Resolving Conflicts of Cultures Through Royce’s “Enlightened Provincialism”
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Abstract
Recently a Muslim cleric was expelled from the United Kingdom for preaching jihad. Last year a Dutch film-maker was murdered for making a documentary perceived as insulting to Islam. This past November, youths who felt themselves disenfranchised by the larger culture rioted in French cities. Earlier, member states of the European Union failed to ratify a Constitution. Underlying these cases is the deeper issue of how to resolve conflicts of loyalties. Thus, European Muslims have, ideally, a dual allegiance: a religious allegiance to Islam, which gives them their identity, and a political allegiance to the nation states which provide their livelihoods. And Europeans are, ideally, doubly loyal, to the nations of their birth but no less to the pan-European union to which they necessarily belong. How, then, might these conflicts be resolved without weakening the very loyalties engendering them? I believe that Josiah Royce provides a compelling answer in his philosophy of loyalty. Through his principle of “enlightened provincialism” he demonstrates how loyalties to sub-cultures, and loyalty to the larger culture to which they belong, need not be antagonistic but may and should be mutually reinforcing if their chief objects are not particular causes but the principle of loyalty itself.

INTRODUCTION

Martin Walker, editor of United Press International and senior scholar at the Wilson Center, in “Europe’s Mosque Hysteria” from The Wilson Quarterly of Spring 2006, opens his article with some grim prognostications to the effect that Europe faces the stark prospect of an Islamic hegemony, reminiscent of the earlier threat when one hundred and fifty thousand Ottoman Turks lay siege to Vienna in 1683. He cites Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci who, in The Force of Reason of 2004, states apocalyptically:


Europe is no longer Europe, it is ‘Eurabia,’ a colony of Islam, where the Islamic invasion does not proceed only in a physical sense but also in a mental and cultural sense. Servility to the invaders has poisoned democracy, with obvious consequences for the freedom of thought and for the concept itself of liberty.

This apocalyptic vision is shared by others, Walker notes. Bernard Lewis, the distinguished Princeton historian of Islam, predicted in 2004 that if Muslim immigration to Europe increases and European birthrates continue to fall, then by the end of this century Europe will be “part of the Arabic west, the Maghreb.” If, consequently, non-Muslims depart Europe en masse, which
Daniel Pipes, an expert in Middle Eastern affairs, predicted in *The New York Sun*, then “grand cathedrals will appear as vestiges of a prior civilization—at least until a Saudi-style regime transforms them into mosques or a Taliban-like regime blows them up.” In light of all this, Walker, cites political scientist Francis Fukuyama who “argued in the inaugural issue of *The American Interest*, that liberal democracies face their greatest challenges not from abroad but at home, as they attempt to integrate ‘culturally diverse populations’ into one national community.”¹ This bleak prognosis given by recognized and sober authorities comes in the midst of, and seems to be vindicated by, current events. Recently a Muslim cleric was expelled from the United Kingdom for preaching jihad. Another cleric, Abu Hamza al Masri, was indicted by a British court for incitements to riot and murder. Walker continues this dismal litany of Islamic atrocities as follows:

The crisis earlier this year over Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad, with repercussions felt more in the Middle East than Europe, was preceded in October by the eruption of riots in France, in which the children of mainly North African immigrants torched some 10,000 cars and burned schools and community centers in some 300 towns and cities. A terrorist attack by four suicide bombers killed 52 in the London subway in July, and was swiftly followed by a second, abortive attack. In famously tolerant Holland, the gruesome murder by a young Islamist fanatic of the radical filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004 was followed by the petrol bombings of mosques and Islamic schools. In Madrid, 191 people were killed on the city’s trains on March 11, 2004, in a coordinated bombing attack by Al Qaeda sympathizers, . . . Less noticed in the United States was the shock that ran through Germany a year ago after the “honor killings” of eight young Turkish women by their own families in the space of four months. The women’s crimes were that they refused the husbands their families had chosen for them or had sought sexual partners outside their religion and close-knit communities.²

² Ibid.
These events are apparently both results and evidence of what political scientist Samuel Huntington has identified as “a clash of civilizations.” European nations are committed to democracy, the honoring of human rights, multiculturalism, and the exercise of tolerance. Consequently, they have welcomed into their midst, and sought to accommodate, a variety of ethnic sub-cultures largely made up of immigrants who, because of their commitment to certain religious ideals, vigorously oppose elements of their host culture, are themselves intolerant towards it, and have no compunction about unleashing violence. The most recent and egregious manifestation of this clash is the brouhaha over the presumed insult to Mohammed with the publication of cartoons in the Danish press caricaturing the prophet. Many in the Islamic community condemned this as blasphemy that should be forbidden and punished. The West countered by saying that this was a legitimate exercise of free speech, a human right enshrined in advanced democracies, which deserves the protection and blessings of the law. The West insists on liberty of conscience as embedded in the sharp separation of church and state; and since “blasphemy” is a religious offence, not a civil one, the state cannot intervene either to prevent or to punish it. In stark contrast, Islam traditionally does not extol liberty of conscience nor does it sharply separate church and state; in some Islamic nations, blasphemy is a capital crime.

This pandemic cultural clash between Islam and the West is but one, and a particularly striking, example of simmering tensions or overt conflicts between minority cultural or ethnic sub-groups and the larger, dominant social group of which they are parts. Other examples are the Welsh and Scots asserting their respective cultural identities against the dominant English culture, and pushing for a measure of political autonomy within Great Britain. Another is

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3 *Ibid.*, 16. Walker, however, disputes Huntington’s characterization of the tension between Islam and the West as “a clash of civilizations” since “the Arab world is not so very alien to Europe. Judeo-Christian civilization has been shaped by the Mediterranean Sea. Its waters constituted a common communications system from which flowed a shared history” (*идем*, “Europe’s Mosque Hysteria,” 16).
Quebec’s ongoing separatist movement committed, minimally, to preserving Quebec’s linguistic heritage within Canada’s dominant Anglophone culture and, ultimately, to achieving the province’s political independence from the rest of Canada. There are, of course, countless other examples from the present and the past and from the non-Western world.

However, such tensions or conflicts between cultures and ethnic groups occur not only within nations but also among them. These international tensions are evident in the failure last year of the European Union (EU) to ratify a constitution; in the opposition of some nations in the western hemisphere to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); and, within the United States, those isolationist factions intransigently opposed to the United Nations and American participation in it.

