Religion Policy and the Faith-Based Initiative: Navigating the Shifting Boundaries between Church and State

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Abstract

Despite widespread presumption of a wall of separation between church and state, boundaries between the activities of religious and policy organizations in the United States are fluid and endlessly renegotiated. Faith-based organizations (FBOs) are full participants in complex policy networks in some policy areas (health, education, and social services), while in other issue areas FBOs have minimal if any impact. Government policies at national, state, and local levels directly or indirectly manipulate the incentives and disincentives of believers’ participation in policy-relevant activities.

Religion policy encompasses a wide array of policy instruments (or policy tools), and this paper identifies the key determinants of diverse patterns of relationships among the leaders of religious and political organizations. The Bush-era faith-based initiative illustrates religion policy in action, revealing both its potential and its inherent limitations. This paper concludes with an examination of criteria by which the positive and negative consequences of increased FBO participation, for those involved in specific policy areas and for society as a whole, might be evaluated.

Introduction

As a natural expression of their religious faith, many believers engage in behaviors that have direct or indirect consequences on politics or public policy, typically through their participation in faith-based organizations, or FBOs (to be defined below). In response, public officials enact policies that shape the activities of FBOs as well as individual expressions of religious faith and commitment.

Even in the United States, where church and state supposedly lie on opposite sides of a formidable wall of separation, the reality is that many national, state, and local officials interact with religious organizations on a routine basis (Sedler 2010). For example, Stritt (2008) offers a detailed accounting of the contributions that religious organizations make in the area of social welfare policy. After combining estimates drawn from a wide range of sources, including estimations of the dollar value of volunteer labor, he concludes that approximately 30% of the $175 billion that is spent annually on welfare policy in the U.S. goes through faith-based organizations, either via individual contributions or in the form of government contacts. Since his analysis explicitly excludes health, education, and international policy areas, it grossly underestimates the monetary value of religion’s contributions to public policy in the United States.

In this paper I outline a framework for the analysis of religion policy, a term meant to encompass all the legal, regulatory, financial, and symbolic activities undertaken by public
officials that involve direct interactions (cooperative or not) with leaders of religious organizations, or which have significant direct or indirect impacts on the practice of religion. Typically the goals behind these policies have nothing to do with religion per se, and it remains to be seen whether or not it makes sense to aggregate all of these diverse policies into a single area of study, but it is worth pointing out that substantively-defined areas of policy encompass similarly diverse modes of motivation and behavior.

Even if this conglomerate of policy activities fails to cohere into an identifiable core, this exercise can serve to counter the misleading implications of the soothing metaphor of a “wall of separation” between church and state. Distinctions can certainly be made between primarily religious and primarily political organizations and their dominant activities, but in practice the boundaries between these two realms are endlessly contested and renegotiated. As we shall see, there are multiple reasons to expect changing patterns of interactions across any such wall, as well as reasons to expect these interactions to remain limited in their extent and consequences.

Religion policy may be studied at any scale of aggregation. In this paper I focus on patterns of interaction between agents of religious and political organizations, especially organizations engaged in the practical implementation of public policy. Analysts distinguish between two fundamentally different types of religious organizations, namely, (1) **congregations** and related organizations primarily focused on doctrines, rituals, and other matters directly related to the shared experience of worship and (2) **faith-based organizations (FBOs)** involved in the delivery of health care, emergency relief, education, or other public welfare services.

Some small-scale service programs, such as food pantries, are directly implemented through a congregation or other basic unit of a religious community (Ammerman 2005, Chaves 2004, Unruh and Sider 2005). Larger service programs tend to be run through separate non-profit organizations, which can simply things in terms of tax liability and other legal concerns. The largest and most well-established FBOs, such as Catholic Charities or the Salvation Army, are especially closely tied to public agencies (Monsma 1996, 2004, Wuthnow 2004, Ebaugh et al. 2005) and their contributions are critical in such areas of social policy as emergency shelter, food aid, and disaster relief. Some of these programs are so well-established and professionally run that they are effectively indistinguishable from secular programs, except perhaps for the use of a religious term in their title. Yet in other cases a connection to religion still makes a significant difference in program priorities or implementation.

Technically, the term **faith-based organization (FBO)** is best reserved for organizations specializing in the delivery of some particular form of service (food, shelter, education, health care, personal rehabilitation, etc.) and which base at least some aspect of their programs on religious inspirations or personnel. There is no consensus on what exactly makes a service organization “faith-based,” (Berger 2003, Ebaugh et al. 2003, Jeavons 1994, 1998, Smith and Sosin 2001, Unruh and Sider 2005), but the basic idea is that an FBO is affiliated in some way with a religious tradition but that it was established to achieve purposes that could not be subsumed under the purview of purely religious activities. The religious component may come in many forms, ranging from explicit connections to a particular denomination or religious
organization (which may provide the facilities in which the program is housed and/or the individuals who oversee the management of that program), to donations from members of a religious community (who may also serve as volunteers in the implementation of these programs), or to the incorporation of particular details of the program itself (perhaps including overtly religious activities such as scripture reading groups or prayer sessions). The extent to which FBO service programs are directly influenced by religion varies widely.

Within the United States, the most successful faith-based organizations in any given area of activity often become intimately linked with the public agencies, secular nonprofits, and private for-profit corporations which are also heavily involved in that area of public policy. Globally, religious organizations have long played important leadership roles in what has come to be known as the international community: a global network of national governments, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and an amorphous constellation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) specializing in humanitarian assistance, development, conflict resolution, human rights, democracy promotion, and post-conflict reconstruction or reconciliation. As such, international or transnational faith-based organizations are critical components in the formulation and in the implementation of public policy at the global level, as well as at national and local levels throughout the world.

This paper outlines a framework for analysis that helps explain the origins and development of the many different patterns of interactions between FBOs and their partners in public service delivery. An informal model of the sequential process through which FBOs are established and later respond to incentives set by political authorities is used to suggest conditions under which different levels of FBO participation in policy networks should be expected to emerge. After examining the reasons why leaders of religious and policy organizations are so frequently drawn together in common pursuits, this paper concludes with a brief evaluation of the normative consequences of increased FBO participation, both for members of that policy network and for society as a whole.

Analytical Preliminaries
My effort to understand the effect of religion on domestic and global public policy has been shaped by one fundamental premise: people engaged in religious activities are just as rational as they are when participating in explicitly economic or political activities. I emphasize my presumption of the rational basis of religious behavior and organization because it is far too easy for unsympathetic observers to dismiss religion as unworthy of serious consideration as an influence on public policy. As a social scientist, I presume that there is a consistent logic guiding the behavior of faith-based service organizations and the religious believers who animate them, and that this hidden logic is amenable to systematic analysis and comprehension.

