for Caribbean diaspora experts to act as de facto agents for their home governments, to make educational linkages with large public and private university systems in New York, Massachusetts, Florida and New Jersey for example, as well as private

proprietary ones. Of course, partnerships would have to be engendered and identified in critical areas of “felt needs”. For instance, tourism students could be developed with opportunities at Florida International University (F.I.U) and Cornell, or in the area of engineering relationships with SUNY, CUNY or Rutgers University could be pursued. Indeed, some of these initiatives currently are being undertaken, but unfortunately they are piece meal, segmented, and not well coordinated for maximum effect.<sup>63</sup> Caribbean diaspora experts, now strategically positioned, can, with the correct political posture, appeal and use their structural affiliations to persuade immigrants to aid the development goals of their former homelands, particularly with regard to the dangerous slippage in education. If embraced and used as pivotal stakeholders, Caribbean and Guyanese diaspora experts can play a highly positive role in this regard. Barbados has done extremely well, with success at all levels of education, on which it spends significant proportions of its GDP, Trinidad and Tobago also has made moderate progress, but Guyana and Jamaica have not done as well, with Guyana showing the least progress in reaching the education goals international organizations have set for it.<sup>64</sup>

## **Conclusions**

There is more that can be stated as the list above is not exhaustive. We have not discussed the family breakup and gender imbalance, with the resulting “barrel children”, about which I have written elsewhere. Nor have we discussed extensively the growing culture of emigration, the massive brain drain, and the valleys of dislocation it leaves in the region. So, although remittances can encourage some improvements in economic stability, often short — term, they must be viewed within the historical context adumbrated earlier, and in the context of the challenges still facing the West Indies (Caribbean), including the four nations under review; Guyana, Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Professor Neville Duncan, political

scientist at the University of the West Indies, in a 2005 conference in Panama,<sup>65</sup> reminds us that despite some decline in the first decade, unemployment is still high in the region, with rates of 10.3 percent in Barbados, 12.5 percent in Jamaica, 10.8 percent in Trinidad and Tobago, and 17 percent or more in Guyana.<sup>66</sup> These high unemployment rates have negatively impacted out – migration, resulting in the brain drain which is collectively weakening skills and capacity in these countries. An extreme case is Guyana, which is losing nurses and teachers at high and unsustainable rates. In Jamaica 80 percent of tertiary graduates leave (migrate), as do large numbers of secondary graduates.<sup>67</sup> Both Guyana and Jamaica have high levels of crime and political violence. In addition, enrollment in tertiary education has been historically low in the Caribbean in contrast with Latin America and, as Professor Duncan argues, is a major obstacle to the Caribbean regions achieving a knowledge-driven economy.<sup>68</sup> Only Barbados spends a high of about U.S \$860 per student on education, and Caribbean governments averaged a lamentable 4.9 percent of their GDP on education during the period 1999-2002.<sup>69</sup> Further, the region’s debt ratio is very high standing at ninety-six percent of GDP, and in 2003 the percentage of GDP that financed public debt was 84 percent in Barbados, 54 percent in Trinidad and Tobago, 142 percent in Jamaica, and a 142 percent in Guyana .Along with Haiti, Guyana and Jamaica have been two of the regions slowest-growing economies over the last four decades.<sup>70</sup> In addition ,in the recent past, Guyana has benefited from debt relief and is making slow progress in eliminating its public debt ( It was included under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) and a sizeable proportion of its debt forgiven). Whether this will spur development and lower the economic inequality between Afro-Guyanese and Indo–Guyanese and blunt the political charges in some quarters (especially in the diaspora) ,of economic and political marginalization of Afro-Guyanese, is still an open question.<sup>71</sup>

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This region with sending “homeland societies” has many micro-states struggling to survive in an increasingly hostile and highly competitive global environment, losing many of their preferential tariffs stemming from colonialization and early political independence, ridden with high debt, cursed with unsustainable brain drain and out-migration, and beset with high rates of crime and political instability. In varying degrees, all these problems and more, affect the four nations under review.