These conflicts and tensions, intra-national and international, are symptomatic of a pair of contrary but complementary seismic forces at work in the social sphere: One is a centripetal impulse towards greater social cohesiveness. This manifests itself within a nation in the efforts of the political authority to ensure maximal cultural unity by assimilating diverse ethnic and linguistic minorities into the dominant culture—the metaphor traditionally used in the United States to represent this social assimilation is the “melting-pot.” Sometimes this impulse towards cultural hegemony can be brutal and even genocidal. Think, for example, of the Canadian government’s past attempts to suppress the cultures of its indigenous peoples by forbidding their children to speak their native languages in schools; or the Nazis’ determination to eradicate every last vestige of Jewish culture. The centripetal impulse also operates among nations forging them into international political and economic associations like the EU and NAFTA; this process is symbolized and abetted by the emergence of a lingua franca which today is English. As a result, traditional ethnic, regional and national ties are loosened.
Counteracting this centripetal force is a contrary centrifugal tendency away from federal unity and cultural hegemony towards the decentralization of power and the self-conscious affirmation of regional and national identities—the Canadian metaphor for the variety of discrete cultural identities resulting from this social tendency within a nation is the “mosaic” where diverse subcultures, defined linguistically or ethnically, are integrated into a larger social whole without losing their individual identities. Within the international sphere this centrifugal impulse plays out in the form of heightened nationalism and ethnocentrism, and the desire of nations to affirm their sovereignty by withdrawing from international associations.

Now these centripetal and centrifugal social and political forces are both essential to the flourishing state of societies; they are complements. But each in its extreme form, without being counter-balanced by the other, is destructive. Thus, the centripetal force operating within a nation, when unrestrained, may lead to a stultifying and repressive uniformity in the intellectual and cultural spheres, inhibiting and even stifling the individuality and creativity of its citizens; and when operating unrestrained among nations, as within the European Union, it may result in a cumbersome and inefficient federal bureaucracy with which people cannot identify and within which they have little or no say. But its opposite, the centrifugal force, when allowed to play itself out unchecked within a nation can lead to separatist movements—even civil war— rending the unity of the state and the loss of national direction and purpose; and when unleashed within the international community it may threaten bellicose hyper-nationalism.4

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4 I borrowed the words “centripetal” and “centrifugal” and their context from “The Religion of Solidarity” by the nineteenth-century American thinker, Edward Bellamy, most famous for his utopian novel, *Looking Backward*. Here he asserts that human beings are animated by two basic instincts. One is the instinct to bond with others and form associations, what he calls the instinct towards “solidarity,” which is a centripetal force. The other is the instinct to affirm and protect one’s self, what he calls the instinct towards “personality,” which is a centrifugal force: “The instinct of universal solidarity . . . is the centripetal force which binds together in certain orbits all orders of being. . . . The fact of individuality . . . is the centrifugal force which hinders the universal fusion . . .
These conflicts at bottom are conflicts of loyalties. Thus, European Muslims have, ideally, a dual allegiance: a religious allegiance to Islam, which gives them their identity, and a political allegiance to the nation states which provide their livelihoods. By identifying themselves as Muslims, they are necessarily loyal to the teachings of Islam—it is this that gives them a sense of self-identity. On the other hand, they are members of Western societies, living and working and participating politically in European democracies, so presumably they are—or certainly should be—loyal to democratic values like free speech and liberty of conscience. Finally, Europeans ought to be, minimally, loyal to the particular ethnic and linguistic communities to which they belong and in whose cultures they participate and from which they take their identities. Yet, their loyalty should not stop here; it should extend to the larger European culture to which they are inextricably bound. Ideally, then, Europeans ought to be doubly loyal, to the nations of their birth but no less to the pan-European union to which they necessarily belong.

JOSIAH ROYCE

How, then, might these conflicts and tensions be resolved without weakening the very loyalties engendering them but, instead perhaps, strengthening them? That is, loyalty to one’s sub-culture should not conflict but harmonize with loyalty to the larger culture. But loyalty to the larger culture should not negate but intensify loyalty to the sub-culture. Loyalty to either one should reinforce loyalty to the other. I believe that Josiah Royce provides a compelling answer in his philosophy of loyalty. Through his principle of “enlightened provincialism” he demonstrates, first, how the flourishing of sub-cultures or minority groups within a larger culture or society is and preserves the variety in unity which seems the destined condition of being. Thus these mutually balancing forces play each its necessary part, and each we may suppose to be an absolute fact” (ibid, in Edward Bellamy, Selected Writings on Religion and Society, ed. by Joseph Schiffman [New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1955], pp. 12-13).
essential to the latter’s health; and, second, how loyalties to sub-cultures, and loyalty to the larger culture to which they belong, need not be antagonistic but may and should be mutually reinforcing if their chief objects are not particular causes but the principle of loyalty itself. Further, I shall show that Royce provides a philosophical rationale for the legitimate curtailment of both the freedoms of speech and of religion in the name of loyalty to both the smaller and the larger groups.

Royce (1855-1916), is numbered among that bright constellation of philosophers active at the turn of the twentieth century—Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Santayana—whose lives mark not only American philosophy’s coming of age but, no less, its Golden Age. Born in Grass Valley, California, he went to study in Germany where he heard Rudolph Lotze lecture. He returned to the United States where he took the Ph.D. in philosophy from the newly founded graduate school of Johns Hopkins University and subsequently joined the philosophy department at Harvard. He may be accurately but awkwardly classified as a pragmatic idealist. His thought synthesizes Hegel’s objective idealism, Schopenhauer’s voluntarism, and British empiricism. Though his thought was anchored in the latest science, he was obsessed with religion, which many scientific sophisticates of his generation dismissed as atavism but he sought to restore to its rightful place in the economy of human thought and experience.

Provincialism and its complement, nationalism, are forms of loyalty. Consequently, prefatory to understanding how Royce’s principle of enlightened provincialism provides a philosophical rationale both for multicultural pluralism within a particular nation, and for cultivating a spirit of healthy nationalism on the part of nations within a transnational union like the EU, and at the same time providing a philosophical basis for arbitrating conflicts of loyalties,
I shall briefly discuss Royce’s conception of loyalty, a central category of his thought, particularly his ethics and metaphysics.5

LOYALTY

As justice is for Aristotle, and duty for Kant, so loyalty is for Royce. It is for him the premier virtue, a virtual “categorical imperative”; all virtues and duties are enfolded within loyalty—it is, for Royce the essence of morality:

I maintain that without loyalty there is no thoroughgoing morality; and I also insist that all special virtues and duties, such as those which the names benevolence, truthfulness, justice, spirituality, charity, recall to our minds, are parts or are special forms of loyalty. My theory is that the whole moral law is implicitly bound up in the one precept: Be loyal.