More specifically, I draw upon the approach to institutional analysis developed by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, co-founders of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961; Ostrom 1990, 2005). Institutional analysis treats rationality as the core component of human choice in all areas of endeavor. Individuals are presumed to pursue goals for themselves and for the communities to
which they identify, and to do so in as effective a manner as possible, but they do so within the context of ubiquitous social dilemmas and biophysical constraints, as well as cognitive limitations and cultural predispositions. When a group of rational individuals realizes that they need some regular means to coordinate their behavior in order to accomplish some shared goals, then they may choose to establish and operate a formal organization, or they continue to rely on more informal institutional arrangements. From this perspective, religious organizations face the full spectrum of dilemmas of collective action (Bickers and Williams 2001), and as a consequence they experience a similarly mixed record of positive and negative results.

The analysis presented in this paper falls between two broad and active traditions of research in which the tools of modern political economy have been applied to the study of religion and policy.

The first tradition of research, dating back at least as far as Adam Smith (1776), examines how a competitive marketplace in religion can shape patterns of religious participation and/or economic growth (Iannocone 1994, 1998, Stark and Finke 2000; Finke and Stark 2005). Briefly, the rational choice theory of religion implies all available niches (as defined by different constellations of consumer tastes for religious products) will be occupied by suppliers of religious experiences, as long as there are no politically imposed restrictions on the formation and promulgation of new faiths.

Religious entrepreneurs search for innovative ways to enhance religious experience, in order to attract more resources and supporters. Since tastes vary and there is no direct means of measuring product quality in a religious market, we should expect to observe a wide array of available products in a competitive setting. The aggregate picture is one of endless religious energy finding expression in an ever-expanding array of alternative forms, along with a natural dynamic tendency for established products to change over time. My analytical point of departure is the presumption that the same methods of rational choice theory that have proven their utility in the study of religion itself can be extended to provide explanations for long-standing patterns of strategic interactions between FBOs and other types of organizations.

In the second body of research that brackets the approach of this paper, researchers investigate macro-level patterns of religious stratification and compare patterns of religious persecution and political conflict in different countries (Fox 2006, 2008, Gill 2001, Grim and Finke 2006). In some countries, one religious tradition has been declared the official state religion and its scriptures enshrined as the ultimate basis of legal authority. Oftentimes only a few religions enjoy ready access to public funding for charitable activities or religious schools. For example, China designates five religions as officially permitted, and India grants Islamic and a few other communities the right to implement family law on a religious basis (see U.S. Department of State yearly reports). Connections between religious and political power may become very close indeed. Every year a few diplomatic incidents arise when limits on proselytism or conversion in one country interferes with the freedom of citizens from other countries engaged in missionary activities (McGinnis 2007b).
Even governments that generally guarantee religious freedom still impose some restrictions on certain means of religious expression in the interest of protecting public order and safety.

A third status category is populated by a large number of faiths whose existence is tolerated but not supported in any direct fashion. Finally, there are some faiths that are denied full recognition by political authorities. Members of new faiths designated as dangerous “cults” or as proxies for foreign governments may be prohibited from owning property, proselytizing, or even engaging in worship activities. The identity of the specific faiths assigned to these status categories differs across countries, but this pattern is prevalent.

**Identifying Policy Networks**

In this paper I focus on a meso-level of analysis, nestled between activities of micro-level religious entrepreneurs and macro-level patterns of legal stratification. Specifically I compare patterns of interaction in different issue areas or subsectors of the overall public economy. The concept of issue area remains essential to the study of public policy, despite the absence of a consensus definition of this term (Hill and Hupe 2009). I proceed more informally, presuming that clusters of substantive issues can be identified in which many of the same actors interact with each other in a routine fashion, coping with many of the same policy problems year after year. In doing so, they constitute a policy network.

A **policy network** consists of all the public, private, voluntary, or community-based organizations that interact to determine and to implement public policy on some substantive issue. Policy networks typically include elected representatives, but details of policy are invariably set by an inter-related network of bureaucrats, appointed officials, technical experts, policy analysts, lobbyists, staff members, business leaders, and managers of professional associations and other nonprofit organizations.

For some analysts, members of a policy network typically share a common belief system, or at least a common understanding of the underlying nature of the policy problems to which they jointly respond (Sabatier 2007). For others, a regular pattern of interaction is sufficient to define a network, and attention shifts to how participants of different forms and with contradictory interests manage to interact in a productive manner (Bryson et al. 2006). In the literature on American public policy, researchers have long been struck by the regularity with which the same actors tend to continue to interact with each other, and especially by the ways their interactions tend to take the form of mutual adjustment to each other’s interests and behaviors. Regular interactions tend to result, perhaps not surprisingly, in an overwhelming pattern of incremental change (Lindblom 1959). Although individual political leaders may come and go as a consequence of such dramatic effects as elections, many of the same policy implementers remain in place, or exchange roles with each other. When dramatic events do occur, they may be treated as temporary punctuations that eventually settle down into a new equilibrium, or as a temporarily open policy window that, once closed, sees the newly established patterns of interaction once again operate far from public scrutiny (Sabatier 2007).

Although there may be pressures for conformity within a policy network and for incrementalism within any given issue domain, there remain dramatic differences among the
policy networks active in different areas of public policy. To my knowledge there has been no research that explicitly compares the roles that FBOs play in the policy networks active in different sectors of the public economy.

In a very useful overview of the third or voluntary sector, Salamon (1999) provides detailed assessments of the diverse roles that nonprofit organizations play in several of the most important sectors of the U.S. public economy. This book includes a separate chapter on purely religious organizations, whereas the contributions of faith-based service organizations are summarized in chapters on each substantively defined sector, along with other relevant nonprofits. As a consequence, the overall configuration of the faith-based subsector remains unclear (Cadge and Wuthnow 2006, Ebaugh 2005).

Table 1 classifies a few example policy areas on the basis of the level of FBO involvement. In the top row are listed issue areas in which faith-based organizations (FBOs) tend to be most tightly intertwined with the rest of the relevant policy networks. In the U.S., religious hospitals still play a major role in the health care system, even though it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish among hospitals originally established by churches, communities, or by for-profit corporations (Salamon 1999). At the global level, Catholic Relief Services, Lutheran World Relief, and World Vision International are large organizations that play critically important roles in the delivery of emergency food aid, health care, shelter for refugees, and other forms of humanitarian aid (Nichols 1988; Kniss and Campbell 1997; McCleary 2009, Thaut 2009). Here the connection between government and religious nonprofits is both longer-standing and less controversial than in the domestic policy arena.