These are the compelling factors that push West Indians, and Afro-Caribbeans especially, to attempt to reconnect with their “homelands”, not only nostalgically, but in order to reconstruct “home” and use their remittances, in cash and kind, and whatever other skills sets, contacts and opportunities they have, to help their less fortunate “brethren”, and aid their societies to stay anchored in a global environment that is hostile on many fronts. Therefore, it behooves Americans and those interested in promoting democracies and thriving market economies in this region on our doorsteps, to work for politically, economically, social and ethnically inclusive diasporic communities that have the potential to catalyze development in these nation-states—at times at their own expense and sacrifice—thus sparing the American taxpayer some of the financial burden.

At a recent historic three-day Heads of Governments conference held in June with leaders of the Caribbean national-states as represented by CARICOM, President George Bush and the U.S. State Department, and the Caribbean Diaspora Fora (comprised of the Experts forum, Private Sector Dialogue, and the Diaspora Forum), agreement was finalized on many of the conclusions made in this paper.<sup>72</sup> Thus, Stuart Hall may have been wrong: Afro-Caribbeans and other West Indians can and must go “HOME” again; and yes, they can even STAY.

## NOTES

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Note also that the terms Afro- Caribbeans and Afro West Indians are used interchangeably as are Caribbean and West Indian

1. Grant Farred, You Can Go Home Again, You Just Can't Stay: Stuart Hall and the Caribbean Diaspora. (The Black Atlantic ), Vol .27, No 1 *Research in African Literatures*, Dec. 1996, pp 28-48; See also Stuart Hall, *Culture Identity and Diaspora, Colonial Discourse and Post Colonial Theory. A Reader*. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman New York, Columbia University Press, 1994, pp 392-403; Camille A Nelson, "Carriers of Globalization: Loss of Home and Self within The African Diaspora," Florida Law Review, 539(2003)
2. R Bryce La Porte, Foreword, to *Emerging Perspectives on the Black Diaspora*, ed by Aubrey W. Bonnett and G.L. Watson, (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1990), p xv
3. *Ibid* p xv11
4. *Ibid*
5. Howard Dodson and Sylvanie A Diouf, *In Motion The African-American Migration Experience*, (Washington DC: National Geographic for The Schomburg Center For Research In Black Culture, 2004), p.166
6. It should be noted here that the author argues that the disconnect between Afro Caribbeans (also called Afro West Indians), and Indo Caribbeans with regard to "Home" is much less nuanced, and that the creolized Afro- Caribbeans tend to focus more strongly on "Home" in the Caribbean as opposed to the ancestral "Home" in Africa. For Indo Guyanese, especially, given their nature of arrival, their numerical modal minority in the West Indies, their general lack of adaptation to Creole, hybrid culture and largely rural status , and the recent attempts by India to woo them both cultural and economically, the connection with the "Caribbean Home" is less linear. Professor Calvin B Holder elaborates on this point much later. See footnote 9
- Creolization. According to Sociologist and Caribbeanist R.T. Smith involves two processes: in the first place it involves the creation of some area of common culture corresponding to the social relations in which people of varying ethnic groups are involved; and second, it is an integral part of the process of creolization to stress the differences between groups identified as racial groups." Raymond Smith, People and Change , in *New World, Guyana Independence Issue*, editors George Lamming and Martin Carter, (Georgetown , Guyana, May 1966) p 51; also Eric Doumerc ,Caribbean Civilization: The English – Speaking Caribbean Since Independence,
6. France, Presses Universitaires, Du Mirail, 2003, Finally one of the earlier works to use the remittances perspectives in analyzing and developing a perspective on Caribbean societies is William F. Skinner, Klaus de Albuquerque and Roy S. Bryce-Laporte, *Return Migration and Remittances: Developing a Caribbean Perspective*, RIES Occasional Papers No. 3 (Washington. DC: Smithsonian institution, Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, 1982.
7. See for example, Maurice St Pierre, *Anatomy of Resistance: Anti Colonialism in Guyana 1823-1865*, Warwick Caribbean Series (New York, MacMillan Press, 1999) and David Lowenthal, *West Indian Societies*, (London, Oxford University Press, 1972); and Stephen Grabe *U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: a Cold War Story* , (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 2005) and. Raymond Smith, "People and Change" in: *New World Guyana Independence Issue* , editors George Lamming and Martin Carter, Georgetown, Guyana, May 1966 ;Ivelaw Griffith, Freedom House, *Countries at The Crossroads, Country Report Guyana*, 2006
8. Although Trinidad and Tobago has not been bereft of ethnic conflict and racial incidents, I argue that the Carnival, calypso and other creolized West Indian cultural symbols have made more inroads among Indo Guyanese than in Guyana, and this has alleviated the razor sharp divisions now found in Guyana.
9. Calvin B Holder, "West Indies Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guyana, Martinique, St.Kitts, Trinidad," in *The New Americans: A Guide To Immigration since 1965*, edited by Mary C Waters & Reed Ueda, with Helen B Marrow, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2007) ,64
10. *Ibid* p 675
11. *Ibid*
12. *Ibid*
13. Dodson and Diouf In Motion pp 157-170
14. Holder "West Indies" and Fiona R Barnes, "West Indian Heritage" In *The African American Encyclopedia 2nd edition* , editor Carl L Bankston 111 et al, (New York, Marshall Cavendish, 2001), pp 2662-26664
15. *Ibid*
- 16 .Aubrey W. Bonnett "West Indian Americans", in *Racial and Ethnic Relations in America*, Vol 111, edited by Carl L. Bankston 111, (Pasadena ,California, 2000), 1037-1039 and Holder, "West Indies".
17. Bonnett "West Indian American"
18. Holder West Indies 676