However, Royce’s identification of loyalty with morality may strike some as questionable; after all, there are examples of blind, idolatrous, and pernicious loyalty such as the loyalty of the Nazis to Hitler or that of his followers to Jim Jones, which are anything but moral. Royce asks rhetorically, “Cannot robbers be loyal to their band, slaves to their master, mischievous boys to the comrades whose pranks they incite and applaud, but whose names they refuse to tell to any teacher?”6 Royce is well aware of such perversions of loyalty. However, he believes that we can distinguish the principle of loyalty from its individual instances, and it is this which is intrinsically good. Moreover, he provides a criterion for distinguishing good, or authentic, forms of loyalty from bad, or false, forms.

Royce defines “loyalty” as the giving of one’s self “to the active service of a cause.” However, he is careful to preserve the distinction between the self and its cause (the object of


loyalty). A sense of self must always remain; otherwise, in the loss of self-awareness there is no self left capable of devotion—in other words, without a “self,” self-devotion is impossible: “For loyalty is never mere self-forgetfulness; it is self-devotion. And you cannot devote yourself unless you are aware of yourself.” And in another place he iterates, “One must be in control of one’s powers, or one has no self to give to one’s cause. One must get a personality in order to be able to surrender this personality to anything.”

On the other hand, one must regard the cause as something greater than one’s self, and superior to all his private interests; the cause is perceived “outside of him,—something vast, dignified, imposing, compelling, objective.” In loyalty, one must exert one’s self towards something other than one’s self; if not, then one merely wallows in self-centeredness. Now though in Royce’s conception of loyalty the contrast between the self and its cause must be preserved, the gap between them ought as much as possible be closed—though closing it completely would be neither desirable nor possible. To close the gap between self and cause—to unite them—requires that one must act in the service of one’s cause:

For my objective cause and my inner private self in case I am loyal, are sharply contrasted. I have to think of both of them, if I’m to be loyal; but they must be brought into unity. Only my deeds can accomplish this result. My loyal sentiments, if left to themselves, would merely emphasize the contrast without giving life any acceptable unity. Loyalty is that loyally does.

Loyalty, then, is “essentially an active virtue.” In each loyal deed, one effectively merges one’s self (without ever losing it) with one’s cause. The cause becomes, in a sense, his larger, higher self, whereas he, its devotee, becomes its willing self: “The cause, then, is not only another than his private self; it is in a sense his larger self. Despite the contrast, he becomes one with it
through his every loyal deed.” Royce, then, conceives the cause as a person, or more accurately perhaps, a “supraperson”—today we might say “virtual person”—which transcends any and all individual persons. My cause is not only my larger self, but also the larger selves of all those others who are likewise devoted to it, and so causes are personal in nature. Loyalty, notes Royce, excludes loyalty to inanimate things. Royce is here affirming what we all understand and do spontaneously. We typically personify the objects of our loyalty, even when they are abstractions. The cause of justice takes human shape as a blind-folded woman; the ideal of wisdom the Greeks worshiped in the form of the goddess Minerva; the British express their loyalty to the nation through the person of the monarch; and for Americans, Lady Liberty represents a complex of national ideals. Even impersonal corporations take on the character of virtual persons for purposes of litigation.

Loyalty necessarily engages the whole person; one’s body and mind become “organs of his loyalty.” It activates the will, of course, through one’s actions, and engages no less one’s emotions, the springs of action. The cause draws our love, and our active service in it exhibits joy and earnestness. Moreover, in the practice of loyalty we necessarily give rein to our “inner virtues” or moral sentiments. Thus, we exercise benevolence towards the cause and others like us dedicated to it, and courage and patience in its service; further, in respecting and strengthening the loyalties of others to their causes, we demonstrate justice. This is part of what Royce means when he insists that “all special virtues and duties, such as those which the names benevolence, truthfulness, justice, spirituality, charity, recall to our minds, are parts or are special forms of loyalty,” since the exercise of loyalty entails the exercise of them all. In throwing

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7 Ibid., pp. 235, 236, 255, 237, 240, 239, 238.
8 Ibid., pp. 236, 240.
ourselves into the active service of a cause we engage ourselves entirely and become fully alive, as well as realize the potential of our moral nature.

It should be clear from the above that for Royce loyalty is far more than an ethical principle; it is also a metaphysical and religious one. His description of the object of one’s loyalty as being “greater than one’s self” and as “something vast, dignified, imposing, compelling, objective” makes it deific. But for Royce a cause is even more—it is salvific. It is that which gives us our unique identity and dignity, and confers purpose or meaning on our lives. In Royce’s words, “You are here to become absorbed in a devotion to some cause or system of causes”—this is our raison d’ être, and the sole means to our self-fulfillment. “Loyalty, the devotion of the self to the interests of the community, is indeed the form which the highest life of humanity must take,” affirms Royce. “Without loyalty, there is no salvation.” Indeed, the object of loyalty in Royce’s characterization is essentially the same as Paul Tillich’s object of ultimate concern, for whom the devotion to which defines one’s religion.

In Royce’s conception, then, loyalty involves an inviolable self willingly and actively devoting itself to a cause through which it becomes truly itself by being enlarged and finding its life’s meaning or purpose. As such it exhibits two distinctive elements of his philosophy. In understanding that self-devotion to a cause does not entail self-abnegation, but, on the contrary, it presupposes self-affirmation, Royce gives voice to his individualism. His insistence that loyalty necessarily demands action for the realization of its object evinces his pragmatism.

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9 Ibid., 246.
PROVINCIALISM

With this understanding of his conception of loyalty, we shall turn now to Royce’s principle of enlightened provincialism as explained in his essay, “Provincialism.” He begins appropriately by defining “province,” the subject of provincialism, as “any one part of a national domain, which is, geographically and socially, sufficiently unified to have a true consciousness of its own unity, to feel a pride in its own ideals and customs, and to possess a sense of its distinction from other parts of the country.” As an example, he uses his home state of California, a region dear to him. Other New World examples would be New England, the American South, and Quebec, each with an indigenous and distinctive culture. By “provincialism” Royce means “first, the tendency of such a province to possess its own customs and ideals; secondly, the totality of these customs and ideals themselves; and thirdly, the love and pride which leads the inhabitants of a province to cherish as their own these traditions, beliefs, and aspirations.” He contrasts provincialism with other “social tendencies” like patriotism, nationalism, and “the larger love of humanity.” He extols the spirit of provincialism as a social good not only for a nation but even the world. “My thesis is,” urges Royce from the historical perspective of 1908, “that, in the present state of the world’s civilization, and of the life of our own country, the time has come to emphasize, with a new meaning and intensity, the positive value, the absolute necessity for our welfare, of a wholesome provincialism, as a saving power to which the world in the near future...”

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will need more and more to appeal.” ¹³ Subsequent history has proven his appeal prophetic, and has even more urgency for us today than it did for Royce’s generation.