The second row of Table 1 includes examples of policy areas in which the faith-based components are important but mostly separate from the rest of the policy network. In the area of elementary and secondary education in the U.S., for example, Catholic schools retain their distinctive role. These schools are subjected to many of the same regulations as public schools, but in other ways they receive special treatment. Religious support for home-schooling as an alternative form of education is also increasing in importance. Religious communities are also serviced by media outlets (magazines, radio and TV stations, etc.) that cater specifically to their tastes for religion-friendly information, and these channels of communication help to sustain relatively distinct religious subcultures.

Transnational networks link people with shared religious beliefs who happen to live in different political jurisdictions. Despite the past prevalence of the pattern in which Christian missionaries were sent from the more developed countries of Europe or North America to the rest of the world, in today’s increasingly interconnected world it is more appropriate to speak of missionaries from everywhere to everywhere (Jenkins 2003, Robert 2000, Pocock et al. 2005). Although many missionaries are, or have been, primarily motivated by their felt need to share their religious faith with others, many of these same missionaries have, in the process, established schools and health clinics. The extent to which 18th and 19th century missionaries were essentially tools or stooges of Western imperialism remains controversial, yet no one can deny the very real consequences of these activities on the shape of today’s world. Also, the
missionary enterprise is still very much alive, and today’s missionaries are just as likely to conflate religious and practical activities as were their predecessors (McGinnis 2007a).

The next and largest row of Table 1 includes several examples of issue areas in which faith-based service organizations play occasionally important roles, but remain concentrated on a limited range of issues of special interest to religious believers. Examples are arrayed in roughly decreasing order of importance or centrality to their respective issue domains.

Many of the same international faith-based organizations active in the delivery of humanitarian relief have extended their operations into the closely-related area of international development assistance. Development can proceed more regularly in times of peace, and religious activists have long been concerned with the search for peace, whether or not it leads to development. Particular religious leaders and organizations have played important roles in resolving certain conflicts at the international level, with efforts by Quakers, Mennonites and other the traditional peace churches being most easily identified as such (Cejka and Bamat 2003; Little 2007). However, for the most part the mechanisms of international diplomacy are carried out with little direct participation by FBOs (but see Johnston and Sampson 1994; Johnston 2003). The one exception, the one area of international peacemaking in which religious participation is uniquely essential, is the area of achieving a peaceful reconciliation among warring groups, especially at the level of local communities (Appleby 2000; Smock 2002, Schrich 2005). Typically such peace and reconciliation conferences require participants to join together in some locally meaningful ritual, which helps them come to a mutual recognition that past abuses on all sides need to be forgiven if both sides are to move forward.

Domestically, a similarly transformative experience lies at the heart of many programs of rehabilitation for drug addicts or hardened criminals. Although FBOs play a relatively small role in the broader area of job-training or professional development (Kennedy and Bielefeld 2006), some have developed strong reputations for their programs to rehabilitate repeat offenders (Mears et al. 2006).

It is widely recognized that religious leaders played prominent roles in historical campaigns against slavery and more recent efforts to insure the civil rights of the descendants of slaves. In addition, religious leaders are often more sympathetic to the plight of immigrants and others whose rights tend not to be as well-protected as those of full citizens. Internationally, the record of religious advocates of human rights is more uneven (Buss and Herman 2003, Lauren 2003, Marthoz and Saunders 2005, Nichols 2008-09). In recent years, religious leaders have dominated campaigns to strengthen international protections against restrictions on religious freedom, as exemplified in the passage of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 by the U.S. Congress and its rapid signing into law by Pres. Clinton (Hertzke 2004). A similar group of activists have inspired campaigns against human trafficking.

One of the enduring characteristics of the U.S. political system is a high concentration of poverty in urban minority communities, where churches and other religious organizations in African-American and Hispanic communities play critical roles in community development, almost by default (Lincoln and Mamiya 1990, Hula et al. 2007). There is no exact analogue to
this role in the international arena, but a case could be made that religious leaders might serve a similarly positive role in local development projects in many parts of the poorer countries of the world. Now that Pentecostal Christianity is growing with great rapidity in many of the world’s poorest communities, especially in urban areas, these leaders might come to play a more central role in economic development. Such has hardly been the case in the past, but now even the World Bank has come to recognize the potential contributions that religious leaders might make in development policy (Belshaw et al. 2001, Thomas 2004).

With the area of political activism to protect the environment we reach an issue area in which religious-based mobilization has been, until very recently, effectively non-existent. But with the growing realization of the consequences of global warming and other forms of environmental degradation, there has been a resurgence of interest in the environment by evangelical leaders, some of whom argue that “creation care” should be included as one of the tasks given mankind by its divine creator (see the Evangelical Environmental Network website). It remains to be seen how extensive will be the religious component to this emerging policy area, and it serves to remind us that these patterns remain fluid, as the relative influence of FBOs wax or wane with changing circumstances.

Even economic policy is not immune from religious influence. One important example is the Jubilee 2000 mobilization campaign, a global effort to convince financial organizations that were holding substantial levels of debt from the governments of many especially poor countries to forgive that debt, in the spirit of a Biblically mandated tradition of debt forgiveness known as the jubilee. Suffice it to say that these Biblical arguments failed to convince experts well-steeped in the doctrines of high finance, but this activism did help exert pressure on these same elites that lead, eventually, to some reduction of the debt burden faced by some less-developed nations, especially the poorest of the poor.

The bottom row of Table 1 acknowledges that there remain vast vistas of public policy for which FBOs are simply not relevant. Rarely does a minister address the issue of excessive U.S. budget deficits from the pulpit, for example. When we get to issues related to the military, such as homeland security or international peacekeeping operations, about the only systematic contribution made by FBOs lies in the training of chaplains. Building and maintaining roads, ports, airports, communication lines, and banking systems are important, albeit technical areas of public policy, but it is difficult to imagine any of them eliciting a creative response from anyone on the basis of their religious belief. On the other hand, at the international level, practical improvements in local infrastructures are often critical components of effective development projects, including those implemented by the most professionalized international FBOs. Ultimately, no area of public policy can be hermetically sealed and protected from intrusion from an FBO, given the right set of circumstances.