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19. Holder "West Indies", 678 and Barnes, "West Indian Heritage"
20. Holder, "West Indies" and Aubrey W. Bonnett, in Commentary Why Do They Hate US, in *CaribVoice* (August 6, 2004), and Commentary in *Caribbean Graphic Online*, West Indian Americans: Why Do They Hate US? (July 5, 2004)
21. Bonnett, West Indian Americans, 1037-1039
22. *Ibid*
23. Holder op cit pp 674-686
24. *Ibid*
26. *Ibid*
27. *Ibid*
28. *Ibid*
29. *Ibid* and Bonnett, "West Indian Americans",
30. Holder, "West Indies"
31. *Ibid*
32. *Ibid*
33. See Dilip Ratha in Workers' Remittances : An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance, in *Global Development Finance*, Washington DC World Bank,2003 pp157-175 ; also Understanding the Importance of Remittances in, Migration Information Source, (October 1 2004) at <http://www.migrationinformation.org/> Feature/print .cfm? ID=256; and Robert Shackleton et al, Remittances: International Payments by Migrants, A Congressional Budget Office, (CBO) Paper, (Washington, D.C., May 2005).
34. Batha, "Workers Remittances"
35. *Ibid*
36. *Ibid*
37. *Ibid*
38. *Ibid*
39. Stuart Philpott Remittance Obligations, Social Networks and Choice among Montserratian Immigrants in Britain, *MAN*, 3(3) 465-76; also Robert A Manners, Remittances and the Unit of Analysis in Anthropological Research," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropolology*, 1965, 21 (3) 179-195 and Bonham Richardson in, *The Modern Caribbean*, ed, Franklin W. Knight and Colin Palmer, Chapel Mill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1989) 224-26
40. Holder "West Indies"
41. Juan Flores, The Diaspora Strikes Back: Reflections on Cultural Remittances in, *NACLA Report on the Americas*, Vol 39, No 3, (November/December 2005)
42. Bryce La Porte op cit p. xv111
43. *Ibid*
44. See Keith Nurse , Remittances and Beyond: Diaspora and Development in The Caribbean (Forthcoming);Keith Nurse , Diaspora , Migration and Development in The Americas, Policy Paper, FOCAL, Canadian Foundation for the Americas September 2004;Claremont Kirton, Remittances: The Experiences of the English- Speaking Caribbean , in Donald F Terry and Steven R Wilson eds, *Beyond Small Change: Making Migrant Remittances Count*, (IADB, Washington DC,2005); Debra Roberts The Development Impact of Remittances on Caribbean Economies: The Case of Guyana; Manuel Orozco The Impact of Migration in The Caribbean and Central America region, FOCAL, Policy Paper, 2003; Manuel Orozco, Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean: Issues and Perspectives on Development, Report commissioned by the Organization of American States, (Washington, DC, September 2004); Manuel Orozco, Distant But Close: Guyanese Transnational Communities and Their Remittances from the United States, Report commissioned by the U.S. Agency for International Development , (January 2004); Beyond Money: Diaspora Engagement in Development. Harvard University Global Equity Initiation, three case studies on (1) Guyana, <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/nacgei/PDFs/caribbean/guyana.pdf> (2) Jamaica, <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/nacgei/PDFs/caribbean/jamaica.pdf>. (3) Haiti, <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/nacgei/PDFs/caribbean/haiti.pdf> (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2003)
45. Press release 226/2066 4 December 2006, Keynote address by H E Edwin Carrington, Secretary General of the Caribbean Community,(CARICOM), on the occasion of the UNFPA Media Awards , 2 December 2006,Mona , Jamaica.