Now Royce distinguishes the provincialism he advocates from what he scores as “false forms of provincialism” which rend the unity of the nation and, in extreme cases, incite civil wars. By contrast, his provincialism—which he variously styles as “higher,” “enlightened,” and “wise”—“will not mean disloyalty to the nation; and it need not mean narrowness of spirit, nor yet the further development of jealousies between various communities.” Such provincialism consists in the citizens of a province knowing and taking pride in its history, both factual and legendary, and—significantly—appreciating its natural features; in Royce’s estimation, it is nothing less than “an essential basis of true civilization.” However, local pride, Royce cautions, “ought to be to all of us rather an ideal than a mere boast.” In other words, it ought not to be a club with which we browbeat others, or a means by which we assert our own superiority. The proper object of our local pride should be the values peculiar to our community that it is attempting progressively to realize; “the better aspect of our provincial consciousness is always its longing for the improvement of the community.” ¹⁴ Values are initially entertained as ideals whose realization seldom occurs in our own life times. Hence, provincial pride should foster patience, and not complacency but aspiration.

However, an “enlightened” provincialism, though essential, is but one basis of true civilization. As a centrifugal social tendency it needs to be counterbalanced by its opposite, the centripetal social tendency expressed in a unifying nationalism or patriotism. “But the two tendencies, the tendency toward national unity and that toward local independence of spirit, must


¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 63, 64-65, 67, 100, 102.
henceforth grow together,” insists Royce. “They cannot prosper apart. The national unity must not kill out, nor yet hinder, the provincial self-consciousness. The loyalty to the Republic must not lessen the love and the local pride of the individual community.”15 The two tendencies ideally exist in a reciprocal or symbiotic relationship—indeed, they are mutually reinforcing.16

Royce conceives of these opposed but complementary social tendencies in terms of loyalty. Now Royce certainly esteems loyalty to the nation, expressed as enlightened patriotism or nationalism, together with the social unity it fosters as an incontestable good. However, intense national loyalty not tempered by wise provincial loyalties is a breeding ground for various social evils, which he identifies as alienation, uniformity (conformity), and a mob-spirit. The antidote to these, according to Royce, is a higher provincialism. I turn now to consider in turn each of these social afflictions and Royce’s remedy of provincialism.

The first of them is alienation of the individual, what Robert V. Hine has aptly called “the American neurotic illness, the ‘inward revolt’ of people who increasingly find it difficult to attach themselves to the community,”17 and which is a leitmotif of much American literature. Royce was well aware of the mobility and attendant rootlessness of many Americans, especially immigrants, in his day. Indeed, he himself was one, who had been uprooted from his native California to go and study in Germany and finally to settle in Cambridge, Massachusetts as a professor at Harvard, becoming thereby a true cosmopolitan. He recalls, “there are some of us

15 Ibid., p. 66.
16 Paradoxically, sharp provincial identities and differences may strengthen the unity of the nation, and strong national unity, in turn, may sharpen the identities and further differentiate its individual provinces. This is an insight of G. W. Hegel, a philosopher to whom Royce was greatly indebted, which is summarized by John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart as follows: “Hegel maintained . . . that finite existences can only be really individual and differentiated in proportion as they are united between themselves in a close unity. The organs of a human body are contained in closer unity than the stones in a heap, and at the same time those organs have each a more individual nature, and are more clearly differentiated from one another than the stones of a heap” (idem, “Mysticism,” in Philosophical Studies, ed. by S. V. Keeling [Bristol, England: Thoemmes Press, 1996], p. 47).
17 Hine, Josiah Royce, p. 200.
who, like myself, have changed our provinces during our adult years, and who have so been unable to become and to remain in the sense of European countries provincial.” It behooves any community to assimilate strangers in its midst; its unassimilated members do not stand to benefit the community and may even threaten to disrupt it. A community can best assimilate them by enabling them to identify with, and share the community’s pride in, both its human and natural history. But it can do this only if the community already has a strong provincial identity with which strangers can identify and so find a cause larger than themselves.

But their [newcomers’] failure to be assimilated constitutes, so long as it endures, a source of social danger, because the community needs well-knit organization. We meet this danger by the development of a strong provincial spirit amongst those who already constitute the centralized portion of the community. For thus a dignity is given to the social order which makes the newcomer long to share in its honors by deserving its confidence.  

By way of illustration, Royce recalls how the provincial identity of California evolved out of the sagas of Spanish missionaries and Mexican colonists before 1846, the events of early mining life, and the magnificent natural environment—particularly its salubrious climate for which California would become famous. Royce himself contributed to the evolution of California’s provincial identity by writing a history of the state, and using its landscape as the setting for a novel. One may more readily be assimilated to a small group, as represented by a province,

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19 Royce’s not insignificant contribution to American historiography is his *California from the Conquest in 1846 to the Second Vigilance Committee in San Francisco: A Study of American Character* (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1886). Vincent Buranelli considers it “the best chronicle of California ever written.” Its subject is simple—“the manner in which Mexican California turned into American California.” As its subtitle suggests, this is more than a chronicle; it, like David Hume’s history of England, is fundamentally a study of human nature. It is an analysis of the effects on the hearts and minds of men and women endeavoring to forge viable communities out of anarchical conditions. It is pre-eminently a moral allegory. Royce is “the annalist of a conquest. He is the analyst of the results of that conquest. He is the philosopher of what happened, what might have happened, and what ought to have happened. His history, therefore, begins and ends with value judgments. *California* is a moral tale.”
than to a large one, as represented by a nation; and one’s assimilation into the province facilitates her assimilation into the nation.

A second social evil remedied by a wise provincialism is what Royce calls the “leveling tendency of recent civilization” resulting in “a dead level of harassed mediocrity.” This leveling tendency, which in Royce’s day was at its incipient stage, is now pandemic throughout western societies and is painfully evident in politics, culture and even the academy. The general culture, particularly in North American society, is geared to the lowest common denominator where a dull uniformity of ideas and a numbing conformity in social behavior hold sway. Royce witnessed the burgeoning of huge industrial and economic institutions driven by unparalleled wealth, and the first stirrings of mass society and mass culture spurred by improved and speedy communications. What Royce saw in its nascent form we now see fully developed as a vast and unfathomably complex system of international corporations transcending the political boundaries of nations and driven by mass communications—increasingly monopolized—represented by the