**Exploring Paths of FBO Establishment and Development**

The patterns of cross-issue policy network differences illustrated in Table 1 manifest the operation of a longer-term process of institutional innovation in which political manipulation
plays a central role. In each issue area, a distinctive pattern of FBO involvement in those policy networks has emerged from historical expression of a generic sequence of events and decisions, which I arrange in four analytically distinguishable steps: (1) religious expression, (2) institutionalization of those forms of expression by religious entrepreneurs, (3) regulation and other forms of manipulation by public officials and other political actors, and (4) a process of selection whereby policy networks become tightly integrated. At each step in this generic process, some types of decisions are more likely to occur than others. Over time, distinct patterns are generated by the acting out of these differing tendencies.

1. **Expression** of religious belief in the form of charitable or other activities can have direct and indirect effects on public policy. In all religious traditions, charitable behavior is evoked by observations of the pain and suffering experienced by others. Thus, those activities that are most likely to be relevant to public policy are disproportionately likely to be directed towards the perceived needs of marginalized groups. This tendency is reinforced by the widespread presumption that the poor and dispirited are most likely to be receptive to potential conversion to a new religion. That presumption may be in error, given research in the sociology of religion that highlights the importance of personal contacts and social network ties in any meaningful process of conversion, but even if mistaken this presumption may well be guiding behavior to a considerable extent.

2. **Entrepreneurship** is required to transform the irregular expression of religious belief in charitable acts into a more regularized or institutionalized pattern of behavior. Establishment of a formal organization may be inspired by an individual desiring to realize more effective implementation of charitable programs, perhaps by devising a regular way in which to attract donations and to organize the programs itself. This form of religious innovation may require establishment of a new organization, or the activities may be incorporated within the purview of established institutions, such as congregations, denominations, or other entities.

   Establishment of a formal FBO is made more or less likely by the operation of a few especially salient factors. First, formalization is especially likely if that activity is deemed to be of critical importance for the continued survival of that religious community as a whole. Schools for training religious leaders and especially for socializing children into the faith of their parents fall clearly into this category. A religious component to primary education is especially likely to emerge if that religious community feels itself to be a threatened minority, but not so threatened as to not have access to sufficient resources to establish their own school system.

   A second path towards formalization emerges when charitable impulses are reinforced by the primary components of religious belief. In some cases a positive feedback loop may be experienced in which the doctrine itself becomes imbued with the importance of public service as a way of life for the members of that community, thereby making charitable acts of certain kinds to be, in effect, another form of worship, a ritual highly regarded as meritorious. Perhaps the clearest example of the long-standing consequences of such a virtuous cycle is the Salvation
Army, an organization that looks very much like a professional service organization and yet remains fundamentally religious in nature. The leadership role taken by Quakers and Mennonites in the pursuit of peace is another example.

A third and more common path is triggered when some entrepreneur seizes an opportunity to improve the effectiveness through which charitable or other forms of faith-inspired activities are implemented. FBOs involved in delivery of health care, education, or other public services frequently find that they are unable to obtain, on their own, the level of resources needed to resolve the problems they seek to address. To obtain additional resources, leaders of FBOs may need to cater to the wishes of government officials controlling large pots of money. This sets the stage for potentially mutually beneficial relationships between the agents of religious and political organizations, within which a subtle form of political influence may be manifested.

In effect, faith-inspired activities can generate externalities, or external effects on both the recipients of charitable activities and for society as a whole. Public officials and/or policy entrepreneurs may seek to encourage more of the activities that FBOs are already engaged in or to shift that organization’s emphasis in other directions more in keeping with their own interests.

3. **Political regulation or manipulation** begins whenever public authorities seek to induce particular changes in the behavior of already existing FBOs. As will be detailed below, public officials have at their disposal a wide array of policy instruments with which they reward or punish different responses (Salamon 2002).

To give a taste of what follows, consider the practice of granting FBOs exemptions from rules that other organizations engaged in similar pursuits have to follow. For example, under the faith-based initiative of former President George W. Bush, religious organizations are allowed to select officials in a way that would otherwise be seen as discriminatory. Without such safeguards, religious entrepreneurs may forgo any opportunity to seek government funding to expand their existing programs. Such exemptions are, needless to say, controversial, and will be considered in more detail below.

4. **Selection and Networking** occurs as a consequence of ongoing reactions to incentives set by public officials. Typically, in any FBO that has experienced some initial small-scale success, at least some of the top leadership would like to expand their program to cover additional recipients. For them the question of practicality may outweigh any perceived costs in terms of deviation from a strict interpretation of doctrine. At the same time, however, some donors or volunteers may see these actions as deviations from the program’s initial priorities. They may shift their support to some other FBO or to help create a new one, or they may become disillusioned and withdraw from overtly political activities.

Those FBOs implementing certain kinds of programs will be reinforced whereas others will find themselves losing support, or needing to direct their fund-raising activities towards government agencies rather than individual donors. Over time, this process of selection should
act to narrow down the extent of variance among those FBOs receiving significant levels of public assistance, compared to those FBOs that remain more independent in their operations. As some FBOs become virtually indistinguishable from their secular counterparts, other more distinctly religious FBOs will continue to be established.

We have come full circle, returning to the original inspiration for charitable activities and the emergent need for more effective organization of those activities. Faith may inspire individual members to engage in charitable activities, but in order to effectively realize these gains some FBOs may end up behaving very much like any other kind of service delivery unit.

In some cases the policy challenges may prove too large for FBOs to handle, even when they receive increased assistance from the state. In welfare policy, for example, it is no accident that since the New Deal era the national government has taken on an unmistakably central role in setting the rules for, and distributing the resources spent on, welfare policy (Gruber and Hungerman 2007). The health care area is one in which the monies involved are so substantial that religious and other non-profit hospitals have come to face competition from for-profit hospital corporations.

On the other hand, FBOs may retain more room for maneuver in those issue areas in which less money is at stake, and the political stakes are too small to entice direct intervention by political authorities. Consider refugee assistance. Millions of refugees who need assistance every year, but few if any of them are going to vote a Western government in or out of office on the basis of this issue, and the amount of money that can be made distributing supplies to refugees is miniscule. Even when governments of the world’s major powers became more sensitive to public reactions to shocking images of starvation or genocidal attacks in far-flung lands, they continue to channel a high proportion of this emergency aid through the existing network of humanitarian aid organizations, several of the largest of which remain tied to specific religious denominations or movements (McCleary 2009).