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46. The Honorable P.J Patterson former Prime Minister of Jamaica to the Caribbean Diaspora community At the CARICOM'S' 30th Anniversary lecture at Medgar Evers College/CUNY entitled :( CARICOM Beyond Thirty: Connecting with the Diaspora, October 30, 2004)
47. Aubrey W Bonnett, "Creating a Cohesive and Substantive Platform of the Caribbean Diaspora in North America That would Contribute to the Development of The Caribbean," Lecture the Caribbean Diaspora Project Experts' Meeting , New York, UN Secretariat, December 2005)
48. Patterson, "Caricom Beyond Thirty," and Bonnett, Diaspora Project Experts Meeting.
49. Bonnett, Diaspora Project Experts' Meeting
50. *Ibid*
51. Cristina Szanton Blanc, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and the Deterritorialized Nation-state*. (Langhorne, PA: Gordon and Breach), 1994.
52. Nancy Foner, engagement Across National Borders, Then and Now, *Fordham Law Review*, New York, (75, 2007):2483-2493
53. Samuel P Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*, Simon & Schuster, (New York, 2004)209
54. See St Pierre op cit; Rabe op cit; Joy Moncrieffe, Ethnic Diversity and State Response in The Caribbean, *Overseas Development Institute*, London January 2004, Griffith, Country Report Guyana, op cit
55. See Achieving Sustainable Development, in *Global Issues*, an Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, Vol 7, No 1,(April 2002)
55. Lloyd Best, Oxford and Cambridge Universities trained Trinidadian intellectual and scholar coined this phrase even as he championed micro lending/savings emanating from an African (Nigerian) cultural retention called SUSU and the establishment a Workers Bank funded and sponsored by the Government to help alleviate gross levels of inequality in the Trinidadian Society.
56. See Holder West Indies 678, and Bonnett, "West Indian Americans",
57. See, A Time to Choose: Caribbean Development in the 21st Century, especially chap 7 Building Skills for The Knowledge Driven Society, *World Bank Report*, (Washington, DC 2005)
58. At the height of the Cold War, the United States government fostered and sponsored hundreds of scholarships to the opposition PNC leader, Forbes Burnham, in Guyana as an alternative to supporting the reputed communist Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan. Students received J1 visa for study at American and Puerto Rican Colleges and Universities and were supposed to return to their homelands to contribute to the country's development. Of course the Cubans, East Germans and Soviets did the same for P.M. Jagan.
62. See US Department of State, "Roy L.Austin Biography" at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/7061.htm>, Other internet and book references including the Trinidad Express, speak to the issue of Skull & Bones and his Yale days and friendship with President Bush.  
"Over the years, numerous piecemeal efforts have been made to bring Caribbean students and faculty to American Universities, often at the behest of college and university presidents who are looking to expand cultural and educational experiences for American students. At least in New York, where many Caribbean nationals reside, such efforts have been made, for example, under Chancellors Murphy and Reynolds at CUNY and Wharton, and Bartlett and King at SUNY. In my opinion, to get the maximum effect from these efforts, they need to be streamlined and coordinated at the regional level of the sending societies."
64. World Bank, A Time to Choose
65. Neville Duncan, "The Challenge of the Contemporary Caribbean on overcoming", held in Panama, 2005, Caribbean Conference of Churches
66. *Ibid*
67. *Ibid*
68. *Ibid*
69. *Ibid*
70. *Ibid*
71. Guyana, with a large out migration of highly skilled and unskilled individuals , growing crime rate spurred by international narcotics, and deep social and political division of a Plural Society seems unfortunately locked in perennial conflict.; also see Griffith, "Guyana"
72. See "Caricom Leaders Pleased with Conference on the Caribbean", in Caribbean Current (June 28, 2007) at [http://www.caribbeancurrent.com/Archives/2007/issue026/easterncaribbean/story\\_id\\_001.html](http://www.caribbeancurrent.com/Archives/2007/issue026/easterncaribbean/story_id_001.html)