California and its history provide the locale and background for Royce’s only novel, The Feud of Oakfield Creek: A Novel of California Life (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1887). Though Royce was a better historian than a novelist, The Feud “has the permanent interest of a novel written by Josiah Royce and dedicated to William James.” For the source of the above citations and further discussion of Royce as an historian and novelist, see Vincent Buranelli, Josiah Royce, Twayne’s United States Author Series (New Haven, Conn.: College & University Press, 1964), pp. 20, 33–47, 49, 50, 147, 148. Further estimates and discussion of Royce as historian and novelist can be found in Hine, Josiah Royce: Hine commends the modernity of Royce’s historiography. He characterizes Royce’s California as an example of “new social history” insofar as Royce is more concerned with social conditions than human individuals. Moreover, it exemplifies “modern sociological history that is built on Max Weber’s writings on collective consciousness” inasmuch as Royce (unlike Carlyle) is concerned principally with the enveloping social order rather than the biographies of individuals, and it is cast in an ecological mould since Royce “conceived of life as interacting with an environment.” For Hine, Royce’s California and Feud are significant because they “grew straight out of his California backgrounds and merely explored in other forms his life’s deepest preoccupations” (ibid., pp. 158, 159, 158, 165). For a thorough and appreciative discussion of Royce as novelist and historian by a fellow historian, see the chapter, “A History and a Novel,” ibid, pp. 143 – 165.

20 Royce, “Provincialism,” p. 74.
Internet and television. Royce warned that these things could quash the individual’s “independence of spirit,” indispensable to his dignity, and replace him with “mass man.”: “Ingenuity and initiative become subordinated to the discipline of an impersonal social order,” and each person stands “to lose all sense of his unique moral destiny as an individual.” Today, to parody Emerson, corporations are in the saddle and ride mankind. Royce recognizes the strength of the “mutual assimilation of men” in society and of their predisposition toward imitation which gives rise to the leveling tendency of mass society with its pervasive uniformity and conformity. And he also recognizes that some mutual assimilation and imitation of human beings are necessary for a minimum of social unity and order without which society could not function let alone flourish. With this he has no quarrel, but only with the extremes of assimilation and imitation when unchecked by the countervailing tendency of enlightened provincialism: “Imitation is a good thing. All civilization depends upon it. But there may be a limit to the number of people who ought to imitate precisely the same body of ideas and customs. For imitation is not man’s whole business. There ought to be some room left for variety.” And that variety, for Royce, is supplied by provinces:

For a man is in large measure what his social consciousness makes him. Give him the local community that he loves and cherishes, that he is proud to honor and to serve,—give him faith in the dignity of his province,—and you have given him a power to counteract the leveling tendencies of modern civilization.  

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21 This state of affairs is dramatized in Paddy Chayefsky’s satirical screenplay for the film, Network (1976), directed by Sidney Lumet and starring William Holden, Faye Dunaway, Peter Finch, Robert Duvall, and Ned Beatty among others. In one of the most dramatic sequences of that film, Arthur Jensen (Beatty’s character) confronts Howard Beale (Finch’s character). Beale is an idealist, and Jensen a hard-headed realist. Jensen seeks to disabuse Beale of his idealistic view of the world. He says that politics is now irrelevant, that nations now exist in name only, and that the real forces at play in the world are economic—the business of the world is now business. Jensen predicts the coming of a dystopian future where human individuals will count for nothing. This film is a poignant dramatization of what might happen if the leveling tendency Royce warns of runs amok. Seen from the perspective of 2006, the era of a global economy and the movement towards plutocracy, Network is eerily and disturbingly prophetic.

22 Royce, “Provincialism,” pp. 78, 75-76, 75, 76, 79.
Provinces, by breaking up the cultural hegemony of the state, allow for a healthy variety of indigenous provincial cultures that serve to mitigate cultural uniformity and conformity and give scope both for the exercise of human individuality and freedom and for the fuller realization of human potentialities.²³

Further, a wise provincialism provides an Archimedean point from which to launch a critique of the dominant socio-political order, an expression of freedom as well as of social amelioration.²⁴

²³ Interestingly, Royce’s cultural pluralism has a parallel in the religious pluralism of his friend and colleague, William James, whose philosophy, like Royce’s, pivots around the individual person. He believed that the greater the variety of religions, and of religious beliefs and experiences, the better. For one thing, we each have different stations, needs and capacities to which different forms of religious life are suited. James writes, “I do not see how it is possible that creatures in such different positions and with such different powers as human individuals are, should have exactly the same functions and the same duties. No two of us have identical difficulties, nor should we be expected to work out identical solutions. Each, from his peculiar angle of observation, takes in a certain sphere of fact and trouble, which each must deal with in a unique manner.” James goes on to say that our experience and knowledge of the divine would be impoverished without a variety of religious perspectives since its multifacetedness demands them: “If an Emerson were forced to be a Wesley, or a Moody forced to be a Whitman, the total human consciousness of the divine would suffer. The divine can mean no single quality, it must mean a group of qualities, by being champions of which in alternation, different men may all find worthy missions. Each attitude being a syllable in human nature’s total message, it takes the whole of us to spell the meaning out completely. . . . We must frankly recognize the fact that we live in partial systems, and that parts are not interchangeable in the spiritual life” (idem, The Varieties of Religious Experience, A Study in Human Nature [New York: The Library of America, 1987], pp. 436-37). Incidentally we find here additional support for Royce’s wise provincialism. Provincialism allows for more possibilities of our social nature to be expressed and realized in the form of different traditions, customs, and ideals, all of which heighten our social experience, which would remain unexpressed and unrealized in a hegemonic society.

²⁴ Royce’s enlightened provincialism is reminiscent of the cultural anthropology of the German poet and philosopher, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803). Herder, writing at the dawn of German nationalism, believed that each and every culture is unique and inherently valuable. He was a cultural pluralist who objected as much as Royce would do to the leveling tendencies in society. For Herder, the greater variety of indigenous cultures, as represented by different nations and provinces, the better. Isaiah Berlin remarks on Herder as follows: “Herder upholds the value of variety and spontaneity, of the different, idiosyncratic paths pursued by peoples, each with its own style, ways of feeling and expression, and denounces the measuring of everything by the same timeless standards . . . The values of one civilization will be different from, and perhaps incompatible with, the values of another. If free creation, spontaneous development along one’s own native lines, not inhibited or suppressed by the dogmatic pronouncements of an elite of self-appointed arbiters, insensitive to history, is to be accorded supreme value; if authenticity and variety are not to be sacrificed to authority, organization, centralization, which
A third social evil addressed by an enlightened provincialism is what Royce identifies as the “mob spirit.” He defines “mob” as “a company of people who, by reason of their sympathies, have for the time being resigned their individual judgment.” The opposite of a mob is a “small company of thoughtful individuals who are taking counsel together”; what distinguishes them is their skepticism, their exercise of critical judgment and, above all, their individualism. Examples of such small companies are the group of interlocutors in one of Plato’s dialogues or a well-run New England town meeting. By contrast with them, mobs are altogether lacking in anything like critical intelligence, doubt, and the individuality of its constituents. Mobs are animated by the spirit of sympathy, which may be benign or malign depending with what it sympathizes; thus the sympathy inspiring lynch mobs is cruel, whereas that spontaneous outpouring of aid for the victims of Katrina was benevolent. The small enlightened social group, wherein each of its members feels her personal engagement in and responsibility to a larger cause is wiser than any of its members; but the mob, in which the individual loses her identity in the mass, is more stupid than any of its individual elements. Royce notes that among the fruits of small enlightened social groups are language, law, and science—to which we might add the fine arts. The mob spirit is especially insidious when it wears the attractive masks of “loyal party spirit,” patriotism (to use Royce’s examples) and piety; and it is particularly dangerous when it animates large social groups and is abetted by the