Each of these steps can be taken as a potential pivot in a contingent sequence of network construction. Changes in each step sets the stage for later developments, by making some forms of change more likely and other forms hard to even imagine, let alone implement, by those actors who emerge from the process thus set in motion. Overall, this process of religious expression and entrepreneurial innovation, political manipulation and selection will generate different patterns of interactions between the overtly faith-based components of a policy network and the rest of that network.

**Matching Policy Tools to Religion’s Component Parts**

To further understand this process of strategic interaction between the leaders of religious and policy organizations, it is necessary to examine the decision-making situation as seen from their divergent perspectives.

At this point, it is useful to clarify my use of the term “religion,” another term that defies consensus definition. I follow Appleby’s (2000, 8–9) lead in “defining” a religion as a configuration of creed, cult, code of conduct, and confessional community. For Appleby, a
religion consists of a group of people who share a common understanding (community) about participation in a common set of rituals (cult) and who share a common set of beliefs (creed) that imply a code of conduct in their everyday lives. Appleby repeatedly emphasizes the diversity of beliefs and behavior that all religions or faith traditions can encompass, yet insists that there remains a meaningful sense in which all four of these components are interrelated and that “religion constitutes an integral culture” (p. 9).

The term “configuration” is not used by Appleby, but I find it particularly apt. I add a fifth c, for corporate actor, because I am primarily concerned with those religions that have been manifested in the form of a formal organization with explicitly defined roles for its agents and normative expectations for their behavior. I also find it useful to distinguish between the two types of religious organizations specified earlier, those primarily directed at worship versus organizations focused on the delivery of more mundane forms of public service.

With these additions, my working definition of a religion is an identifiable group of individuals who share most (if not all) of the following characteristics:

- Beliefs and doctrines, often related to things unseen or unknowable;
- Joint participation in rituals and modes of understanding that experience;
- Familiarity with symbols, narratives, stories, modes of understanding;
- Reverence for sacred objects (scriptures, places, persons, etc.);
- Appreciation of the unique legitimacy of certain codes of conduct;
- Joint membership in a corporate body (congregation or related entity);
- Efforts to help those in need, both individually and through more corporate endeavors;
- Procedures for selecting leaders and making common decisions;
- Common experiences, shared social ties, and participation in social networks that contribute towards a shared identification as members of a trans-generational community.

Religious communities naturally engage in activities with direct or indirect political consequences for a few simple reasons. First, most religions include prescriptions for helping the poor and sick, and those with a penchant for proselytism often consider such groups to be an especially attractive source of potential converts. Second, most religions espouse moral standards that can only be incompletely realized in the practical settings, so those inspired by religious visions often play important leadership roles in campaigns for peace, justice, and other forms of fundamental social change. Third, if a religion is to survive, members must socialize their children in the tenets of the faith, which is why education is so often a sensitive issue for religious communities. Finally, religious communities may need to fight to protect their own existence as corporate entities, and this concern may be especially likely to require them to engage more directly with political powers.

The relative importance of these concerns will change over time, especially as the size of a religious community changes in relation to that of the broader political community. However, very small religious communities may simply want to be left alone so they can worship in
whatever way they see fit, even if some of those practices conflict with general societal norms. Any service operations they implement are likely to be directed exclusively to their own members. They may also request to be exempted from the general requirement that all children attend public school.

Religious communities of more moderate size will still insist on religious freedom, but their definition of what counts as religious expression may not include the actions of “cults” deemed dangerous to social order. They may seek public support for their own religious schools. In the area of public service, they may reach beyond their own communities, especially if their religious tradition values expansion through conversion. Their leaders may encourage them to participate in campaigns to improve societal conditions, including in some instances partisan alignments with political parties.

Finally, if a single religious tradition is dominant among a country’s population, then some of its leaders may be unable to resist the temptation to seek hegemony over such policy areas as education, insisting that their religion’s precepts be taught in public schools. Leaders of hegemonic faiths may seek to limit proselytism and may criminalize the simple act of conversion, in order to protect their position.

To a considerable extent, religious communities respond much as other specialized interest groups, in the sense of wanting to protect their own resources and to seek implementation of desired policies. The incentives of political leaders also change in different settings.

For the purposes of this analysis, policy involves the strategic use of tools by public officials to influence the behavior of private actors, to shape their incentives or disincentives so as to encourage actions that result in desired outcomes and to discourage the generation of negative externalities. Salamon (2002) and Weimer and Vining (2005) offer two influential systematic categorization schemes for policy instruments, but as yet no one has developed a consensus typology of policy instruments, perhaps because creative public officials continue to devise new and more complicated instruments. For our purposes, we can collapse all policy instruments into four broad areas: Legal Status, Regulatory, Financial, and Symbolic.

As shown in Table 2, public officials have access to a policy tools of all four types which are relevant to religion’s effects on public policy. The rows in Table 2 designate the characteristics used above to define a religion. For the column headings I use four generic categories of policy instruments, or policy tools, available to policy makers in diverse types of public bureaucracies. Entries in each cell specify examples of a generic type of policy tool (column) that are directly relevant to the aspect of religion denoted by that row.

Only those examples bolded in Table 2 are relevant to the case of the United States, but the sheer number of bolded entries should belie any presumption of an impermeable wall of separation between church and state. A much more convoluted pattern emerges, in which the boundaries between policy and religious activities shift as new organizations are established and new, more subtle policy tools are deployed. These categories of policy tools are worth discussing in further detail.
**Legal Status.** Public officials define the legal status of organizations and determine criteria for citizenship. The U.S. Constitution prohibits any religious test for public office, but in other contexts it is possible to require membership in a particular faith for anyone holding certain public offices. Voting rights may also be restricted by religion, in some settings. Any group seeking to establish a church or build a religious building may need to register with public officials, and may in some cases be denied the right to do so. In a common pattern of the legal stratification of religions, some faiths are allowed to operate publicly and to own property, whereas other religions are prevented from doing so and still others may be granted further rights, such as being able to run religious schools or to implement a separate legal system applicable only to the members of their faith.

**Regulatory Instruments.** Public officials are held responsible for public order and safety, and in pursuit of those responsibilities they may be authorized to restrict certain forms of behavior that might otherwise be required of the members of particular religious organizations. Exactly this rationale has been used to criminalize plural marriage or the ritual use of certain drugs, even though these practices are encouraged by a few religious traditions. With a few exceptions in the contemporary Islamic world, no government officials interfere in the resolution of disputes over religious doctrine. When members of a religious community dispute ownership of their shared property, however, the legal system may have to get involved. Also, religious organizations may be granted exemption from regulations that apply to all other forms of organization. For example, in the U.S. religious organizations have long had the right to require holders of certain purely religious positions to be members of their religious community. The extent to which these exemptions from non-discrimination hiring laws apply to FBOs using public funding to implement service programs remains in dispute, and is an important aspect of the faith-based initiative controversy (to be detailed below). Finally, those religious traditions allowed to operate their own schools may still be required to cover certain subjects in their curriculum.

**Financial instruments.** This is the area of most direct concern for the current analysis, because of the frequency with which public officials provide financial support for faith-based organizations specializing in particular areas of public service. This support typically come in the form of grants to or contracts with the FBO itself or as vouchers distributed to individual consumers. In addition, governments may exempt religious organizations from paying property tax and certain forms of sales tax, even though those organizations nonetheless enjoy the public goods financed by tax revenues, including national defense, police and fire protection, water, energy distribution and transportation systems, and legal guarantees of property rights. In the U.S. it has long been a standard practice to allow taxpayers to deduct donations to charitable organizations, including religious ones, from their taxable income, in the expectation that the activities of these organizations will reduce the overall load on services directly operated by
public officials. Finally, religious organizations with close connections to influential public figures may find themselves the recipient of patronage, earmarks or other targeted forms of public support.

**Symbolic Actions.** Since religion has a large impact on the culture of a society, it should not be surprising that powerful symbols lie at the heart of most controversies over church-state relations. Details of legal limits on public displays of religious material remain convoluted and in frequent flux, but the basic pattern is one of accommodation to majority sentiment, provided that connection does not too directly impinge on the sensitivities of members of minority religious groups (Davis 2001, Heclo 2003, Urofsky 2008). The extent of this sensitivity has dramatically changed over time. In the early years of the Republic, public schools routinely used the Protestant version of the Christian Bible as a standard textbook, but religion’s role in American political history is rarely even mentioned in today’s textbooks.

Each policy tool has a grey area, where boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable practices are being actively redrawn by processes of political contestation. Although many observers criticize the inconsistent record of Supreme Court decisions on the limits of state entanglement with religion, Sedler (2010) identifies a consistent logic through which the separation clause of the First Amendment has been wielded as an effective means to reinforce the clause guaranteeing freedom of religious expression. In the next section we turn to a specific example of religion policy in practice, which nicely illustrates the tensions inherent in these types of relationships.

**Evaluating the Faith-Based Initiative**

Although closely associated with former President George W. Bush, the origins of the faith-based initiative date back to the Clinton era, and this program has continued virtually unchanged during the initial years of the Obama presidency.

The basic contours of debate can be summarized quickly (CRS 2005, Wright 2009). It emerged as part of a response to widespread concerns that public welfare policies had the unintended effect of creating a culture of dependency which discouraged welfare recipients from actively seeking employment. Analysts argued that effective reform would require ramping up programs that helped instill a sense of personal responsibility among beneficiaries of those programs. The 1996 PROWA law included an amendment on charitable choice which encouraged more applications for public funding from religious-based organizations. The faith-based initiative was essentially an effort to accomplish this goal.

For some advocates it was a question of cost, since FBOs’ heavy reliance on volunteer labor made their programs potentially cheaper to operate than programs dependent on hiring service professionals. Others argued that in minority communities, especially among immigrants or urban African-Americans, religious leaders had a special connection to segments of the population with sound reasons for keeping their distance from public authorities. Thus, some faith-based organizations might be uniquely positioned to connect to especially needy groups.
However, for most advocates the critical factor was their presumption that religious programs are more effective in helping realize the personal transformation seen as the critical step in helping individuals wean themselves away from welfare dependency. Several potential reasons were proffered, with minimal supporting evidence, for this increased effectiveness. First, volunteers inspired by religious faith might tend to be more caring and less bureaucratic in the ways they related to the recipients of relief programs. Second, faith-based programs may tend to be more holistic, in the sense that workers inspired by certain kinds of religious beliefs will encourage participants to seek a through-going transformation of their personality, rather than seeing their problem in the purely instrumental terms common in programs designed by secular professionals. Allowing the service organization to retain symbols of religious faith in the physical setting or requiring participation in communal prayer or other religious rituals may make faith-based programs uniquely effective in achieving personal transformation.

For critics, however, incorporation of explicitly religious components into service programs threatened inappropriate entanglement of church and state (Lupu and Tuttle 2008). Over many decades, courts insisted that whereas programs with a primary secular purpose could be supported by public funding, such funds should not be available for the use of “pervasively sectarian institutions” such as congregations of particular faith traditions. Others saw this very distinction as part of the problem, in that public officials, when deciding which programs to fund, would shy away from any program with any hint of religious content. As a consequence of this supposed discrimination, the organizers of many faith-based organizations might not even bother applying for funding.

President Bush’s faith-based initiative was intended as a multi-pronged attack on this situation. Since he was unable to convince Congress to pass significant legislation in this area, he operated instead via executive order, establishing offices of “Faith-Based and Community Initiatives” in the White House and in several executive agencies. Many states and local governments followed suit (Sager 2010). These agencies were tasked with several missions, especially (1) eliminating bias against applications by service organizations with strong religious connections, (2) providing assistance in helping smaller FBOs develop the capacity to apply for public funding and to cope with the paperwork required in their implementation, and (3) clarifying that FBOs should be exempted from laws prohibiting labor discrimination in their hiring practices. This last stipulation has proven especially controversial. Advocates see it as essential, because otherwise FBOs might be required to hire workers whose beliefs or behaviors were incompatible with the tenets of the religious community that inspired that program, and their participation might undermine the unique capabilities of such programs. They also see it as a natural extension of existing exemptions given religious organizations for filling positions that are exclusively religious in nature (such as priests or preachers). For opponents it was discrimination, pure and simple, and thus not acceptable.

All this remained controversial under the Bush Administration, and yet the Obama team maintained the program in pretty much the same format, albeit under the new title “Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships.” Complaints about discrimination in hiring are to be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis, a position that was not consistent with promises made during the campaign.