inexorably tend to uniformity and the destruction of what men hold dearest — their language, their institutions, their habits, their form of life, all that has made them what they are — then the establishment of one world, organized on universally accepted rational principles — the ideal society — is not acceptable” (idem, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, Chapters in the History of Ideas, ed. by Henry Hardy [New York: Vintage Books, 1990], p. 224. Royce did hold out hopes for the establishment of such an ideal society, international in scale, but nevertheless constituted from individual nations, with each in turn made up of distinct provinces. For Royce, enlightened provincialism is compatible with enlightened nationalism, and enlightened nationalism with internationalism — indeed, each depends upon the other. Incidentally, Royce’s kinship with Herder is not surprising. He was, after all, a keen student and admirer (though with reservations) of the German Romantics, of which Herder was one.
techniques of mass communication. Royce correctly and prophetically identified the exorcism of the mob spirit from democracy as one of the chief socio-political problems of modernity, and cites approvingly the remark of Gustave Le Bon, the distinguished French social psychologist who made a special study of crowd behavior, “that the problem of the future will become more and more the problem how to escape from the domination of the crowd.” For modern examples of the mob spirit we do not have to look far—Nazi Germany was a mob, and so were the Muslims on the rampage throughout the world protesting the allegedly “blasphemous” cartoons published by western newspapers. The province, because of its relative smallness, and its honoring the individuality and autonomy of the individual persons making it up, is conducive to the emergence of enlightened social groups within it and so provides an antidote to the mob spirit. Royce puts it in an uncompromising way:

Freedom, I should say, dwells now in the small social group, and has its secured home in the provincial life. The nation by itself, apart from the influence of the province, is in danger of becoming an incomprehensible monster, in whose presence the individual loses his right, his self-consciousness, and his dignity. The province must save the individual.\textsuperscript{25}

Having established that a wise provincialism is no less necessary than an enlightened patriotism to the flourishing of a national culture, with both — ideally — being mutually supporting, Royce recognizes that the two may come into conflict, thereby threatening the

\textsuperscript{25} Royce, ‘Provincialism,” pp. 81, 85, 86, 91-92, 98. Royce’s own life is a perfect illustration of the importance of a wise provincialism in the mental formation of human beings. His preoccupation with the issues of loyalty and community — in fact, his whole philosophy — is a profound response to the Californian province where he spent his formative years. In his ”Autobiographical Sketch,” he reminisces: “My earliest recollections include a very frequent wonder as to what my elders meant when they said that this was a new community. I frequently looked at the vestiges left by the former diggings of miners, saw that many pine logs were rotten, and that a miner’s grave was to be found in a lonely place not far from my own house. Plainly men had lived and died thereabouts. . . . What was there then in this place that ought to be called new, or for that matter, crude? I wondered, and gradually came to feel that part of my life’s business was to find out what all this wonder meant” (idem, “Autobiographical Sketch,” in The Hope of the Great Community [New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916], pp. 122-23, cited by Buranelli, Josiah Royce, pp. 49-50). It would be no exaggeration to say that California made Royce a philosopher.
integrity of the state. How, then, can the two be harmonized? A conflict of loyalties, within the
nation, may occur in several ways. The conflict may rage within the breast of a single person
devoted to incompatible causes. Thus, a Justice of the United States Supreme Court may have to
adjudicate a case where if he heeds the dictates of his conscience he may find himself at odds
with the Constitution, but if he adheres to the demands of Constitutional principles he
compromises his conscience—think, for example, of a Roman Catholic Justice having to
determine a case concerning the legality of abortion or capital punishment. On the other hand,
the conflict of loyalties may occur between sections of a country, or between a section and the
country as a whole. For example, one’s loyalty to the American Confederacy would have
conflicted with her loyalty to the Union; one’s loyalty to Quebec might potentially conflict with
her loyalty to Canada. Royce’s solution to this problem is deceptively simple. One’s ultimate
loyalty ought not to be to one’s own cause, however noble, but to the principle of loyalty itself.
Though one may be at odds with another person’s cause, one must abstract and respect (be loyal
to) her loyalty to it. Thus, a soldier may hate his enemy’s cause and oppose the enemy himself,
but honor his valor in battle and his devotion to that cause. “Regard your neighbor’s loyalty as
something sacred,” Royce exhorts. “Do nothing to make him less loyal. Never despise him for
his loyalty, however little you care for the cause he chooses.” But in the exercise of our
individual loyalties, we should seek at all times and in all ways to strengthen and advance the
loyalties of others, because loyalty itself is a common good wherever it is found:

_Be loyal, and be in such wise loyal that, whatever your own cause, you remain loyal to loyalty._ That is, so choose your cause, and so serve it, that, as a result of our activity, there shall be more of this common good of loyalty in the world than there would have been, had you not lived and acted. Let your loyalty be such loyalty as helps your neighbor to be loyal.

Despite the diversity of the individual causes—the families, countries, professions,
friendships—to which you and your neighbor are loyal, so act that the devotion of each shall respect and aid the other’s loyalty.26

If, then, in one’s loyalty to her province her first loyalty is to loyalty itself, she is, at least in principle, in harmony with the provincial loyalties of others and loyalty (patriotism) to the nation as a whole.