It remains to be seen if exemptions from anti-discrimination laws will survive legal challenges now working their way through the system, but the overall record of this initiative is meager at best. Monsma (2004) provides an especially careful and damning comparative analysis of programs in a few selected communities. Among his conclusions are the findings that there remains little empirical evidence of significant differences between secular and religious programs, there have been no clearly documented cases of anti-religious bias in funding decisions, and that those FBOs which were capable of benefiting from increased public funding were already well-integrated into this policy network. He highlights the irony that effective faith-based programs may be able to expand only with increased public funding, but that such funding directly threatens to undermine the autonomy which was critical to their initial success.

The proportion of public funding awarded to FBOs may have increased slightly, but the overall level decreased even more substantially (GAO 2006). This has led critics to see it all as a smokescreen for off-loading responsibilities for public services to the private or voluntary sectors, or even as a misguided effort to attract African-American voters to the Republican party or to reward conservative evangelical Christians for their support (Kuo 2006). If designed as an effort to curry favor with African-American community leaders more inclined to consider religion as a key component of community development, and thus draw some of the African-American vote away from Democratic candidates, this program must be evaluated a dismal failure. Even some evangelical groups expressed grave concerns when FBOs from non-Christian religions received public funding under this program.

There are some indications that religious program components may help certain types of clients or participants to achieve more effective results than other programs (i.e., those who undergo some kind of personal transformation as they participate in that program), but there is no systematic evidence that these components would have the same effect for other clients, especially those actively resistant to that particular belief system. Nor is there evidence concerning the long-term sustainability of the few positive results that have been demonstrated.

This leaves us with the tentative conclusion that faith-based programs should be seen as parts of a broader system of service delivery, with different programs tailored to fit different client types.

**Normative Evaluations**

By now I trust the reader has been convinced that the extent to which FBOs play important policy roles differs dramatically across issue areas. Frankly, this meso-level perspective implies that the standard characterization of a “wall of separation” between church and state needs to be abandoned as a unifying metaphor. In some policy areas there are indeed secure barriers to interaction between religious and political organizations, especially those policy areas in which the uniquely faith-based concern for marginalized groups is simply not relevant. But in other policy areas the wall is at most a fence, across which neighbors can freely communicate, or a gate, which allows both sides easy egress to the other. In still other areas that gate opens onto a
well-worn path upon which residents from both sides tread as they gather together to address shared concerns. In a few policy areas of particular concern to religious adherents, the image of a path is too feeble to reflect the tight interconnections between religious and political organizations. In effect, bricks in the wall have been torn down to pave an expressway facilitating the routine transfer of diverse types of resources.

What may not yet be apparent is why we should care about these different patterns of religious-political interactions. Policy analysts have demonstrated that different consequences for society as a whole have been realized, depending on what kinds of actors are in charge of making and implementing policy in that area (Hill and Hupe 2009, Klijn and Skelcher 2007, Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). Granted, the role of religion per se has rarely been a matter of sustained concern among policy researchers, who have instead focused on what happens to the public interest when policy networks are dominated by a self-contained power elite, or by greedy business interests, or by recipients of political patronage who need to keep their bosses happy, or by technocratic experts who presume to know what is best for the public, without bothering to ask the people themselves.

Increased reliance on FBOs for the delivery of public services runs the risk of making that policy more responsive to the interests and preferences of those leaders who happen to be influential within their respective faith communities. Allowing FBOs to play essential roles in the formation and implementation of public policy could potentially serve to reinforce the hegemonic influence of that particular faith on society as a whole. On the other hand, other easily mobilized groups within the American pluralist system can effectively counter any effort to overtly impose Christianity, of whatever form, as the official religion. Elsewhere, effective counter-pressures may be absent.

Even so, the dangers of theocracy are less than often imagined, because all religious traditions encompass values that may be interpreted as supporting contrasting positions on most political controversies. Appleby (2000) argues that the political implications of any religious tradition are intrinsically ambiguous, because any religious tradition can be used either to pursue peace or to justify violence in pursuit of religion-inspired goals. With particular reference to sub-Saharan Africa, Longman (1998) demonstrates that religion can be used either to protect the powerful or to empower the weak, or even both at the same time. Because of these internal tensions, no contingent of FBOs could conceivably “capture” a vibrant policy network in quite the same way as in economic regulatory policy, where those ostensibly being regulated are often the ones who actually write those regulations, and do so in such a way as to protect themselves from the entry of new competitors.

Existing members of the policy network may benefit from increased FBO participation. Religious leaders may be able to tap into resources that are not available to secular organizations, even ones that are implementing virtually the same programs. Religious leaders may be effective liaisons between public officials and members of suspicious or marginalized communities, drawing upon a reservoir of trust to help policy entrepreneurs gain access to the very people they most want to help.
Faith-based components may prove especially useful when members of a policy network confront intractable problems. Religious faith can be a source of strength in times of trial, and may thus facilitate the persistence needed to face certain long-term dilemmas. Such persistence seems especially relevant to such matters as the slow rehabilitation of hardened criminals or the excruciatingly long process of reconciliation that may be required to convince former enemies that they can now live peacefully with each other (Smock 2002; Schirch 2005, Tutu 1999).

More generally, incorporation of FBOs within a policy network will insure that there will always be someone dissatisfied with the status quo, since no political program can fully satisfy anyone inspired by visions of perfect justice. Since there will always be pressure for reform, it may be less likely that a religion-infused policy network would remain mired in an unproductive state of stasis as conditions continue to worsen. The position of moral leadership enjoyed by religious leaders may greatly facilitate mobilization for costly programs of reform by drawing upon the deep emotions evoked by religious belief (Nadelmann 1990).

Including individuals with a strong reputation for high moral stature may help outside observers see the network as being more than just a creature of partisan politics or patronage. At the same time, this sense of increased legitimacy may help insure a degree of insulation from the close scrutiny of media and oversight agencies. One of the basic tenets of the policy network perspective is that many networks work best (at least in terms of more effectively realizing their own interests at the expense of society as a whole) if they are allowed to make their decisions and implement their preferred policies with minimal interference from the potentially pesky and fickle public.

Yet reliance on moral leadership of religious members of a policy network can backfire whenever an instance of fraud, waste or abuse involving those leaders is revealed and publicized. An incessant drumbeat for more reform can prove distracting, especially to those elements of the policy network perfectly content to sustain the status quo, with all of its attendant imperfections, into the indefinite future.

From the perspective of society as a whole, other considerations come into play. The first concern is that inefficient programs may continue to be funded, especially those FBO programs that can expect to receive funding from religious sources, whether or not they can demonstrate any practical success. A second concern is related, in that because of such reliance on religious donations, policy in this area may manifest misplaced priorities, since those public problems of more direct concern to religious donors are more likely to receive direct attention than other, perhaps equally important problems. This problem arises because, in effect, the agenda guiding policy response will be more responsive to donor interests than to the recommendations of experts. Third, incorporation of faith-based components into service programs necessarily imparts a sense of mystification into the whole process, to the extent that favorable policy responses are going to be attributed, at least in part, to factors which are by definition beyond scientific scrutiny.

A fourth problem is more practical and directly observable. Given the natural diversity of religious traditions in any modern society, it will prove impossible to incorporate, on anything
remotely resembling an equal basis, programs initiated by all religious traditions into policy networks. Instead, certain religious traditions are going to have their practices legitimated by their participation in policy implementation, while others will be excluded. Efforts can be undertaken to minimize tensions, but advocates of increased FBO participation must face up to the inevitability of introducing inequities in the ways different religious traditions are treated.

A fifth problem resides at the macro-level. Patterns of close interaction between agents of religious and political organizations in any one policy area may tend to diffuse over into adjacent policy areas. This type of diffusion would be expected to be especially important by those analysts who conceptualize the state as a broad configuration of interests and ideological understandings within which social interactions take place, with those interactions experiencing, whether directly observable or not, pressures to conform to the basic structure of interactions as legitimated in the overall state structure (Hall and Taylor 1996, Amenta et al. 2001). In short, increased FBO participation in any policy area may subtly enhance the influence over society of those religious traditions most directly involved in these particular policy programs.

On the positive side, FBOs are especially attracted to policy areas in which they can help to alleviate the pain and suffering felt by the most marginalized segments of any society. Rather than being just like other self-interested participants in a pluralistic system, many FBOs are motivated to look out for the interests of groups that would otherwise be ignored. By doing so, they fill a gap in the coverage of any policy network. In that sense, FBO participation may prove critical to assuring more equitable policy outcomes.

Even as faith-based organizations become more closely integrated into policy networks, their members will, to a great extent, still remain a world apart. Perhaps the most critical contribution of religion to governance is as a source of countervailing moral authority. In an influential critique of the widespread tendency among political analysts to misunderstand religion as a purely individual matter when religions are instead fundamentally communal in nature, Stephen Carter (1993) articulates the political implications of religion in a succinct and powerful manner.

Religions are in effect independent centers of power, with bona fide claims on the allegiance of their members, claims that exist alongside, are not identical to, and will sometimes trump the claims to obedience that the state makes. A religion speaks to its members in a voice different from that of the state, and when the voice moves the faithful to action, a religion may act as a counterweight to the authority of the state….A religion, in this picture, is not simply a means for understanding one's self, or even of contemplating the nature of the universe, or existence, or of anything else. A religion is, at its heart, a way of denying the authority of the rest of the world; it is a way of saying to fellow human beings and to the state those fellow humans have erected, "No, I will not accede to your will." (Carter 1993, 35, 41, italics in original)
Precisely because of its deep roots outside the standard realm of politics, religion can serve as a uniquely efficacious constraint on the excessive partisanship so characteristic of struggles for political power. In this way, religion takes its rightful place as a supporting pillar of the checks and balances essential for democratic governance (Carrese 2010). No matter what our own personal convictions may be, policy analysts have a professional responsibility to recognize and appreciate the unique contributions made by all types of governance institutions, including those shaped by religious faith and practice.

References


Table 1. Extent of Faith-Based Contributions in Selected Issue Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of FBO Component</th>
<th>Domestic Policy Networks in the U.S.</th>
<th>International or Global Policy Networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrated into Policy Networks</td>
<td>Health Care</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social policy (welfare)</td>
<td>Health Care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important but Mostly Separate Systems</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Missionary/Proselytism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media, Culture</td>
<td>Transnational Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized or Selective Roles</td>
<td>Civil Rights, Immigrants, Anti-poverty Rehabilitation (and job training)</td>
<td>Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td>Social Reconciliation (esp. local)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental Issues (“creation care”)</td>
<td>Mediation and diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Human Rights (religious rights, anti-trafficking )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Debt (Jubilee 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal to Non-Existent FBSO Contribution</td>
<td>Budgetary Issues</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military, Homeland Security Infrastructure</td>
<td>Global Commons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by Author.
### Table 1. Matching Policy Tools to the Core Components of a Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Components of a Religion:</th>
<th>Types of Policy Instruments:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beliefs and Doctrines</strong></td>
<td><strong>Legal Status</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Guarantee freedom of expression • Religious tests for public office or citizenship • May determine official doctrines</td>
<td>• Criminalize conversion • NA • Undermine or accommodate beliefs in public education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rituals</strong></td>
<td><strong>Regulatory</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• May mandate participation in religious ceremonies</td>
<td>• Restrictions based on public health, safety • NA • Incorporate prayer, rituals in public ceremonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sacred Texts, Symbols, Narratives</strong></td>
<td><strong>Financial</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• May select texts or symbols</td>
<td>• Exemptions from sales tax for religious books • NA • Incorporate symbols in public discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sacred Places, Persons</strong></td>
<td><strong>Symbolic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protected areas, spaces</td>
<td>• Historical preservation • NA • Hate crime laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Codes of Conduct and Normative Prescriptions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Specialized Organizations and Processes for Making Collective Decisions and Selecting Leaders</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Aspects may be enshrined in legal codes</td>
<td>• Criminalize practices (e.g., polygamy) • Encourage or subsidize certain actions • NA • Reward lobbying for policy change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialized Organizations and Processes for Interactions with Outsiders</strong></td>
<td><strong>Grant exemptions from zoning laws, environmental or labor regulations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Registration for legal recognition, property rights • Stratification of legal status (separate legal systems, etc.) • Select religious leaders • Autonomy for internal affairs</td>
<td>**Deliver public goods (fire, police) • Tax deductions for contributions • May collect taxes, pay salaries • Reinforce or undermine “wall of separation” between church and state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialized Organizations and Processes for Interactions with Outsiders</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tax deductions for contributions • Public funding for schools, programs • Earmarked funding</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Registration may be required for operations</td>
<td><strong>Encourage or discourage political alliances with religious leaders</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Networks and Identification with a Trans-generational Community</strong></td>
<td><strong>Regulate operations of service programs • Prohibit some cults • Criminalize proselytism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Allow religious schools • Protect right of assembly</td>
<td><strong>Subsidize religious schools, programs • Prohibit display of symbols</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Complied by Author. Only those examples listed in bold are relevant to the U.S. case. NA means Not Applicable.