CONTEMPORARY APPLICATIONS

I shall now apply Royce’s defense of provincialism and his theory of loyalty to our contemporary problem of understanding and dealing with conflicts of loyalties both within and among European nations and their reconciliation. To do so, however, I need to slightly emend Royce’s definition of “province,” though without, I hope, violating its spirit. Remember, his definition of “province” is “any one part of a national domain, which is, geographically and socially, sufficiently unified to have a true consciousness of its own unity, to feel a pride in its own ideals and customs, and to possess a sense of its distinction from other parts of the country.” I propose we omit the adverb “geographically,” so if a group is sufficiently unified just socially, however geographically dispersed it might be, to “have a true consciousness of its own unity, etc.,” then it qualifies as a province. Accordingly, the Muslim community established in various European countries, counts as a province, though it spreads across many national borders. Moreover, the several nation states that belong to the EU themselves constitute distinct provinces within the larger social domain of the European Union. Yet, the Muslim community, though lacking geographical unity, and any European country, while possessing it, indisputably has “a true consciousness of its own unity, to feel a pride in its own ideals and customs, and to possess a sense of its distinction from” the rest of Europe.

Royce’s wise provincialism, then, applies as much to Europe’s Muslim community and the several nations of Europe as any other province, and provides a philosophical rationale for defending their distinct identities and autonomies; further, his theory of loyalty shows how, say, a Muslim’s loyalty to Islam and his loyalty to European liberal democracy, or a European’s loyalty to a country and her loyalty to the European Union, may be in harmony. In Royce’s view, the existence of sub-cultures within a larger culture is eminently desirable for the reasons that we have seen, viz. facilitating the assimilation of immigrants into the larger community; counteracting the “leveling tendency” within the larger culture towards a stultifying uniformity and conformity of beliefs, ideas and ideals; and counteracting the mob spirit that threatens the individual’s autonomy and rationality—in brief, Royce’s defense of enlightened provincialism comes down to preserving the integrity, autonomy and critical intelligence of the individual person against those larger social forces that would eradicate them. Further, on Royce’s analysis, there is no inherent incompatibility between loyalty to a sub-culture and loyalty to the larger culture of which it is a part—indeed, each may strengthen the other—as long as the principle of loyalty to loyalty remains paramount. Thus, an Imam might from his pulpit legitimately criticize the secularism and moral values of western democracies for the sake of improving them—after all, intelligent criticism is one of the merits of those smaller, enlightened societies that Royce contrasts with mobs—however, under no circumstances may he incite his congregation to violence, since this strikes at the loyalty of those loyal to the democratic polity. A nation within the EU might legitimately score some of the its policies—again, exercising the virtue of constructive criticism—but it may not separate from or declare war on the EU, since this would be an attack on the loyalty of other nations to the pan-European union. Royce
specifically contrasts his wise provincialism with its “false forms” which impair the unity of the larger social order and invite civil conflict.

For Royce, the ultimate object of any of our loyalties ought to be nothing less than the community of mankind, which is the cornerstone of both his ethics and metaphysics. Through our several narrower loyalties to our provinces, our nations and our various causes, we should all be serving this the greatest and most inclusive of communities, what Royce calls the “Great Community.” Indeed, the limited objects of our narrower loyalties and the great community are in a reciprocal relationship: our loyalty to the great community will foster and properly order our sub-loyalties, whereas these in turn will nourish our loyalty to the community of mankind. And if our loyalty is not so much to any cause but to the principle of loyalty itself, we cannot help but serve the great community. Royce’s view that the ultimate object of our loyalties should be the great community determined his stance towards nation states and international relations.27

Royce was a thorough-going internationalist. As the province is to a nation, so is a nation to the community of nations. Just as there is a false and an enlightened provincialism, so too there is a false and enlightened nationalism. Just as a false provincialism makes for internal strife and even civil war, a false nationalism makes for war among nations. And for the same reasons enlightened provincialism is indispensable to a flourishing nation, so an enlightened nationalism is indispensable to a healthy community of nations, particularly when they are linked together as in the EU, since, among other things, it gives the opportunity for self-determination of peoples and serves as a corrective to the excesses of a stultifying bureaucracy. For Royce,

27 William Ernest Hocking, Royce’s student and disciple, developed his mentor’s cosmopolitanism as represented by the idea and ideal of the Great Community. In his The Coming World Civilization, Hocking declares (from the perspective of the 1950s), “Today, we seem to stand on the threshold of a new thing, civilization in the singular.” He then cautions, “The era of ‘the civilizations’ being past, what we now enter is either the era of civilization or the era of universal desolation” (idem, The Coming World Civilization [New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1956], pp. 51-52).
true internationalism depends upon particular nationalisms. “There can be no true international
life unless the nations remain to possess it,” Royce insists. “There can never be a spiritual body
unless that body, like the ideal Pauline church, has its many members. The citizens of the world
of the future will not lose their distinct countries.” And in envisioning the future prospect of the
establishment of a global community, he anticipates that “the community of mankind will be
international in the sense that it will ignore no national and genuinely self-conscious nation. It
will find the way to respect the liberty of the individual nations without destroying their genuine
spiritual freedom.” In thus affirming the integrity and sovereignty of individual nation states as
necessary for a well-ordered international system, Royce proved himself prophetic. Many
movements of the nineteenth century—Marxism, for example—had pronounced the death of
nationalism. But they could not have been wider off the mark. “The prophets of the nineteenth
century predicted many things,” writes Isaiah Berlin, “but what none of them, so far as I know,
predicted was that the last third of the twentieth century would be dominated by a world-wide
growth of nationalism.” In this respect nationalism is much like religion, the ultimate form of
loyalty. Many in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Nietzsche, Marx and Freud
conspicuous among them, had likewise rung the death knell of religion which they considered
atavistic and even pathological. They would no doubt be mystified at the virulent outbreak of
fundamentalisms, particularly Islamic, in the late twentieth century. Nationalism, it seems, like
religion, will always be with us; and again, like religion, it may be enlightened and a force for
good, all of which Royce recognized. On the other hand, Royce condemns chauvinism,
jingoism, and cultural isolationism. He would undoubtedly deplore the buccaneering, unilateral
foreign policy initiatives of the current administration in the United States. As a Hegelian, he

28 Royce, *The Hope*, pp. 51, 52
29 Berlin, *Crooked Timber*, p. 213.
understood that all peoples and nations are organically connected. He advocated cooperation among nations, the principles of international law, and diplomacy. “We shall always be required to take counsel of the other nations in company with whom we are at work upon the tasks of civilization,” he admonishes. “Nor have we outgrown our spiritual dependence upon older forms of civilization. In fact, we shall never outgrow a certain inevitable degree of such dependence.” Yet, learning from others does not mean our slavishly imitating them. According to Royce,

all the individuals of the true spiritual order have ideal goods in common, as the very means whereby they can win each his individual place with reference to the possession and the employments of these common goods. Well, it is with provinces as with individuals. The way to win independence is by learning freely from abroad, but by then insisting upon our own interpretation of the common good.30

Though witnessing the outbreak of the First World War, and bitterly disappointed with Germany (whose civilization he loved and imbibed as a youth) which he blamed as the aggressor in that conflict, Royce nevertheless remained optimistic. He saw the advent of the twentieth century as a time propitious for the emergence of a truly international community of nations whose differences might be settled in courts and board rooms rather than in the field: “The modern world has become in many ways more and more an international world. And this, I insist, has been true not merely as to its technical and material ties, but as to its spiritual union.”31

CONCLUSIONS

As a coda to the above, I shall briefly note an implication of Royce’s doctrines of loyalty and provincialism for the freedoms of speech and religion. For Royce, we may practice our loyalties to various causes as long as our primary allegiance is to the principle of loyalty itself, so long as

30 Royce, “Provincialism,” pp. 63-64, 103.
31 Royce, The Hope, p. 42. During the First World War, Royce endeavored to make a practical application of his theories of loyalty and community. He proposed a scheme of international insurance which, he hoped, would significantly diminish the threat of war. See his War and Insurance (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914).
we do not undermine the loyalties of others but increase the stock of loyalty in the world. However, if my loyalty to a cause destroys or dishonors yours, then it is illegitimate. Now Abu Hamza al Masri’s public call in England for jihad was, in his eyes, a legitimate expression of his loyalty to Islam; but, in calling for the destruction of secular democratic principles, and the death of those loyal to them, he was calling more fundamentally for the destruction not only of the object of their loyalty, and but also for the loyalty itself they embody. To ban such inflammatory speech, as the British government did in Abu Hamza al Masri’s case, is not to restrict lawful freedom of speech, but simply to preserve existing loyalties and the true freedom they make possible—namely, the freedom to be loyal to the cause of one’s own choice which is the sole means to one’s self-realization. It is precisely that kind of freedom which is enshrined in the democratic polity.

Royce’s essays, “Provincialism” and “Some Relations of Physical Training to the Present Problems of Moral Education in America,” are windows of sorts on his entire philosophical system. As we have already noted, his conception of loyalty summarized in the latter essay and exemplified in the former bears the hallmarks of his philosophy, specifically his individualism and pragmatism. Like streams which, if followed, take you to a river and eventually the sea, this pair of essays, though occasional pieces, have ideas that, if followed out, will carry you to the deeper and broader currents of Royce’s thought. Further, these essays tackle a perennial issue in socio-political philosophy, namely, the relation of the individual to society, or the problem of

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32 Royce’s allowance for the maximum of an individual’s loyalty to any cause so long as it does not subvert the loyalties of others to their respective causes, is reminiscent of Mill’s principle of freedom. Mill too allows for the maximum of an individual’s freedom as long as it does not threaten harm to others. In his On Liberty, he stipulates, “the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (idem, On Liberty, in The English Philosophers From Bacon to Mill, ed. by Edwin A. Burtt [New York: The Modern Library, 1939], p. 956).
balancing the private interests (freedom) of the individual person with the public interests (preservation) of the society to which she belongs. And this issue is in reality the manifestation at the human level of the old philosophical conundrum that goes back to the Pre-Socratic Greeks, wrestled with by Parmenides and Heraclitus, and Plato, namely, spelling out the relationship of the particular to the universal, a perennial issue of metaphysics. Royce consistently and in different ways affirms the inviolability of the human individual; his affirmation of enlightened (wise) forms of provincialism and of nationalism is an expression of his individualism at the social level. But no less strenuously, Royce affirms the supreme value of union among individuals whether they be persons, provinces, or nations; and social union is achieved through individual loyalties to common causes which result in communities. “Josiah Royce, protagonist of individualism,” remarks Ralph H. Gabriel, “yet insisted that men are ‘saved by the community.’ He symbolized in his effort to combine in his philosophy individualism and collectivism a conflict in American social thought that grew more intense with each decade.”

And that conflict is specific not only to American social thought, but also to the attempts of European nations to accommodate the sub-cultures in their midst, and to form among themselves a viable pan-European Union. “The detached individual is an essentially lost being,” admonishes Royce, and this goes for persons, provinces, and nations. Echoing the apostle Paul, Royce affirms, “the salvation of the world will be found, if at all, through uniting the already

34 The tension between honoring individual freedom and preserving public order is endemic to the history of European culture. Isaiah Berlin has remarked: “It is a truism that European history is a kind of dialectic between craving for public order and for individual liberty. The quest for order is a kind of fear before the elements, an attempt to build walls and hedges against the chaos caused by absence of control, against the weakening of traditions, habits, rules of life, in an effort to preserve the banisters that human beings need to prevent them from toppling over into an abyss, to connect them with their past and point a path to the future. When institutions become too set and obstruct growth, order becomes oppression and worship of it self-stultifying; sooner or later it is broken through by the almost physiological desire to live, move, create, by the need for novelty and change” (idem, Crooked Timber, pp. 195-96).
existing communities of mankind into higher communities.” A fitting motto for Royce’s ethics and metaphysics would be the distinctively American one, *E pluribus Unum*, a condition both within and without their borders to which it would behoove Europeans, in the spirit of Royce, to aspire.

In light of Royce’s understanding of loyalty—namely, that the objects of their loyalty give their lives meaning and offer them salvation, no less, and that their devotion to their various causes is indispensable to their self-fulfillment and happiness—it is little wonder that people cling so pertinaciously to their traditions, customs, creeds, and lands, brooking no interference with them. And this is why two forms of loyalty, provincialism and nationalism, are ineradicable features of the human social world, and why in their enlightened forms, both are essential to a flourishing society.

Royce, I think, has three important lessons for us today. One is that cultural pluralism, since it allows for the expression of individualism and the exercise of individual freedom and creativity, thereby breaking up the hegemony of a dominant culture, is an undeniable good. A second lesson is that provincialism and nationalism need not be narrow and pernicious but may be enlightened or wise. What makes either provincialism or nationalism enlightened is its awareness of and adaptation to the wider social environment. Enlightened provincialism is mindful of the nation, as enlightened nationalism is mindful of other nations; and the lodestar guiding both is, of course, the great community of humankind, the most inclusive social order. Reciprocally, however, a healthy internationalism depends upon the sovereignty and integrity of the nation states making up the international order, as nationalism preserves and encourages the flourishing of its component provinces. We might put it this way: enlightened provincialism is a function of enlightened nationalism, and conversely, and enlightened nationalism is a function of

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35 Royce, *The Hope*, p. 49.
enlightened internationalism, and conversely. Royce’s social philosophy is deeply ecological; every individual person, and every smaller social group, is unavoidably and organically related to a larger social whole. A third of Royce’s lessons is that loyalties need not conflict but can coexist peaceably, and in so doing strengthen one another, if the ultimate object of one’s loyalty is to the principle of loyalty itself rather than to any particular cause, however good.

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